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Abstract 
Much commentary and analysis conceives of a generic Chinese ‘state sector’ which is 
stubbornly inefficient and, sometimes simultaneously, the central pillar of an assertive ‘state 
capitalism’. This thesis argues that the nature and performance of state ownership varies across 
the Chinese economy in ways that can’t be reduced to homogenous ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ sectors. 
The introductory chapter recalls China’s transition from a planned industrial state monopoly to a 
mixed economy in which non-state firms dominate state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) share of 
activity in competitive sectors.  
Chapter 2 argues for SOE performance to be assessed according to the sector in which it 
operates, and the state owner’s objectives therein. Where an SOEs is operating in market that 
depart from conditions of perfect competition, or when the state owner’s objectives encompass 
broader policy goals, the maximisation of profits may not be a good benchmark for an SOE’s 
contribution to the economy, or social welfare more broadly. 
Chapter 3 surveys the sectoral distribution of state ownership and reveals the diversity of 
state owners. Projecting from current fixed-asset investment shares, it shows that China’s share 
of state ownership in aggregate is approaching levels similar to OECD mixed economies such 
as the Netherlands or Sweden. While China’s largest corporate conglomerates tend to be 
controlled by the central government, these prominent ‘national champions’ are not 
representative of state ownership more broadly. Ownership rights over most of China’s 160,000 
SOEs are exercised directly by hundreds of state owners, including at the local level, or 
indirectly, by other SOEs.  
Chapter 4 tests the extent of state monopoly within China’s vast array of industrial sectors. 
Monopoly is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration in 
521 industrial subsectors using enterprise-level data. To account for the SOE conglomerates 
observed in the previous chapter, a novel adjustment is made to group SOE observations 
according to their administrative relationship (lishu guanxi). These estimates confirm that large 
central state monopolies remain in oil (a strategic resource), electricity (a network utility) and 
tobacco (an administrative monopoly). By contrast, Chinese manufacturing subsectors are 
mostly unconcentrated, with ownership weighted toward private companies and local SOEs. 
Chapter 5 compares SOE and non-SOE profit per unit of fixed assets (profitability) within 
manufacturing, based on regression analysis of enterprise-level data pooled from 2011–2013. 
While smaller SOEs match non-SOE profitability, profitability of the largest SOEs is one-third 
lower than large non-SOEs. Because of their sheer size, this drags down the aggregate 
profitability of SOE manufacturing. SOEs also pay out a higher-than-expected share of value 
added in wages and taxes – further evidence of SOEs’ deviation from profit maximisation, even 
under competitive market conditions. This likely reflects the different distributional objectives 
between state and non-state owners. 
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The thesis argues that SOEs’ broader contribution to GDP can be better illuminated using a 
value-added measure rather than profits alone. Poor performance on the value-added measure is 
limited to certain subsectors (most importantly, steel pressing). 
The thesis concludes with implications for China’s ongoing reforms and suggestions to 
guide future research. 
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Chapter 1: State ownership and market 
efficiency 
We must unswervingly consolidate and develop the public economy, 
persist in the dominant position of public ownership, give full play to 
the leading role of the state-owned sector, and continuously increase 
its vitality, controlling force and influence. 
… 
We must actively and in an orderly manner promote market-oriented 
reform in width and in depth, greatly reducing the government's role 
in the direct allocation of resources, and promote resources allocation 
according to market rules, market prices and market competition, so 
as to maximize the benefits and optimize the efficiency.  
 
Excerpts from: Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening the Reform (the Decision), Adopted at the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on November 12, 2013 
 
The Communist Party of China (the Party) recommitted itself in its 2013 Decision to ‘hold 
the direction of reform towards the socialist market economy’. The ‘socialist market economy’, 
which had been officially adopted in 1993 (Zeng, 2012) contains two limbs. The ‘socialist’ limb 
is reflected by the Decision’s commitment to consolidating the ‘dominant position of public 
ownership’. The ‘market’ limb is reflected in the commitment to promote the market’s role in 
resource allocation in the name of efficiency. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) is an entity that 
spans these two limbs. The SOE is ultimately owned by society (socialist), but unlike ministries 
or state agencies that produce public goods or services, it operates in a market context. 
Foreign economists’ accounts of China’s sustained economic growth since 1978 emphasise 
the role of the market. Naughton’s account of China’s economy ‘growing out of the plan’ (1996) 
and Lardy’s ‘Markets over Mao’ (2014) stress the role of the private sector in driving economic 
growth. By assumption the default producer in the neoclassical model is a private, profit-
maximising firm. State intervention is an exception that is permitted in the case of market 
failure. SOEs are one direct instrument for public intervention. SOEs are found even in market 
economies (OECD, 2014), but they are the exception rather than the default.  
In China it is state ownership rather than private ownership that is the historical default. 
The transition to a ‘socialist market economy’ began from an industrial economy that was 
almost exclusively state owned. Reform and opening up allowed private and foreign enterprises 
to compete in those areas where competition contribute to the Party’s desired economic and 
social outcomes.  
12 
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SOEs’ reputation for efficiency is poor. In classical socialist economies, SOEs were 
political animals, with a ‘soft budget constraint’ (Kornai, 1986, 1992) that insulated them from 
the need to pursue profit or efficiency. Economic policymakers in United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia arguably share an ‘ideological preference for the private sector’ 
(Quiggin, 1999). These economists, trained in neoclassical economic models, public ownership 
is immediately associated with inefficiency. At (second) best, SOEs may be tolerated to remedy 
some market failure elsewhere. When, in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the Obama 
administration effectively nationalised Chrysler and General Motors, this was a source of 
embarrassment for the administration’s economists, who were relieved when the intervention 
worked.1  
By contrast in China, the Party’s commitment to state ownership is unabashed. General 
Secretary Xi Jinping frequently stresses the importance SOEs ‘becoming stronger, doing better, 
and growing bigger’ (Xinhua, 2017). Some of China’s SOEs are indeed growing bigger. 
Between 2005 and 2014, the number of Chinese SOEs included on the Global Fortune 500 
increased from 14 to 76 (Kwiatkowski & Augustynowicz 2015). By 2015, the 113 SOEs 
administered by China’s central government, had, between them, established 8,515 branches in 
150 countries and were then responsible for 70 per cent of China’s overseas direct investment 
(Xinhua 2015). 
Such differences in history and ideology create a situation where Chinese SOEs are 
frequently misunderstood and often subject to ideological suspicion. In describing China’s 
economic model as one of ‘state capitalism’,2 Bremmer asks whether this spells ‘the end of the 
free market?’ – hopefully not, he concludes, if the United States continues to ‘leading by 
example in promoting free trade, foreign investment, transparency and open markets’ (2009, p. 
55). More recently, the Trump administration in the United States (US) sees state ownership in 
China as evidence of a ‘state-led, trade-disruptive economic model’ that it claims is 
fundamentally incompatible with the commitment to ‘open, market-oriented policies’ on which 
the US claims that membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is predicated (United 
States Government, 2018).   
Yet the ideological objections to state ownership are rarely grounded in thorough, 
contemporary empirical analysis. Critics conceive of a large generic ‘state sector’ without 
distinguishing between the legitimate sector-specific roles that SOEs may play, particularly in 
those sectors in which free market competition is not sufficient to maximise social welfare. 
                                                     
1 ‘no one involved in the decision to rescue and restructure General Motors and Chrysler ever wanted to 
be in the position of bailing out failed companies or having the government own a majority stake in a 
major private company. We are both thrilled and relieved with the result: the automakers got back on  
their feet, which helped the recovery of the US economy.’ (Goolsbee and Krueger, 2015, p. 22) 
2 McNally (2012, p. 744) proposes an alternative ‘Sino-capitalist’ model that combines ‘top-down state 
development with bottom-up entrepreneurial private capital accumulation’. 
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SOEs’ monopoly position is often asserted – and used to explain both high3 and low4 SOE 
profits. This thesis attempts to inform the broader debate by setting aside normative ideological 
questions, and instead providing a positivist account of the diverse and fragmented nature of 
state ownership in contemporary China. It considers the nature of SOEs in different sectors, 
before considering how to judge their performance.  
1.1 Key questions for this thesis 
To illustrate the poor performance of SOEs, scholars present Figure 1-1. It shows that the 
return on assets for SOEs in China’s industrial sector is persistently lower relative to non-SOEs. 
Low profitability is evidence of allocative inefficiency in capital. As Lardy argues, ‘there is a 
substantial misallocation of capital, which, if corrected, would allow China to sustain relatively 
rapid economic growth with a smaller share of resources devoted to investment’ (2014, p. 125).  
Figure 1-1 Return on assets by ownership in industrial sector (1993-2015) 
 
Note Return on assets = profits before income tax divided by total assets. State-owned and 
state-holding companies, according to the concept to be defined in section 1.3 
Source National Bureau of Statistics various years, adapted and updated from Lardy (2014, p. 
98, 2016, p. 43, 2018, p. 332), Naughton (2017, fig. 3) and Song (2018, p. 355). 
 
                                                     
3 ‘SOEs have been retreating from some of the more competitive industries but remain concentrated in 
other industries with a state monopoly … The associated monopoly position arguably gives these SOEs 
competition advantage over private enterprises. Profits of SOEs continued to rise (they increased by 9.8% 
in 2009).’ (World Trade Organization, 2010, pp. 55–56) 
4 ‘despite the controlling status enjoyed by some SOEs in China’s economy – largely due to their 
monopolistic market positions and barriers for private sector competitors – inefficiency and 
mismanagement of assets run rife’ (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2016, p.94). 
14 
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This figure raises five related sets of questions,5 which are used to structure this thesis. 
These questions relate to recognising changes to SOEs over time, the competitive conditions 
under which profit is most appropriate as a performance measure, the distribution of SOEs 
across the Chinese economy, the nature of market competition within industry, and finally the 
profitability of different SOEs within competitive parts of Chinese industry. 
The first set of questions relates to comparisons of SOE performance across time. How has 
the role of the state in the economy changed during the reforms of a planned economy to a 
‘socialist market economy’, and the opening up of China from a closed economy in 1978 to a 
globalised economy marked by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001? Having commenced life 
in the planned economy as urban work units integrated within the state apparatus, what is the 
modern definition of ‘SOE’ and how does the state owner exercise its ownership rights? These 
are the questions to be explored in the remainder of this introductory chapter.  
The second set of questions relates to the suitability of profit-based measures (such as 
return on assets) as a measure of SOE performance. A standard result of producer theory under 
assumptions of perfect competition is that profit-maximising behaviour of perfectly competitive 
firms leads to socially efficient outcomes. A corollary of this is that a departure from profit 
maximisation implies inefficiency.  But what about sectors where profits are higher because of 
monopoly, natural resource rents, or the inherent uncertainty of economic development?  And 
what if the state owner values social, political and developmental objectives beyond profit 
(Naughton, 2018, p. 378)? Of course, there may be inefficiency still from the state owner’s 
failure to monitor its operations and the possibility that SOEs are used for the benefit of insiders 
rather than state. These questions are considered in Chapter 2.  
Given the potential difference in objectives between different sectors, it is necessary 
consider the importance of state ownership in different sectors of the Chinese economy. After 
four decades of reform and opening up, where do SOEs remain dominant, and where has state 
ownership been replaced by private competitors? While the largest Chinese SOEs in electricity, 
oil, telecommunications and transport have achieved global prominence, to what extent are they 
representative of SOEs in general? How is state capital actually distributed amongst different 
state owners, and across different sectors? Are the sprawling corporate conglomerates that are 
characteristic of China’s largest SOEs representative of SOEs in general? These empirical 
questions explored in Chapter 3 are important to judge how significant SOEs actually are in 
Chinese industry, and how representative industrial SOEs are of state ownership in general. 
If profit is to be interpreted as a measure of return on capital (neither augmented by the 
existence of monopoly rents, nor dissipated by the pursuit of broader policy objectives), then a 
                                                     
5 Lardy and Naughton both presented variations of this figure at the 2018 China Update held at the 
Australian National University on 20 July 2018. Professor Justin Lin questioned this figure, suggesting it 
was comparing apples and bananas. 
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comparison of profits between SOEs and non-SOEs is most meaningful in those sectors in 
which forms of ownership compete directly. Given this, it is necessary to identify not just those 
sectors in which SOEs remain dominant, but also the nature of market competition in those 
sectors.  To what extent is Chinese industry competitive?  The extent of market competition has 
previously been estimated in individual mining, manufacturing and utilities subsectors, drawing 
from China’s National Bureau of Statistics’ (NBS) Survey of Above-Scale Industrial enterprises. 
But to what extent does this understate the level of market concentration, given that 
economically-related members of the same large SOE conglomerates appear in the survey as 
legally-distinct survey respondents? Do SOEs in concentrated industries in fact seek to parlay 
market concentration into higher profits, as would a profit maximising firm?  These questions 
are explored in Chapter 4. 
Focusing just on competitive manufacturing sectors, how do SOEs then perform on a 
direct profit comparison?  Does the large gap between SOE and non-SOE aggregate profitability 
still hold at the firm level, and after using regression analysis to control for otherwise 
confounding sectoral and regional fixed effects?  Does the profitability gap hold for small SOEs 
under the most competitive conditions? Do “bigger” SOEs have better or worse performance, 
and does this dominate the overall results? Given the potentially broader interests of a state 
owner compared to a private owner, is there any evidence of ‘missing’ SOE profits being 
captured in a broader measure of value added that accounts also for wages and taxes? And to 
what extent is poor SOE performance as measured in this way a sector-specific phenomenon? 
These are empirical questions that are considered in Chapter 5, using the 2011-2013 waves of 
the Above-Scale Industrial Enterprise survey. 
Following the empirical observations in the preceding chapter, the final chapter offers 
some concluding remarks on the original question – what is the nature and performance of 
SOEs in China’s economy today?  What does this imply for future reform or the study of the 
Chinese economy? 
1.2 A brief history of China’s state-owned enterprises6 
China’s modern SOEs emerged from a dynamic historical process that began with the 
deliberate monopolisation of industry by the State. This section provides a brief account of the 
pre-reform conditions of the Chinese economy, in which the state monopolised the industrial 
sector as an explicit development policy. It then briefly outlines how SOEs emerged from the 
                                                     
6 This section is derived in part from Hubbard and Williams (2017), copyright Inderscience Publishers: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJPP.2017.10006452. The published paper was co-authored by the author with 
Patrick Williams, whose contribution focused on the history and evolution of Chinese policy toward 
SOEs. For a more expansive history of SOEs, readers are referred to Garnaut, Song, Tenev and Yao 
(2005), Lardy (1998, chap. 2, 2014, chap. 2), Lin (2012, chap. 5), Naughton (2007b, chap. 13) and Wu 
(2005, chap. 4). 
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work units of the central plan, and how in many sectors the emergence of non-state firms 
created competition for state enterprises. The purpose is to understand the historical context in 
which today’s SOEs emerged and explain why state ownership is the default ownership mode in 
sectors with less competition.  
1.2.1 A planned industrial state monopoly economy (1949–1978) 
Prior to the successful Communist Revolution in 1949, China’s Nationalist regime had 
governed China according to a ‘controlled economy’ policy. This entailed state ownership and 
control of large-scale investment in important industries such as finance, mining and electricity 
(Paauw, 1957, p. 216). Although China was an agricultural economy, poorer on a per capita 
basis than most other parts of Asia or Africa (Maddison, 2013), the Nationalist government had 
developed a few industrialised urban centres (Tamura, Menton and Cohen, 1997). It controlled 
the flow of credit through four government banks, and government shareholdings in the 
otherwise ostensibly private banking system (Paauw, 1957, p. 218). It also controlled, either 
directly or through its officials, one third of industrial production in the Republic of China 
(Chen, 1996, pp. 26–27). The conclusion of the Second World War resulted in the confiscation 
and nationalisation of property previously owned by the Japanese and their collaborators, 
pushing the state share of industrial capital to almost two thirds by the late 1940s (Naughton, 
2007b, p. 49). 
At the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new Communist 
government assumed control of those enterprises previously owned by the Nationalists 
(Naughton, 2007b, p. 49). Some of today’s central SOEs relating to railway signals, engineering 
and construction can trace their origins loosely to this period. The forerunners of China 
Minmetals Corporation,7 the China National Salt Industry Corporation and the China National 
Silk Import and Export Corporation were also established prior to the Communist revolution 
(SASAC, 2016, p. 305,469,617).  
The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1848) was explicit in its policy toward 
private property: 
You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in 
your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-
tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-
existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. … 
In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. 
Precisely so; that is just what we intend.  
 
                                                     
7 Established in 1950 as China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation and renamed in 
2004 (Huang and Zhu, 2016, pp. 76–77). 
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Yet China’s Communist Party did not immediately attempt to abolish it. Given China’s 
immediate challenges, Party Chairman Mao Zedong regarded foreign imperialists to be a greater 
threat than domestic capitalists (Wu, 2005, p. 31). So capitalists were briefly co-opted and 
sheltered from foreign competition (Naughton, 2007b, pp. 66–67; Lin, 2012, pp. 78–79). The 
1952 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China still recognised the rights to inherit and use 
private property, subject to the public interest (National People’s Congress, 1954). Complete 
nationalisation was not expected to come for another fifteen years (Wu, 2005, p. 32) 
But China’s entry into the Korean War in October 1950, against what it perceived as the 
imperialist threat of the United States (Hao and Zhai, 1990), demanded a faster pace of 
industrialisation (Wu, 2005, pp. 32–33,35; Naughton, 2007b, p. 64). Many newly independent 
countries in the decades following the Second World War sought to establish an industrial base 
through the rapid accumulation of physical capital (Felix, 1989; Lin, 2012, p. 104). The Soviet 
Union provided the model for China (Ishikawa, 1983; Lin, 2012, p. 70). Following this 
economic model, and backed by Soviet expertise, China established its State Planning 
Commission in 1952 and launched the first five-year plan in 1953. The Plan channelled 
resources to almost 150 new state enterprises (Lieberthal, 1995, p. 93), some of which, such as 
China First Heavy Industries and Harbin Electric Corporation, survive today as central SOEs 
(SASAC, 2016, pp. 208, 222). Private finance was abolished, and pre-existing financial 
institutions were amalgamated into the People’s Bank of China, which, from 1953 until 1978, 
was a ‘mono-bank’, performing the basic function of keeping the financial accounts of the 
economic plan (Lardy, 1998, p. 61; Wu, 2005, p. 218; Naughton, 2007b, pp. 454–455).  
The Plan attempted major changes to China’s industrial structure – yet its initial practical 
success was overtaken by ideology (Naughton, 2007b, pp. 69–71). In a 1958 report later praised 
by Mao, the Minister of Metallurgical Industry estimated that China’s steel production could 
catch up with Britain’s within ten years, and the US’ ten years after that (Shen and Xia, 2011, p. 
864). This was from an almost negligible base, in 1949, of less than one megaton (Feng, 1995, p. 
220). With Soviet assistance, steel production had already reached five megatons by 1958 and 
almost 19 megatons in 1960, but production collapsed back to less than nine megatons in 1961 
(Feng, 1995, p. 220) as the Great Leap Forward ended in a catastrophic famine (Naughton, 
2007b, pp. 70–72; Lardy, 2014, p. 39).  
The heavy industry push had defied the comparative advantage of China’s agrarian and 
labour-dense economy (Lin, 2012, p. 104). Nine out of ten Chinese still lived as rural peasants 
on millions of smallholding farms. These farms, which for centuries had been owned either by 
families or petty landlords, were collectivised on a largely ‘voluntary’ basis into 753,000 
cooperatives by 1957. After 1958 they were consolidated into 24,000 communes (Lin, 1990, p. 
1234; Wu, 2005, p. 34). State policy was explicitly designed to channel resources from rural 
agriculture to urban industry (Naughton, 2007b, p. 115).  
18 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
Suppression of market prices was one method of controlling the flow of resources to 
preferred beneficiaries under the plan (Lin, 2012, pp. 76–78; Lardy, 2014, p. 12). The state 
acted as a single buyer in agricultural markets, which allowed it to depress prices for rural areas, 
and transfer the surplus to urban units (Stone, 1988). High state-industry profits that resulted 
from distorted prices, rather than taxes, formed the bulk of the state’s budget revenue, which 
was largely re-invested back into industry (Naughton, 2007b, p. 60). This required formal 
division of rural peasants and urban workers into work units (danwei) (Lieberthal, 1995, pp. 
108–109). These are the forerunners of China’s modern SOEs.  
The work unit defined not just the production possibilities of the industrial economy, but 
also the consumption choices, social services from birth to death, social identities and political 
engagement of urban Chinese (Koppell, 2007, p. 258; Naughton, 2007b, p. 117). The 
management of the work unit was appointed by the state, and tasked with fulfilling the 
obligations of the Plan (Au, 2011, p. 465). Employees’ representative meetings were also 
created to allow the exercise of ‘enterprise democracy’ (Hua, Miesing and Li, 2006, p. 417). 
Workers received exhortation rather than material incentives to work harder (Naughton, 2007b, 
p. 69).  
The Plan was not monolithic (Naughton, 2007b, p. 66). China’s geographic size, large 
population, low industrialisation, and weak central administrative capacity meant the layout of 
industry and its administration could not be centralised as completely as in smaller Communist 
countries. Regions were divided into relatively self-sufficient economic units (Donnithorne, 
1972; Qian and Xu, 1993, p. 544). The provincial administrative level would control larger-
scale enterprises, such as those engaged in steel production (Lin, 2012, pp. 174–175). The 
county government below it controlled the enterprises assigned (for example, the finance bureau 
and textile industry), and oversaw township governments within its territory.  
Execution of the plan prioritised politics over efficiency. Officials appointed managers to 
work units, assigned labour and administered cash flows. Managers within the work unit had no 
say over investment, production, procurement, recruitment or marketing (Lin, 2012, p. 80). 
While there was no need to engage with the market, an astute manager could negotiate 
bureaucratically to access scarce resources (Naughton, 1992a; Wu, 2005, pp. 141–142). The 
reliance on political favours and organisational discipline to induce effort removed incentives to 
reduce waste or seek to improve production methods (Kornai, 1992, pp. 121–127). Combined 
with the impossibility of bankruptcy, this created the ‘soft budget constraint syndrome’ that was 
a worldwide feature of the socialist economic system as coined and extensively described by 
Kornai (1986, 1992; 2003). 
To ameliorate some of these problems, various schemes of administrative decentralisation 
were adopted throughout the 1960s and 1970s to shift responsibility for planning and production 
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to lower administrative levels (Wu, 2005, p. 53). But this generated new problems which 
triggered periodic recentralisation (Lin, 2012, p. 175). There was no room for experiments with 
private ownership. The 1975 revision to the Constitution removed recognition of private 
property and declared the inviolability of ‘[s]ocialist public property’ (National People’s 
Congress, 1975).  
The monopolisation of Chinese industry by the state, and the forced transfer of resources 
from rural agriculture to urban work units was successful, in its own terms, at diverting 
resources to industry (Lin, 2012, pp. 82–85). Figure 1-2 shows that from the beginning of 
statistical collection in 1952 until the beginning of China’s economic reforms in 1978, the 
industrial share of GDP more than doubled, and that most of this came from state units. Non-
state production in the 1970s did not refer to ‘private’ firms, but referred to those collectively 
owned firms under the jurisdiction of local governments (Lardy, 2014, p. 11) or the People’s 
Liberation Army. 
Figure 1-2 Industry and state industry shares of GDP (1952–1978) 
 
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS (1999, secs 3–2, 13–3). 
1.2.2 Enterprise reform and opening up to non-state 
competition (1978–present) 
Despite the growing importance of industry in the economy, national income growth fell 
short of the economic progress being made elsewhere in Asia (Naughton, 2007b, p. 59). The 
average per capita growth rate from the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 to the 
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death of Party Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976 was just 2.5 per cent per year. China lagged well 
behind the faster growing economies in East Asia (Lin, 2012, p. 153). Average income in 1976 
was 13 times higher than China’s in Japan, more than four times higher in South Korea and 
Taiwan, and two and a half times higher in the Philippines (Lin, 2012, p. 154; Maddison, 2013). 
The ascension of Deng Xiaoping as China’s paramount leader after the death of Mao in 
1976 allowed for the relaxation of ideological control, and the pursuit of a more pragmatic 
economic policy (Naughton, 2007b, p. 79; Vogel, 2011, pp. 387–388; Lin, 2012, p. 153). The 
1978 Constitution (National People’s Congress, 1978) restated the 1975 provisions with respect 
to property, but the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978 launched a 
three year program of economic ‘readjustment’ designed to boost the production of agricultural 
and consumer goods, and overcome bottlenecks in transport and industry (George, Gullo and 
Stein, 1981). The introduction of the household responsibility system, beginning in 1978 as a 
local experiment in Xiaogang village, Anhui province, had by 1984 effectively reversed the 
1950s’ collectivisation of agriculture (Lieberthal, 1995, pp. 147–148; Lin, 2012, pp. 155–160).  
In the industrial sector, the focus was on improving the efficiency of work units. A policy 
of opening up enabled China to seek foreign technical assistance in bringing modern production 
technology to mainland China (Zheng, 1980). The flagship project for this was the Baoshan 
steel plant, a project that was initiated on 23 December 1978 (SASAC, 2016, p. 238) and built 
in the 1980s under the auspices of the central government with assistance from Japan’s Nippon 
Steel (Hogan, 1999, p. 4). The focus on quality steel using the new milling technology required 
the construction of a new harbour to facilitate the import of high-grade iron ore from Australia 
and Brazil (Zheng, 1980; Tcha and Wright, 1999). It remained China’s largest and most modern 
steel plant until the 1990s.8  
Managers in work units began to receive some autonomy from plan directives. The 
readjustment plan limited the mandatory elements of the plan to fewer economic variables, 
recasting other items as projected targets instead (Ishikawa, 1983, p. 653). After meeting the 
plan targets, some work units were allowed to produce and market goods according to market 
demand and retain some of the profits for welfare expenses, bonuses and technical 
improvements. This was authorised on an experimental basis in October 1978 (Wu, 2005, p. 60). 
By the end of 1980 almost six thousand work units were participating, retaining around ten per 
cent of profits (Aram and Wang, 1991, p. 32). This was the first step in creating stand-alone 
‘enterprises’ that were separate from the state bureaucracy. 
                                                     
8 By 2015, Baosteel had become the fifth largest producer of steel in the world by tonnage (World Steel 
Association 2015b). Although it is the largest steel producing central SOE, steel remained primarily a 
provincial concern. China’s largest steel producer (and 43rd largest company by revenue in 2013, see 
Table 3-6), Hesteel Group, remains under the jurisdiction of Hebei Province (2017). 
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Increased managerial autonomy was to be incentivised with a ‘managerial responsibility 
system’ that began to realign managerial behaviour away from plan fulfilment toward 
profitability (Naughton, 2007b, p. 95; Lin, 2012, p. 177). At the start of the reform period the 
secretary of the work unit’s party committee exercised almost complete control over production 
decisions as well as political affairs of the enterprise. With the work unit now expected to 
respond both to market and state demands, provisional regulations were promulgated in 1982 to 
create a division of labour between the party secretary, who would specialise in political affairs, 
and the factory manager, who would make the day to day production decisions. The system was 
trialled in six cities from May 1984 and applied universally in 1986 (Chamberlain, 1987; Lee, 
1990). This encouraged managers to seek above-target growth, indirectly increasing revenue for 
the state.  
Through these reforms the work unit, which had been integral part of state administration, 
had begun its evolution into a separate enterprise, marked by an ownership relation with the 
state. This was most easily done by the wholesale conversion of industrial bureaux, and 
sometimes entire state ministries, into SOEs. For example, the China National Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec) was created in 1983 from the Ministry of the Petrochemical Industry, 
which had monopolised downstream oil production. Its twin, the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (PetroChina) was likewise established in 1988 from the Ministry of the Petroleum 
Industry – which had monopolised upstream domestic production (Wu, 2005, pp. 156–157).  
These gradual but dramatic changes in the Chinese economy were encapsulated by the 
term ‘growing out of the Plan’ (Naughton, 1996, p. 93). First in agriculture and then in industry, 
non-state production began to re-emerge with the relaxation of bans on private enterprise (Wu, 
2005, pp. 181–186). State industry began to be ‘de-monopolised’ as the state ceased enforcing 
the strict discipline of the plan (Naughton, 1992b, p. 14). Limited private property rights began 
to re-emerge (Putterman, 1995, pp. 1051–1052), with the right ‘to own lawfully earned income, 
savings, houses and other lawful property’ and to inherit property re-recognised by the 1982 
Constitution (National People’s Congress, 1982).  
New entrants were not part of the state monopoly, but nor were they strictly ‘private’. 
Entrepreneurship occurred in collective ‘township and village enterprises’ (TVEs). These TVEs 
were local factories (Naughton, 2007b, p. 90) registered as collectives or cooperatives. But 
many were de facto private enterprises that were effectively owned or leased by private 
entrepreneurs. They wore a ‘red hat’ in order to receive the backing of local government 
officials and to escape the political harassment still associated with private enterprise (Garnaut 
and Song, 2004). It was not until 1998 that the ‘red hatted’ TVEs were finally ordered to 
privatise (Garnaut and Song, 2004; Naughton, 2007b, p. 287). 
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Unlike the urban work units, new non-state entrants were freed from the ‘policy burdens’ 
of providing education, housing, healthcare, pensions and other living allowances to current and 
retired workers (Lin and Tan, 1999, p. 429). With the advantage of being able to employ wage 
labour rather than provide jobs for life, they proved to be more nimble profit seekers in the 
market environment. They recruited cheap rural labour (Lardy, 2014, p. 17) and chased profits 
in those sectors where the cost of entry was lowest (Naughton, 2007b, p. 276). 
Some SOEs had countervailing advantages. During the 1980s a ‘dual track’ pricing system 
was implemented with ‘plan prices’ and ‘market prices’ running in tandem. This created 
opportunities for arbitrage and corruption for those SOEs that could buy at the typically lower 
plan price and sell at the market price (Wu, 2005, pp. 68–71; Naughton, 2007b, pp. 91–92). By 
the early 2000s these opportunities dissipated as almost all product-market prices became 
competitively determined (Lardy, 2014, pp. 13–14).  
A ‘dual track’ for pricing capital between SOEs and non-SOEs has also existed since 1983 
when fiscal appropriations were replaced by bank loans as the primary source of capital for 
SOEs (Lin, 2012, p. 193; Lardy, 2014, pp. 21–22). Non-SOEs needed to depend either on 
investment of their retained earnings, or seek access to credit through informal markets at much 
higher rates (Lau et al. 2000). Some began to raise capital outside the state banking system. In 
September 1984, the Tianqiao Department Store Company of Beijing was the first new 
enterprise to raise money by issuing debt stock outside the state banking system (Mookerjee and 
Yu, 1995, p. 24). The state began to mimic some of the corporate forms of the non-state sector. 
In 1986 a small group of state enterprises were given permission to issue stock, following the 
example of Tianqiao. Although stocks had been traded unofficially and in regulated over-the-
counter markets, the official Shanghai Security Exchange began operation in December 1990, 
followed by the Shenzhen Securities Exchange in 1991 (Mookerjee and Yu, 1995, p. 24).  
The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee meeting in November 1993 
declared the establishment of a ‘socialist market economy’ (Zeng, 2012). One of its key 
decisions was broadly to adopt the corporate model for the state economy, completing the 
transition of work units from part of the government administration into stand-alone enterprises 
that were connected to the state via a property relationship (Xi, 2005, p. 95). The state-owned 
enterprise was born. 
Those SOEs in sectors facing private competitors began losing the state money (Naughton, 
2007b, pp. 105–106). Almost three quarters of local SOEs were loss making by 1995, compared 
to around a quarter of central SOEs (Garnaut, Song and Yao, 2006, p. 38). Faced with this 
problem, the central government adopted a policy in 1995 of ‘keeping the large and letting the 
small go’, proving permission for the closure or privatisation of loss-making SOEs and 
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retrenchment of state employees (Wu, 2005, pp. 192–194; Naughton, 2007b, pp. 301–302; 
Zhang and Freestone, 2013; Lardy, 2014, p. 18).  
Over the first two decades of the reform program, the Chinese government provided direct 
budget subsidies to maintain the viability of loss-making SOEs (Bhala, 2000). But China’s 
aspiration to join the WTO meant aligning to external standards and driving competition by 
exposing Chinese producers to world prices (Naughton, 2007b, pp. 104–105). The WTO’s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibited direct subsidies to promote 
exports or favour domestic goods, whether provided by the direct transfer of funds or through 
tax credits. Explicit undertakings to remove subsidies, including budget support to unprofitable 
SOEs, was a further condition of China’s accession protocol that was concluded during bilateral 
negotiations with the US in 1999 that finally opened the way for China’s WTO accession 
(World Trade Organization, 2001; Bajona and Chu, 2010).  
But the protocol did not require the removal of indirect subsidies provided through soft 
loans in the banking system. The use of subsidised bank credit to provide ongoing financial 
support to SOEs remains a widely noted feature of the Chinese economic system. Based on Liu 
and Zhou’s (2011, p. 60) estimates of the real interest rate9 of above-scale industrial firms from 
2001-2007, the Unirule Institute of Economics (2011, p. 46; Haley and Haley, 2013, p. 34) 
assumes a real interest rate of 1.6 per cent for SOEs, and 4.7 per cent for non-SOE borrowers. 
Estimating the interest that would be payable were SOEs to pay the non-SOE rate, the Unirule 
study attributes a 454 billion RMB interest rate subsidy to industrial SOEs for 2009. This was 
almost half of the 929 billion RMB profits reported by industrial SOEs that year (Unirule 
Institute of Economics, 2011, p. 52).10  
Following the example of Japanese and Korean industrial policies, Nolan (2001) describes 
the Chinese government’s early interest in forming large industry groups as ‘national 
champions’. These would be of sufficient scale to compete internationally and could be used to 
justify non-competitive behaviour between firms in the domestic market. Large SOEs were 
given an opportunity to become larger still – by creating subsidiary corporations to which their 
best performing assets were transferred, and then floating those subsidiaries on the domestic and 
international share markets (Zhang, 2004). 
By the early 2000s the formal barriers to private sector competition in most industrial 
sectors had been removed. The 2004 constitutional revision finally rehabilitated the citizen’s 
lawful private property to equal status with public property – it too was now ‘inviolable’ 
                                                     
9 Calculated as total financial costs, divided by total liabilities 
10 The 2016 IMF Staff Report on China (Kang et al., 2016, p. 46) follows this estimate, and further 
remarks that the financing costs for listed SOEs are 40-50 basis points below the official benchmark 
lending rate, a figure misinterpreted in the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 
(2016, p. 104) as being 40-50 percent below the benchmark lending rate. 
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(Article 13). In 2005, the State Council removed formal barriers to private investment in most 
areas (Rong, 2013). By this stage the initial round of SOE reforms and retrenchments had run its 
course, and modern forms of corporate governance had been widely adopted (Naughton, 2018, 
pp. 376–377).  
The nature of the Chinese economy had fundamentally shifted. While China’s economic 
model prior to 1978 had promoted industrialisation, the economic development that came with 
reform and opening up grew the services sector that had been repressed under the Plan 
(Naughton, 2007b, p. 80). Between 1952 and 1978, the services share of GDP hovered around 
one quarter (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1999, secs 3–2). The share began growing 
in the 1990s, finally surpassing half of GDP by 2015 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2016, secs 3–7). 
The evolution from work units in monopolised markets pursuing political and 
developmental objectives of the state to corporate SOEs pursuing financial profits in 
competitive markets can be illustrated, in stylised form, using a basic production possibility 
frontier chart. Figure 1-3 shows the potential for trade-offs between profit objectives on the 
vertical axis, and political, social or developmental (policy) objectives on the horizontal axis.11  
The top-left corner solution – in which the state owner seeks to maximise financial profit – is 
equivalent to the standard profit-maximisation objective of private firms.  
The shifting objectives of state-ownership, from policy objectives (fulfilling plan directives 
and providing social welfare services) to the pursuit of financial profit can be represented as a 
shift in objective up and to the left of the curve. The more financial profit is emphasised as the 
goal of SOEs, the less affordable become the non-profit policy objectives 
                                                     
11 This follows the OECD guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (2015, p. 
15), which define the public policy objectives of an SOE as those specific requirements – other than the 
maximisation of profits – placed on an SOE to benefit the general public. The production possibility 
frontier has been represented as two dimensional for the purposes of simplicity. In reality the trade-offs 
for Chinese state-owned enterprises are multi-dimensional. Even if the development policy objectives of 
the State could be easily specified, there is a further explicitly political dimension that relates to the role 
of the Party that would need to be considered. This accounts for the fact that not only are the “bosses” of 
SOEs business managers, but in many cases they are also politicians for whom a post at an SOE is simply 
a step on a broader career path (Brødsgaard et al., 2017).  
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Figure 1-3 Changing objectives of SOEs (1978–2006) 
 
But policymakers did not intend to leave the development of the Chinese economy entirely 
to market competition. The Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (Central SASAC) in 2006 designated 
armaments, power generation and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, 
coal, civil aviation and shipping, as industries in which the state should maintain a majority 
shareholding (Zhao, 2006; Lardy, 2014, p. 54). In other ‘basic and pillar’ industries (machinery, 
automobiles, information technology, construction, steel, base metals, chemicals, land surveying, 
research and development) central SOEs would remain ‘heavyweights’ (Zhao, 2006). 
But the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) – judged by some as a failure of the neoliberal 
economy model – also marked a turning point back toward political and developmental 
objectives for SOEs. Naughton (2017, p. 289) contrasts the old ‘policy burdens’ with four new 
developmental ‘missions’ for SOEs: upgrading of Chinese technical capacity (for example, the 
China 2025 goals), promoting China’s international economic power and influence (through its 
national champions), maintaining of macroeconomic stability, and leading structural reform by 
decommissioning excess capacity. While not a regression to the original work unit, this can be 
conceptualised as a move back down the production possibility frontier. 
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1.3 Contemporary classification of state-owned 
enterprise12 
Although SOEs are formally owned by ‘the people as a whole’, the exercise of ownership 
rights was vested in the relevant industrial ministry until the late 1990s, with limited financial 
oversight from the State Asset Management Bureau (Naughton, 2003). This system was further 
fragmented in 1998 with rights to oversee various aspects of SOE management scattered across 
various state organs – including the State Economic and Trade Commission, the Central Work 
Committee for Large Enterprises, and sections of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security (Ho and Young, 2013; Wang, Zhen and Zhang, 2015). 
 Central SASAC was created in 2003 was meant to re-integrate ownership rights into new 
specialised ownership agencies responsible for the supervision and management of state-owned 
assets of most non-financial enterprises (Naughton, 2007a; Unirule Institute of Economics, 2011, 
pp. 161–162). Responsibility for most local SOEs was passed to newly established SASAC 
branches down to the provincial level and below.  
Different vertical levels of the state may have different political standing and geographic 
responsibilities. All SOEs and many older private firms also have a defined administrative 
relationship (lishu guanxi), which determines not just the administrative level at which 
government approvals are necessary, but also the point through which the firm may be able to 
extract resources from the state through subsidies, access to finance or favourable tax treatment 
(Harris, Hashimzade and Ding, 2016). Depending on their position in the hierarchy, SOE 
managers have a corresponding political status and social influence (Li, 2012; Suo, 2014). For 
example, a central agency’s firm may be able to ignore local environmental regulations, even 
when the local regulator is effective at constraining private firms within its jurisdiction (Ahlers 
and Shen, 2017).  
Central SASAC controls the most politically significant central SOEs. Their top managers 
are integrated with the Party’s political leadership system through the Central Organisation 
Department of the Communist Party, which acts through central SASAC to appoint the 
leadership from the central nomenklatura (Naughton, 2007b, p. 61), conferring on them a 
political rank equivalent to a vice-minister (Brødsgaard, 2012; Lardy, 2014, p. 52). SOE leaders 
outside the 53 main SOEs are appointed at bureau director level, equivalent to the mayor of a 
large city, by a separate office within SASAC office, subject to Organization Department veto 
(Yang, Wang and Nie, 2013). 
                                                     
12 This section is based in part on EABER Working Paper (Hubbard, 2015a), in part from Hubbard (2016), 
copyright Taylor & Francis, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17538963.2016.1138695, and in 
part from my co-authored paper with Brødsgaard et al (2017) 
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SOEs controlled by local SASAC bureaux and agencies lack the national political 
connections or policy significance of ‘national champions’. Appointments are controlled by the 
local party apparatus rather than the central government, and so the political status of these SOE 
leaders is inferior to that of central SOE heads. But the local state and party apparatus may have 
its own interests in its SOEs, ranging from local development priorities (Oi, 1995) and the 
maintenance of social stability (Wang, 2014), to the opportunities they provide to local officials 
for personal enrichment through corruption (Pei, 2016).  
The profusion of corporate structures means that, in terms of numbers, most SOEs are only 
indirectly controlled by the state, through chains of other SOEs. In many cases (most notably 
publicly-listed companies) these are through mixed ownership arrangements that combine 
outside private or foreign capital. This concept of ‘mixed capital’ also encourages the state to 
take non-controlling shares in otherwise private enterprises. Figure 1-4 illustrates the different 
ways in which state-controlled companies might be related to various state organs. 
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Source Author’s diagram (Brødsgaard et al., 2017, fig. 2) 
 
These can be captured in statistical data according to separate concepts of official 
registration, control or capital shares. These are briefly described and compared below. For the 
remainder of the thesis the broader ‘control’ concept is used.  
1.3.1 Narrow – Official registration and state equity 
All industrial and commercial enterprises in China must be registered according to the 
2006 Provisions for the Classification of Types of Enterprise Registration. These provisions are 
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jointly issued by the National Statistics Bureau and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce. They include 18 major classifications, and ten sub-classifications. These are 
grouped broadly into ‘domestic capital enterprises’, ‘Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) 
capital enterprises’ and ‘foreign capital enterprises’ as shown in Table 1-1. 




Share cooperative enterprise 
Joint venture 
 State-owned joint venture 
 Collective joint venture 
 State-owned and collective joint venture 
 Other joint venture 
 Limited liability corporation (LLC) 
Wholly state-owned LLC 
Other LLC 
 Company limited by shares 
 Private enterprise 
Private wholly-owned enterprise 
Private partnership 
Private limited liability company 
Private company limited by shares 
 Other enterprise 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT)-invested enterprises 
Equity joint venture (HMT) 
Cooperative joint venture (HMT) 
Wholly HMT-owned enterprise 
HMT-invested company limited by shares 
Other HMT-invested enterprise 
Foreign-invested enterprises 
Sino-foreign equity joint venture 
Sino-foreign cooperative joint venture 
Wholly foreign-owned enterprise 
Foreign-invested company limited by shares 
Other foreign-invested enterprise 
Source (National Bureau of Statistics of China and State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce, 2011) 
 
A ‘State-Owned Enterprise’ defined strictly according to these provisions is a wholly state-
owned, non-corporate entity that is registered as such according to the Administration of the 
Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons. Effectively, this includes enterprises that are directly 
administered by the SASAC at the central or provincial levels (box B in Figure 1-4). However, 
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A limited liability corporation (LLC) is registered in accordance with the Regulations for 
the Administration of Company Registration and has between two and fifty shareholders. There 
are wholly state-owned LLCs, in which the only investors are SOEs (in the strict terms defined 
above) or agencies, and other LLCs – which may include any degree of ownership by the state 
less than 100 per cent. A company limited by shares (a limited liability company) is also 
registered according to the Regulations for the Administration of Company Registration and 
may have any number of shareholders. 
The provisions define ‘private enterprise’ to include a ‘private wholly-owned enterprise’, a 
‘private partnership’, a ‘private limited liability company’ and a ‘private company limited by 
shares’. The basis of this group is that the investors are natural persons (the minimum number of 
whom differs according to the sub-classification) or, in case of a private LLC or private 
shareholding company, that the enterprise is controlled by a single natural person.  
The limitations of definitions above for SOEs and wholly-state-owned LLCs become stark 
when considering that many SOEs are part of sprawling corporate conglomerates. Any publicly 
listed company that is controlled by an SOE would not count as an SOE under this strict 
definition, nor would SOE-private joint ventures or partnerships with foreign investors. 
Therefore, any analysis undertaken based on official registration categories would understate the 
degree of actual state control in the economy (Scissors, 2016).  
A related method of classifying SOEs is according to the nature of their equity contribution. 
The NBS industrial survey provides data on the paid-in capital of enterprises, which is further 
divided into five subcategories – state capital, collective capital, legal-person capital, natural 
person capital, HMT capital and foreign capital. State capital includes direct capital contribution 
from government departments, institutions and public-sector units (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2012, p. 87).  
Classification on these grounds also fails to capture SOEs that are indirectly controlled by 
the state, if they are held through ‘legal person capital’ – for example, state-owned LLCs or 
other state-owned corporations – rather than a state agency. 
1.3.2 Broad – State-owned and state-controlled companies 
A broader NBS definition of ‘state-owned and state-holding company’ employs a more 
useful concept of control that goes beyond formal registration. According to explanatory notes 
provided in the China Statistical Yearbook, this category (more accurately translated as state-
owned and state-controlled enterprises) includes not only SOEs (as strictly defined) but also 
‘enterprises with mixed ownership, … where the percentage of State assets (or shares by the 
State) is larger than any other single shareholder of the same enterprise’ (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2013). 
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This is broader than the registration measures since it includes the subsidiaries of (formally 
registered) SOEs in which the state, an SOE or an SOE subsidiary (and so on, recursively), is 
the largest single capital provider. This concept therefore not only includes SOEs that are 
directly administered by SASAC or another state organ, but also their partly-owned subsidiaries, 
joint ventures and listed companies in which they are controlling shareholders. Unlike the 
narrow definition, it captures the sometimes elaborate holding structures of SOEs (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013) which will be considered in Chapter 3. 
Figure 1-5 shows the total value of industrial output for 2009 according to both definitions. 
It shows that reliance on the (narrow) registration fails to observe half the industrial output of 
enterprises that are ultimately controlled by the state (including through other SOEs).  Unless 
otherwise stated, the control concept is followed for the remainder of this thesis.13 
                                                     
13 See Lardy (2014, pp. 62–68) for comprehensive discussion of the biases introduced by reliance on the 
narrower official registration statistics. 
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Figure 1-5 Total value of industrial output (2009) 
 
Source NBS Survey of above-scale industrial enterprises (described in section 4.1.1) 
1.3.3 Mixed capital – State-controlled 
A common mode of mixed ownership is to list SOE subsidiaries on stock exchanges. 
Provided that the state owner (or another SOE) remains the largest shareholder, such listed SOE 
subsidiaries remain SOEs under the broader definition of control (Lardy, 2014, p. 46). 
Figure 1-6 illustrates that China’s largest company by assets, the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), is directly administered by central SASAC. CNPC was formed from a 
state oil ministry in 1988. A decade later, CNPC’s core assets in extraction, refining, chemical 
and retailing were restructured into a subsidiary called ‘PetroChina’. This subsidiary was listed 
on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges in March 2000 (Wu, 2005, p. 157). 
PetroChina is an example of an indirectly controlled, mixed ownership SOE. The parent’s direct 
share is 87 per cent.  
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Figure 1-6 PetroChina, an indirectly-controlled, central SOE subsidiary 
 
                                   100% owns
China National Petroleum Corporation
(Unlisted, first-tier SOE)





Source Author’s diagram (Brødsgaard et al., 2017, fig. 3) 
 
Subsidiaries of directly state-owned companies can also have their own listed or unlisted 
entities. In principle, there is no limit to the number of corporate entities that can be interspersed 
between the directly administered SOE and companies that are under its ultimate control. For 
example, Tongrentang is a traditional Chinese medicine company founded in 1669 during the 
Qing dynasty. Figure 1-7 shows that the China Beijing Tongrentang Group is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of a capital management company that sits directly under Beijing municipality 
SASAC. The Tongrentang Group owns a majority stake in Beijing Tongrentang Shareholding 
Ltd, which is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
Figure 1-7 Beijing Tongrentang Shareholding, Ltd an indirectly-controlled, local 
SOE subsidiary.  
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Beijing State-owned Capital 
Operation and Management Center
(Unlisted, first-tier SOE)
                                 100% owns
China Beijing Tongrentang Group
(Unlisted, second-tier SOE)
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Tracing ownership of listed Chinese companies takes hours of work for each company. 
Central SOE China National Chemical Corporation (ChinaChem) has at least nine listed 
subsidiaries (including 17 interspersed companies and a joint venture with Guangzhou City 
SASAC) (Rooker, 2016b). Bright Foods, which is ultimately owned by Shanghai SASAC, has 
direct and indirect interests in five listed subsidiaries (Rooker, 2016a). 
Only the parent SOE comes under the direct administration of a state agency (usually 
SASAC). The state owner controls these indirectly through vertically overlapping executive 
appointments that create a career path from subsidiary companies up to the parent (Fu, 2013). 
The SOE and its subsidiaries, including listed subsidiaries (Zhang, 2012), each have a Party 
organisation that guides both key personnel appointments and key business decisions. 
According to the Party Constitution, the Party organisation within the SOE ‘guarantees and 
oversees the implementation of the principles and policies of the Party and the state in (the) … 
enterprise and backs the meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and 
manager (factory director) in the exercise of their functions and powers according to law’ 
(Xinhua, 2013).  
The result of these arrangements is that even if a single state owner can be identified as the 
‘ultimate controlling owner’, the actual degree of control or even interest that the state owner 
plays in the firm can be attenuated by the holding structures employed. Joint venture structures 
have also been used to allow corporate engagement between the state sector and foreign 
investors, in order to attract foreign technology to China, most notably in the automotive sector 
(see discussion in Section 4.2.2.1). More generally, the use of complex corporate structures 
might increase market responsiveness and efficiency by attenuating opportunities for political 
interference in enterprise affairs (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2013). 
For example, Meyer and Lu (2004) provide a case study of the China International Marine 
Container (Group) Company, Ltd. (CIMC), a manufacturer of shipping containers. CIMC had 
been listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange, with the two equal-largest shareholdings held by a 
central SOE, the ‘China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company’ (COSCO) and the China 
Merchants Container Industry Co. Ltd (CMCI), which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
holding company listed in Hong Kong that itself was controlled by the Chinese Ministry of 
Transportation. Although the resulting company was a ‘state-owned or state holding company’ 
since the largest shareholder was itself an SOE, Meyer and Lu describe both how the listed 
structure insulated the company from direct interference from government ministries, and how 
the joint venture arrangement between COSCO and CMCI prevented dominance by either 
company. For example, while the COSCO Party Committee appointed the Chairman of the 
CIMC board of directors, the longstanding general manager (and chairman of the CIMC Party 
Committee) reported directly to the Organization Department of the Shenzhen Party Committee 
and operated with considerable autonomy. 
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1.3.4 Mixed capital – Non-state controlled 
Classification as a non-state-controlled enterprise does not preclude state or Party 
participation. Enterprises may have a controlling private shareholder, with minority SOE 
shareholdings, in which case it might be better thought of as a mixed ownership enterprise 
(Scissors, 2016). The starkest example of mixed ownership would be a privately-controlled 
enterprise in which the state has a 49 per cent share, but could include much more subtle 
configurations. An SOE (or its subsidiary) might have taken a non-controlling equity stake in a 
publicly-listed non-state company. It could also include the case where a formerly state-owned 
enterprise has been partially privatised, but in which the state retains some small shareholding.  
The definition of ‘state-owned and state controlled’ is also non-cumulative – for example, 
company A might be 49 per cent state-owned and 51 per cent owned by a private shareholder, in 
which case it is classified as privately controlled. Suppose they create a new company, company 
B, in which company A holds a 51 per cent stake, with the remaining 49 per cent owned by 
wholly state-owned enterprise B. In this case, company C is not ‘state controlled’ because its 
controlling parent is not state-controlled. Nevertheless, the state would remain the ultimate 
beneficial owner of almost three quarters of company C.14  
It is not possible to tell from the NBS statistics the extent of this mixed ownership. NBS 
does report annual series on owners’ equity for industrial firms, including a series for the ‘state 
capital’ component. This is also broken down for ‘state-owned and state holding’ enterprises, 
HMT enterprises and ‘private enterprises’.  
Table 1-2, based on the 2007 NBS survey shows 7,857 enterprises that were ‘state 
controlled’ but have no recorded state capital. These are likely to be indirect subsidiaries of 
SOEs. It also shows 1,229 privately controlled entities with some state capital. There are also 
279 ‘private’ entities that are majority or wholly state-owned based on capital shares. These are 
likely to be enterprises that were previously state owned but have since entered mixed 
ownership with a majority private shareholder, without updating registered capital.  
Table 1-2 Number of industrial enterprises according to state capital share 
(2007) 
 
State capital share of total capital 
 
 
None Minority Majority Wholly All 
SOE and state-controlled  7,857   842   2,249   9,298   20,246  
Collective  22,945   446   76   105   23,572  
Private  232,929   1,229   159   120   234,437  
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan  27,476   342   24   8   27,850  
Foreign  28,532   579   47   5   29,163  
Total  319,739   3,438   2,555   9,536   335,268  
Source 2007 Survey of above-scale industrial enterprises (described in section 4.1.1) 
                                                     
14 Thanks to Derek Scissors for this example. 
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The Party has channels for engagement even within companies that have no formal state 
ownership share. Article 17 of China’s 2004 Company Law made explicit that ‘grass roots 
organizations of the Communist Party’ are allowed to carry out their activities in companies 
(even foreign companies) in accordance with the Party Constitution. Article 19 of the 2013 
revision of the Company Law strengthened this provision by adding the further provision that a 
‘company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organization’. 
 Reportedly ‘all 210,000 large private companies’ now have Party committees and have 
recruited more than 3.5 million workers (Xinhua, 2012). Nevertheless, the Party’s mandate is 
weaker than in SOEs (Lardy, 2014, p. 121). In a private enterprise, the Party committee is meant 
to ‘guide and oversee the enterprise in observing (state) laws and regulations.’ It comes with a 
pro-business rider that the Committee ‘stimulates the healthy development of the enterprise’ 
(Hawes, 2007, p. 818). Such businesses might be able to exploit political links, for example 
through government or military experience of top leaders (Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012), but unlike 
in the SOE, neither the State nor the Party control personnel movements. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The modern conception of SOEs as independent legal entities, existing in a property 
relationship with parts of the Chinese state system, and operating in a market economy, is a 
fundamental departure from their origins as part of the state apparatus in a centrally-planned 
economy. While work units were an integral part of the state planning apparatus, modern SOEs 
have become now standalone legal entities that exist in a property relationship to the state. In 
some cases there is a direct ownership relation, in which control is maintained by direct 
appointment of management through State or Party personnel systems. But in many enterprises 
are only indirectly state-controlled through other SOEs. The boundary between state and private 
enterprise is further blurred when the state – or an SOE – becomes a non-controlling equity 
owner in an otherwise private firm.  
Despite the evidence of historically poor SOE performance and a commitment to market 
efficiency, the Chinese government remains committed to a ‘socialist’ market economy, that 
emphasises public ownership in some form. The next chapter provides a framework to consider 
the potential role for SOEs in different sectors from the perspective of the state owner. 
Subsequent chapters respond in order to the key questions set out in Section 1.1. 
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Chapter 2: Profit and policy objectives of 
state-owned enterprises 
 
External criticism of China’s SOEs focuses on their low profitability relative to private 
firms. When is profit the most appropriate performance measure, and what is the appropriate 
profit benchmark for comparison? This depends on the underlying assumptions about market 
structures and information. Section 2.1 sets out the case for profit maximisation given 
neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition. Section 2.2 then extends the analysis to 
consider the broader range of objectives available in markets with imperfect competition and 
incomplete information. Under such circumstances, financial profit may cease to be a good 
measure of efficiency. 
Even where profit is the most appropriate benchmark, how should an absence of profit be 
interpreted? Is this evidence of shirking, inefficiency and waste? Or could potential profits be 
captured by insiders – through on the job consumption or above-market compensation? These 
questions are considered in section 2.3. 
2.1 Profit maximisation and perfect competition  
The notion that firms do maximise profits (that is, that profit maximisiation is an objective 
and accurate description of firm behaviour) and that firms should maximise profits (that is, 
profit maximisation by firms is normatively desirable), derives from neoclassical assumptions 
of perfect market competition. Profits here are the residual claim on firm revenue after 
compensation is paid to labour at the prevailing market wage, and rental payments have been 
made to owners of capital at the market rate of interest. Since all productive factors of 
production have been compensated, profits in this model are a form of rent. 
Alchian (1950) established an objective theoretical basis for profit maximisation of the 
representative firm, even if no specific firm can be found that behaves in this way. In a 
competitive market, with no barriers to entry, the existence of average firm profits that are over 
and above the competitive rental cost of capital will induce profit-seeking entrepreneurs to enter 
the market. This new competition expands supply and therefore lowers prices, until the expected 
rate of profit for a new entrepreneur is no higher than is available in other markets. In a world of 
perfect competition and knowledge, the maximum economic profit is zero. So the marginal firm 
earning zero profits is, trivially, profit maximising. A firm that fails to maximise profits is 
therefore making a loss, and without an ongoing subsidy cannot remain viable. It is then forced 
to exit the market, freeing up capital for more productive uses elsewhere.  
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This profit-maximising point can be illustrated as a single point on the production 
possibility frontier in Figure 2-1.15 Facing a perfectly competitive market, the firm’s financial 
profits are sufficient to cover the competitive rental rate of capital (r) and no more. Without 
subsidy, it has no scope to pursue costly policy objectives that deviate from profit maximisation. 
In this special case, the “primacy of competition versus ownership” (Vining and Boardman, 
1992) can be established – the subjective character of the owner becomes irrelevant in the long 
run (Wu, 2005, p. 12). To the extent that a state-owned firm could exist without subsidy in a 
perfectly competitive market, it would behave identically to a private profit-maximising firm. 
Firms that pursue costly policy objectives would become unviable and leave the market. 
Figure 2-1 Profit-maximising point in perfectly competitive market 
 
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics provides that perfect competition 
maximises social welfare in a world without externalities, public goods or imperfect information 
(Blaug, 2007, p. 185). Given that profit-maximising behaviour maximises social welfare, there 
is no need (under these strict assumptions) for state-owned firms to pursue any other policy 
objectives. An omniscient and benevolent social planner might seek to redistribute income in 
accordance with the planner’s own distributional preferences (Barone, 1908), but could not 
intervene to increase output any further (Lange, 1936; Wu, 2005, p. 13).  
If profit-maximisation provides for an efficient outcome, then evidence of persistent 
deviation from profit maximisation is evidence of departure from the competitive equilibrium. It 
is inefficient. Differential financial returns between SOEs and non-SOEs would indeed be a 
                                                     
15 Introduced in the previous chapter (Figure 1-3) 
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measure of SOE inefficiency under these strict assumptions. While there is no general efficiency 
argument for having the state as an owner of capital, the persistence of state ownership while 
maintaining competitive efficiency requires the state to act identically to a profit-seeking private 
owner. A state sovereign wealth fund with a mandate to behave as an entirely passive investor 
might provide the closest example. 
Provided there are no market failures that might otherwise justify state intervention, profit 
is therefore an appropriate measure for SOE performance. Whether a firm is private or state 
owned, provided it maximises profits it would be an efficient firm. The relative performance of 
the small number of Chinese SOEs that exist in conditions close to this will be explored later 
(Chapter 5.3). 
2.2 Policy objectives given imperfect markets and 
uncertainty  
While the neoclassical model provides a powerful analytical framework, it is an 
incomplete guide for policy in real economies. Governments do intervene in markets, and SOEs 
are one of many available policy instruments. The welfare case for SOEs depends on identifying 
those markets where real world conditions depart from competitive market assumptions. This 
departure can occur because of institutional factors (for example, the monopolisation of industry 
as observed in the previous chapter), or due to the nature of the underlying production 
technology (for example, the natural monopoly features of network utilities).  
The representative firm in the perfectly competitive model above was a profit maximiser, 
since that was the objective consistent with continued viability. There was no need to inquire as 
to the firm’s subjective intentions or its internal governance. However, as Figure 2-2 shows, 
when financial profits are possible above the competitive (risk-free) rate of return (r), a range of 
viable firm objectives become available once more. The subjective intent of the firm’s controller 
becomes relevant again – choosing between the maximisation of financial returns, the 
maximisation of policy objectives, or some combination that constitutes a trade-off between 
them – subject to the constraint that financial returns are sufficient for the firm to meet the 
minimum demands of the firm’s creditors (that is, to break even). 
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Figure 2-2 Choice of objectives given positive economic profits. 
 
Uncertainty about the future is a source of persistent positive profits in the real world 
(Knight, 1921). This is compounded in transition economies like China, where reforms to the 
political and economic institutions generates additional uncertainty about the sustainability of 
certain policies. The private, profit-seeking investor facing uncertain policies demands a higher 
rate of return to compensate for the risk of policy change (Rodrik, 1991). China’s gradual and 
sometimes piecemeal reform perhaps contributes to policy uncertainty. But the failure of rapid 
privatisation (‘shock therapy’) to deliver prosperity in the post-Communist transition economies 
of the former Soviet bloc suggests that there is no short-cut alternative to the slow process of 
institution building, such as the rule of law, as a precondition before mass ownership reform 
(Hamm, King and Stuckler, 2012, pp. 7–8). If state actors have better knowledge of the future 
path of policy reform (or can protect the value of their investment through other means), then 
the state owner may accept a lower rate of return than the private owner who required additional 
compensation for this policy uncertainty. 
Even where there is competitive market pressure, the state can expand the range of 
potential policy objectives through subsidies. The previous chapter showed that, as a condition 
of WTO entry, China agreed to remove its direct fiscal subsidies to its loss-making SOEs. 
However, it is still open to making otherwise non-viable SOEs profitable by tolerating a rate of 
return below the competitive rental rate of capital (Huang, 2010; Lardy, 2014, pp. 22–23). The 
state can provide this either directly as an owner (i.e, equity holder) by not demanding a 
competitive return on its equity, or as a creditor, by acting through the state-owned banking 
system. This is represented in Figure 2-3 by providing a lower rate of return (r’) for some SOEs, 
which recovers the possibility of departing from non-profit objectives.  
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Whether the viability of non-profit maximising firms arises from the imperfect nature of 
market competition or from an indirect subsidy on the part of the capital owner, potential SOE 
profits can be exchanged for policy objectives, along the production possibility frontier. In this 
case, the value of the policy objective needs to be compared to the cost of the foregone profit. A 
complete assessment of the costs and benefits of using an SOE to achieve any given policy 
objective should also compare this with alternative, available policy instruments available to 
achieve the same objective, rather than with some theoretically perfect, but unattainable 
benchmark (Demsetz, 1969). 
The policy tools available at any given time will be contingent on the administrative 
capacity of the state. In the early stages of reform, and in the absence of a general social safety 
net, poor profitability of SOEs may have been tolerated as a second-best mechanism to provide 
social services to state workers (Putterman, 1995, p. 1061). For example, in the historical case 
where SOEs were required to provide health services to their employees, it may be the case that 
direct state provision of health services can be done at lower cost per worker (perhaps, because 
of economies of scale from larger hospitals rather than smaller clinics). This is an empirical 
question that would need to be decided through a careful analysis of policy objectives. 
The perceived value of using SOEs for political purposes is likely to vary between 
observers. The Party may be willing to trade off profit to pay off potential ‘losers’ from 
economic reform (Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000), or even to ensure political loyalty of firm 
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managers (Zakharov, 2014). Those who have a political objection to the Party may object to a 
departure from profit maximisation by SOEs precisely because they disagree with the policy 
objectives of the Party.  
Even if a conventional economic approach is adopted (that is, setting aside political 
valuations), the departure from a model of perfect competition means that there are cases – most 
notably natural monopolies – in which profit-maximisation does not maximise social welfare. 
State ownership with non-profit objectives may be a viable alternative to attempted regulation 
of private monopolies. This is considered in the next section. 
The potential for rents (whether deriving from imperfect market structures, uncertainty or 
natural resource rents) also means that the financial profits of firms may no longer be an 
accurate measure of capital returns. Allocative efficiency still requires equalisation of the 
marginal rate of return on capital between firms and between industries. But the marginal return 
on capital is not directly observable from financial profits. Nevertheless, profit maximisation 
may be an efficient goal – with profit-maximising SOEs a potential alternative to taxing rents 
from private enterprises. This considered in section 2.2.2. 
2.2.1 When profit maximisation is not socially efficient  
The efficiency case for profit maximisation in the perfectly competitive case rests on the 
assumption that, in the long run, there are no excess profits in the industry. The free market is 
free of rents. The introduction of potential rents into the model quickly shows that profit 
maximisation no longer maximises social welfare: a textbook profit-maximising monopolist 
restricts supply to drive price above the marginal cost of production. In this case, the quantity 
demanded may be significantly reduced at the higher price, the producer gains additional profit 
based on the difference at the expense of the consumer. There is an additional (static) welfare 
loss from consumer surplus that is no longer gained from those units that are not produced. The 
extent to which output is reduced depends on the elasticity of demand for the good.  
Sometimes new entrants are inhibited by the existence of regulations or laws that prohibit 
competition. This was the case for Chinese industry from the nationalisation of industry until 
the advent of non-state competition in the reform and opening up period, as described in 
Chapter 1. Yet even in the absence of formal barriers to entry, some industries are naturally 
monopolistic because of the underlying production technology. Naturally monopolistic 
industries typically carry high fixed costs but low and often declining marginal production costs 
(for example, an electricity network, transportation network, or telecommunications network). 
In such an industry, a new entrant cannot expect to recover the (high) fixed cost of its initial 
investment at the (low) competitive price. 
In an industry that is not readily open to competition by new profit-seeking entrants, 
above-normal industry profits may persist. However, these additional profits are a symptom of 
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monopoly inefficiency, rather than efficient use of capital. While the owner of the monopoly 
may gain, the overall economy is smaller. The efficient equilibrium, at which the marginal 
product of capital is equal across all uses, requires the monopolist to expand output again, 
lowering price – and their profit – back to the competitive level. 
The welfare loss of a profit-maximising monopoly is greater when it is in an upstream 
industry (such as electricity distribution) that provides inputs into the rest of the economy. Price 
distortions in these markets compound through the industrial structure – high profits from SOEs 
in such sectors effectively act as a tax on downstream producers and consumers (Schmitz, 2001).  
In the absence of an efficient free market solution, avoiding the welfare costs of a private 
profit-seeking monopoly tends to rely on the state either regulating the monopolist in order to 
constrain its behaviour to act more consistently with social welfare objectives, or adopting a 
policy of outright ownership in which the state operates the monopoly itself according to 
non-profit objectives (Demsetz, 1968; Posner, 1969; Foster, 1993). A carefully selected 
non-profit objective under these conditions can lead to better welfare outcomes than profit 
maximisation.  
The profitability of manufacturing firms producing private goods under competitive 
conditions (considered in Chapter 4) will not be a reliable benchmark for the efficiency of 
utilities with non-profit objectives. That is why Figure 2-4, which shows that the aggregate 
profitability of utilities in China (distribution of electricity, water and gas) is much lower than 
that of Chinese manufacturing says little about the relative efficiency of each sector, given their 
likely different objectives. 
Figure 2-4 Return on utilities and manufacturing assets (2000–2014) 
 
Source Author’s calculations based on NBS China Statistical Yearbook (various years)  
  
Lardy (2014, p. 13) suggests that the behaviour of Chinese SOEs in these sectors might be 
explained as simply the reinvestment of retained (monopoly) earnings. This behaviour is not 
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necessarily efficient and may effectively subsidise downstream industries, but it is not 
unequivocally less efficient than the profit-maximising monopolist’s choice to restrict 
investment and drive up prices – which would reduce production in downstream industries.  
The key point is that the efficiency of network utilities should be judged based on 
economy-wide (social) costs and benefits, rather than a straight observation of financial returns 
to the firm, as if its production were in a competitive private market with no externalities. This 
separation of competitive and non-competitive components of industry, and further reforms in 
non-competitive sectors, were also part of the Third Plenum Decision (noted at the beginning of 
this thesis): 
In natural monopoly industries in which state-owned capital continues to be 
the control (sic) shareholder, we will carry out reform focusing on separation 
of government administration from enterprise management, separation of 
government administration from state assets management, franchise 
operation, and government oversight, separate networks from operations and 
decontrol competitive businesses based on the characteristics of different 
industries, and make public resource allocation more market-oriented. 
(Communist Party of China, 2014) 
 
This approach is not unique to China and does not provide evidence of a uniquely Chinese 
state capitalism. China’s State Grid stands out internationally because of its size; but this is 
potentially derived from China’s own status as the largest economy in the world (in PPP terms).  
Norway, Korea, Italy and France are OECD economies that still have major electricity or gas 
SOEs (OECD, 2014, p. 11). Even the United States’ federal government is involved in various 
regional ‘power administrations’, the largest of which is the Tennessee Valley Authority. The 
Authority was created in 1933 and 70 years later controlled over one hundred hydroelectric, 
coal and nuclear power plants (Geddes, 2004, p. 45).  
In such markets, performance needs to be assessed based on sector-specific regulatory 
arrangements and policy objectives, rather than raw profitability.16 Where benchmarking against 
private profit-seeking competitors is not feasible, alternative performance benchmarks across 
time or internationally may be required. For example, the 2013 reorganisation of the Ministry of 
Railways (an organ of the state) into the China Railway Corporation (an SOE) provides an 
opportunity to benchmark the performance of the new Corporation against that of the previous 
Ministry. The performance comparison is unlikely to be financial profits.  
2.2.2 When financial profits include other rents 
Where there are rents are not dissipated through competition, the use of SOEs may provide 
a mechanism for the state to appropriate them. This allows the state to reduce (or avoid 
                                                     
16 Relevant studies relating to electricity in China include Yeh and Lewis (2004), Xuegong et al (2013). 
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imposing) otherwise distorting taxes on other factors of production, or direct taxes on private 
resource companies that may not be fully cooperative with the tax authorities (Garnaut and 
Clunies Ross, 1975)  
   Figure 2-5 shows the relatively high return on assets for mining companies in China prior 
to 2009. The Unirule Institute for Economics (2011, p. 61) argues that the low cost of natural 
resources is a major factor explaining the (previously) high profits for mining SOEs – 
calculating that the low rate of royalties payable by SOEs for their access to coal, oil and natural 
gas amounted to 497.7 billion RMB from 2001 to 2009. Anderson (cited in Lardy, 2014, p. 125) 
suggests that their declining profitability from 2009 is most likely explained by declining 
commodity prices after the Global Financial Crisis. 
Figure 2-5 Return on mining and manufacturing assets (2000–2014) 
 
Source Author’s calculations based on NBS Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
 
This tendency of resource company profits to include large natural resource rents 
confounds a direct comparison with the profitability of fully competitive industries. The 
divergence in profitability between resource firms and non-resource firms is not by itself 
evidence of inefficiency in the allocation of capital. Diagnosing capital misallocation requires 
an observation of returns excluding rents.    
As with electricity, the existence of large state-owned resource companies is not unique to 
China. State ownership or control of oil companies is common across the Middle Eastern 
countries, Libya, Nigeria, India, Venezuela, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Algeria and 
Norway (Pirog, 2007, p. 20). For many former colonies, the creation and control of a national 
oil company became an important symbol of political independence (Stevens, 2008, p. 13). The 
alternative to state ownership is not always robust competition. Robinson (1941, pp. 197–205) 
provides an account of how John D. Rockefeller’s private oil company, Standard Oil, came to 
refine 95 per cent of US output by 1879. The eventual American response was to adopt 
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anti-trust policies that today are administered by the United States’ Federal Trade Commission. 
The performance of national oil companies should best be judged against private oil companies. 
When it is, evidence regarding relative efficiency is mixed (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1992; Wolf, 
2009). 
The appropriation of rents through state ownership also needs to be compared against the 
costs of collecting revenue in other ways. States can monopolise the use of force17 to control 
markets for inelastically-demanded consumer commodities (for example tobacco, alcohol, and 
salt) for revenue purposes. This is equivalent to imposing a narrow-based excise tax, and has 
been a common feature of taxation systems since classical times (Rich and Wilson, 1967, p. 
289).  
China’s salt monopoly dated from the Han dynasty (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006) through 
to the establishment in 1950 of what is now the China National Salt Industry Corporation. 
Although salt is no longer a major revenue source, the state monopoly was defended on multiple 
non-profit justifications of stewarding mineral resources, ensuring public health (by requiring 
iodine fortification), contributing to taxation revenues, and protecting consumers (especially the 
poor) from price fluctuations of an essential commodity (Gu, 2002). The state monopoly was 
only relaxed in 2017 when producers were finally allowed to sell directly to market (Hancock, 
2017).  
Tobacco monopolies are also common. Since the establishment of the Spanish tobacco 
monopoly in 1636, tobacco monopolies were imposed largely as revenue source revenue. They 
were imposed in Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union, although they were phased out of the 
European Union under the 1970 Common Agricultural Policy (Comin, 2005). Tobacco remains 
heavily taxed, though no longer state owned, in all OECD economies (OECD, 2016a, p. 145). 
Chinese tobacco has remained centrally owned and centrally planned even during the reform 
and opening-up period (Wang, 2013).  
2.3 Inefficiency and corporate governance 
Even if a state owner makes a rational choice between profit and a particular policy 
objective, the SOE may still fail to deliver. This is illustrated in Figure 2-6, which shows the 
owner’s policy objectives at an efficient point E on the frontier. The SOE will report a lower 
rate of profitability than if it were maximising financial profits, but this is offset by the creation 
of value elsewhere. However, the SOE may fail to deliver the expect policy objectives. In this 
case, the value of output falls to an inefficient point I inside the frontier.  
                                                     
17 In 2000, enforcers of China’s salt monopoly in Hunan province confiscated 7,277 tons of contraband 
salt and detained 88 people, of whom 11 were arrested, four were re-educated through labour, and four 
were sentenced (Gu, 2002, p. 5). 
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Figure 2-6 Inefficient output despite efficient choice of objectives 
 
Such a failure of an enterprise to achieve the objectives of its owners is not unique to SOEs. 
Since Berle and Means (1948) identified the separation of corporate ownership and control as a 
departure from the classical notion of the owner-manager, a broad discipline of corporate 
governance has been developed to align the interests of owners and managers. Where there is a 
separation between (public or private) firm owners and day-to-day management, the task of 
corporate governance is to align incentives of owners and managers. This is necessary even for 
a profit maximisation goal. 
The convention that enterprise profits be assigned to passive shareholders of the firm arose 
from Anglo-American legal precedent (Berle and Means, 1948, pp. 333–339). Yet there is a 
persuasive efficiency argument to assign at least some of the residual claim to firm insiders who 
are better informed to increase profits (Berle and Means, 1948, pp. 349–350). The construction 
of performance-linked management bonuses, stock options, and employee share schemes are 
examples of attempts to induce firm management to improve firm efficiency. The early SOE 
reforms that allowed work units to share in the fruits of above-plan production are another 
example.  
Where there is a single, transparent objective the use of high-powered incentives such as 
profit sharing may be an effective means of aligning the interests of owners and managers 
(Naughton, 2018, p. 374,378). But these can fail or be ‘gamed’ by managers faced with multiple 
– often ambiguous or competing – policy objectives (Levy, 1987; Wu, 2005, p. 140). 
Particularly in cases where the value placed on policy objectives depends on a political value 
judgment, or the priority between different policy objectives changes according to political 
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factors, political loyalty of the manager becomes more important than technical competence 
(Zakharov, 2014). 
The lack of a clear and binding financial performance indicator creates conditions for the 
so-called ‘soft-budget constraint syndrome’. This has been used to describe the chronic 
inefficiency of SOEs across all socialist economies, including China (Kornai, 1992, p. 13; Bai 
and Wang, 1998; Dong and Putterman, 2003). 
 Figure 2-7 illustrates the financial rate of return expected of an SOE, as the broken 
horizontal line r. This rate of return may even be lower than the competitive rate of return if the 
state is expecting the firm to attain some set of policy objectives, at the efficient output 
combination E. But what happens if the cost of achieving the policy objectives was higher than 
expected, causing output to fall to I?  The state owner would not have accepted this inefficient 
trade off in advance. But unless it is willing to sack the manager (or liquidate the firm) it must 
accept the lower rate of return at r’. The manager then learns that the original constraint was soft.  
Figure 2-7 Inefficiency and soft budget constraint 
 
This begs the question of why the state owner, once it discovers the soft budget constraint 
phenomenon, continues to tolerate it? The answer likely relates both to information and 
incentives on the state owner’s part. The SOE manager may be informed from a technical 
perspective as to the real costs and benefits of different policy objectives. But he has no reason 
to reveal that information. The burden then falls on the state owner to expend effort to monitor 
the SOE output closely (Qi, Song and Liu, 2016). This is difficult because, unlike profit, policy 
objectives can be difficult to measure. Furthermore, while the state owner might always prefer 
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more profit to less (always to prefer point E to point I), it has its own internal principal-agent 
problems. The bureaucrat responsible for overseeing the SOE does not typically receive a share 
of the profits, and so lacks the private capitalist’s incentive to expend any effort on monitoring 
(Zhang, 2006).  
There are also political relationships between SOE managers and their supervisors, 
although they are not necessarily unique to state-owned firms (Lardy, 2014, pp. 119–120). 
Wang (2016) finds that publicly-listed non-SOEs are more likely to cultivate connections with 
members of People’s Congresses or Consultative Committees, whereas SOEs are more likely to 
be connected to the bureaucracy and the People’s Liberation Army. The problem is confounded 
when the political rank of the SOE manager may be higher than that of the agency tasked with 
regulating the SOE (Ahlers and Shen, 2017). 
2.4 Value capture and waste 
The previous subsection shows that the corporate governance problems inherent in the 
pursuit of multiple policy objectives results in the potential loss of value from the perspective of 
the state – this is simply the vertical distance from the output combination actually achieved 
back to the frontier (which represents a rational trade-off between profit and policy objectives). 
While this missing profit is evidence of inefficiency (by definition, because there is a departure 
from the frontier), to what extent does it reflect a loss to the economy overall? Is foregone profit 
wasted (through slack use of capital, shirking on behalf of labour, or some misallocation of the 
two), or is it – as in the case of theft (Tullock, 1967) – captured elsewhere?  
The view that the foregone SOE profits are wasted is consistent with a view of SOEs as 
inherently inefficient and SOE managers and workers as inherently lazy. It accords with the 
plan-era incentives of the work unit and a management tradition of bureaucracy rather than 
business (Wu, 2005, p. 140). This view of ingrained SOE inefficiency is not just from China’s 
historical experience but also that of other socialist countries (Kornai, 1992). 
Yet the material incentives facing SOE management and workers vary. They can induce 
quite energetic behaviour when firm insiders are given the opportunity to capture resources for 
themselves. The theory of managerial capitalism suggests that professional managers run firms 
to pursue their own interests – whether they do this by paying themselves higher wages, giving 
themselves better working conditions, or acting scrupulously to increase profits for the 
shareholder-owner depends on the incentive structures they face (Marris 1964). This suggests 
that restricting channels by which management can capture a portion of firm surplus potentially 
encourages risk-aversion or shirking (reducing output) rather than increasing in profit for the 
state owner. 
Wang’s (2014) detailed case study of the Chinese tobacco industry through the 1980s and 
1990s provides a compelling account of entrepreneurial management even in a sector that 
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remained monopolised by the state. Unlike other sectors undergoing reform, the tobacco 
industry and cigarette manufacturing remained subject to central administrative planning. Yet 
the manager of a provincial Yunnan cigarette factory, Chu Shijian, continually drove to 
modernise the factory and its production methods, convinced local peasants to change 
production plans to meet his requirements, and took control of the administrative apparatus to 
suit the interests of his own company. His Hongta Tobacco (Group) developed its own retail 
network and leading premium cigarette brand – ‘Red Tobacco Mountain’ and by 1996 had 
company revenue of US$2.3 billion. Although Manager Chu’s formal salary was less than 
US$250 per month, he was eventually convicted of embezzling US$145 million in company 
funds (Faison, 1998). While his actions were illegal, it is an illustration of the principle that 
potential profits may be captured by entrepreneurial insiders. 
The potential for foregone profits to be captured elsewhere in the economy can be 
illustrated by considering the effect on GDP. Figure 2-8 shows the composition of Chinese GDP 
in 2012 calculated on a value added basis. Half of GDP was labour compensation, while just 
under a quarter was attributed to operating surplus, which includes corporate (and SOE) profits. 
Figure 2-8 Composition of GDP by value added (2012) 
 
Source Input-Output Table from the NBS China Statistical Yearbook (2015, secs 3–21) and 
Finance Yearbook 2015 (China Ministry of Finance, 2015, p. 374). 
 
SOE profits could be increased at the expense of other components of GDP. In a neutral 
scenario, stricter monitoring arrangements might induce the same degree of effort from SOE 
management and workers, while redirecting any profits over and above what is needed to 
incentivise the workers as profits in favour of the state owner. This would tend to increase 
operating surplus, but the impact on GDP would be offset by reducing the compensation of 
employees. GDP would be redistributed rather than created.  
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Negative net GDP effects are possible too. Suppose that stricter monitoring arrangements 
(for example, an anti-corruption campaign) have the effect of reducing the effort of SOE 
management and workers. This closes off channels for firm insiders to share the residual profit 
of the firm, so insiders begin shirking instead. The result is not higher profits, but lost output.  
Achieving a positive GDP effect (rather just a redistribution of its components) depends on 
the removal of some underlying economic distortion. For example, if SOE labour captures some 
enterprise profits such that they raise their compensation above their marginal product, it could 
draw additional workers into the state sector and therefore drive up wage bills for competing 
private employers. Similarly, a lower cost of capital for SOEs can result in over-investment in 
capital per worker relative to non-SOEs facing a market cost of capital. This could result in 
inefficiently large SOEs. 
Even if the state owner’s declared interest is financial, it is likely to take a broader view of 
the economic and social impacts of its operations than would a private shareholder who is 
concerned only about increasing profits. The state can capture some of the downstream 
economic benefits through high tax receipts, and can reduce the cost of other social outlays (for 
example, transferring resources to workers in a depressed region). This broader view is reflected 
in the choice of economic value added, rather than profit, as the key management performance 
indicator for central SASAC SOEs (Zheng and Zhang, 2012, pp. 12–13).  
Dickson (2013) shows that Party members are more concentrated in SOEs than in private 
business, and they demonstrate more political loyalty to the regime. Assuming a state owner in 
China is also an agent for the Party, it may tolerate the redistribution of income back to 
politically supportive SOE workers.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Under perfectly competitive assumptions there is, by assumption, no profit beyond the 
risk-free rental rate of return on capital. Profit maximisation is socially desirable (but trivial) 
under the competitive assumption that there are zero profits. Under these circumstances, the 
profitability of competing private firms may be a good benchmark against which to measure the 
performance of SOEs producing goods for which there is competitive market price.  
Allowing for non-competitive markets, and introducing uncertainty, provides scope for 
positive profits. It is still the case from an efficiency perspective that the marginal return on 
capital should be equalised between uses, but this is no longer represented in ‘profit’ that is 
foregone to achieve other objectives. The potential for monopoly rents and returns to risk 
confound profitability as a measure. 
Even in cases where an SOE’s return on capital can be isolated and measured, the nature of 
the state owner’s preferences is relevant to the assessment of the SOE’s performance.  In some 
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cases, the state owner may adopt a single explicit objective to maximise its financial returns, 
similar in nature to a private investor. But in many cases – particularly in those where there are 
social externalities from economic activity – the state owner’s interest goes beyond those of the 
private capitalist whose primary interest is profit. It may be prepared to accept lower profits in 
exchange for the distribution of value elsewhere.  
This could be measured elsewhere in GDP (for example, through higher employee 
compensation or taxes), in which case the first-round effect of redistributing capital away from 
SOEs (or inducing SOEs to act more like private firms) would be to redistribute income rather 
than to raise output. Alternatively, it could be unmeasured in GDP but nevertheless achieving 
policies that the state owner values. In either case, profits are foregone to achieve something of 
value elsewhere. A performance measure based only on missing profit is likely to over-estimate 
SOE inefficiency, since it fails to capture value realised elsewhere.  
The performance of SOEs therefore needs to be assessed based on the nature of the SOE in 
question, given the market structure of the sector in which its operating and the sector-specific 
policy objectives. This implies that a general performance measure for ‘state ownership’ overall 
will be misleading. A careful consideration of SOEs on a sector-by-sector basis is required. To 
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Chapter 3: China’s mixed economy and 
diverse state owners 
 
In principle, it is possible to compare performance between SOEs and non-SOEs in those 
markets where they directly compete. In markets that are still dominated by the state – whether 
because of active policy, or underlying market structures – domestic benchmarks may be 
missing. In which sectors of the Chinese economy do SOEs remain dominant, and where does 
the private sector take the lead? By examining the largest economic sectors to the smallest, the 
first part of this chapter shows the degree to which the prominence of the state in the Chinese 
economy has receded from its original dominance of the industrial sector. The chapter then 
projects forward to consider the future scope of state ownership in different sectors, based on 
current trends in fixed-asset investment. 
How is state ownership distributed between different types of state owners? Large central 
SASAC SOEs are now globally recognisable as some of the world’s largest companies, but if 
they are not generally representative of state capital overall, then a focus on their behaviour and 
performance may not be useful to judge the performance of SOEs more generally. 
Understanding the distribution of SOEs between the myriad central, provincial and local state 
owners beyond central SASAC helps understand the risks of treating State Grid or Sinopec as 
representative SOEs. 
3.1 Sectoral distribution of SOEs in China’s economy  
Table 3-1 sets out China’s economic sectors in order of their contribution to Chinese GDP, 
as measured by their value-added.18 Before considering each of the large sectors in turn, it is 
worth comparing the distribution of GDP with the distribution of SOE assets (excluding state-
owned banks that report through separate systems). The table shows that while the largest sector 
– manufacturing – accounted for a third of the value of Chinese output in 2014, it accounts for 
less than twenty per cent of all SOE assets (including the refining assets of the state oil 
conglomerates). By contrast, SOE assets are weighted heavily in ‘transport, storage and post’ 
(4.5 per cent of GDP but 16.4 per cent of SOE assets). While utilities directly contribute less 
than three per cent of Chinese GDP, they account for almost ten per cent of SOE assets 
(including the large electricity companies) and are important upstream industries that influence 
output across the economy. Over a quarter of total SOE assets fall into either ‘Government, 
                                                     
18 Some NBS categories are consolidated to allow comparison with Ministry of Finance SOE data – 
‘Wholesale and Retail Trade’ is consolidated with ‘Accommodation and Catering’. 
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NGO or Other’ and social services sectors,19 which combined account for only five per cent of 
GDP. 
Table 3-1 Value-added by industry, and distribution of SOE assets (2014) 
 
Percentage share of  
 
GDP GDP ex Finance SOE Assets 
Industry – Manufacturing 31.2 33.7 18.5 
Wholesale, retail, accommodation and catering 11.7 12.7 5.4 
Primary 9.3 10.1 0.9 
Finance 7.4 
  Construction 7.2 7.7 7.1 
Real Estate, Leasing and Commercial Service 6.1 6.5 9.8 
Transport, Storage and Post 4.5 4.9 16.4 
Education, Culture and Broadcasting 4.1 4.4 0.6 
Government, NGO and Other 3.8 4.1 10.7 
Industry – Mining 3.7 4.0 3.2 
IT, Computer Service and Software 2.5 2.7 0.2 
Industry – Utilities 2.4 2.6 9.4 
Health, Sports, and Welfare 2.0 2.2 0.1 
Scientific Research and Technical Services 2.0 2.1 1.0 
Social Services 1.5 1.7 16.2 
Geological Exploration and Water Conservancy 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Total 100.0 
  Total: ex Finance 
 
100.0 100.0 
Source GDP value-added shares calculated from China NBS (2016, secs 3–6), SOE assets 
shares from China Ministry of Finance (2015, sec. 384).  
 
The remainder of this section considers the extent of state ownership in each of these 
economic sectors, in declining order of their contribution to China’s GDP. In total, sectors for 
which official aggregate statistical reporting on ownership of assets or output exists covered 
77 per cent of the Chinese economy in 2014. 
3.1.1 Industry –  Manufacturing 
Manufacturing accounted for 31 per cent of GDP in 2014. The distribution of state 
ownership in manufacturing, as well as a comprehensive survey of market concentration in 
manufacturing will be considered in the next chapter. The performance of SOEs in 
manufacturing sectors is then further covered in Chapter 5.  
Here it is sufficient to observe that the SOE share of manufacturing assets has declined 
steadily for at least a decade. Figure 3-1 shows the relative decline of SOEs from manufacturing; 
in 2000 SOEs controlled just under sixty per cent of manufacturing assets; by 2014 the share 
                                                     
19 This includes amongst other things, aged care homes, services for the disabled and for communities, 
and funeral homes (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016, secs 22–20).  
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controlled by SOEs was less than thirty per cent. The state is fading from most manufacturing, 
even as vestiges of state ownership remain in each (Naughton, 2017, p. 286).  
Figure 3-1 SOE share of assets in above-scale manufacturing firms (2000–2014) 
 
Source Author’s calculations based on NBS Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
 
The decline of SOEs is even starker when focusing on internationally traded goods (Lardy, 
2014, pp. 86–88). In 2014 China was the world’s largest merchandise exporter, with goods 
exports valued at US$2.3 trillion, of which 95 per cent was manufactured goods (World Trade 
Organization, 2015, p. 44,89). Table 3-2 shows that the SOE share of industrial exports 
(including manufacturing) fell from 12 per cent in 2005 to 8 per cent in 2014.  
Table 3-2 Value of Chinese exports (2005–2014) 
 
Value of export 







2005  4,774.1   554.3   12  
2006  6,056.0   598.1   10  
2007  7,339.3   721.8   10  
2008  8,249.8   868.4   11  
2009  7,205.2   602.3   8  
2010  8,991.0   772.5   9  
2011  9,961.2   870.1   9  
2012  10,661.0   866.9   8  
2013  11,282.4   879.2   8  
2014  11,841.4   931.4   8  
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Even with the declining relative importance of SOE manufacturers, thousands of 
(particularly local) SOEs remain in competitive manufacturing sectors (Lardy, 2014, p. 141). By 
contrast, SOEs in manufacturing sectors are relatively rare in advanced economies – the 
OECD’s 2012 survey of OECD and partner countries (not including China) identified 185 
manufacturing SOEs out of 2,111 SOEs in total, which accounted for just 1.7 per cent of total 
SOE value (OECD, 2014, pp. 14–15).  
3.1.2 Wholesale and Retail Trade, Accommodation and Catering 
Figure 3-2 shows that the share of revenue held by SOEs in wholesale and retail sectors 
(the largest sector after manufacturing, at ten per cent of GDP) has more than halved for each 
since 1999, with the state share of retail being half that of wholesale. 
Figure 3-2 Revenue share of state-controlled wholesale, retail enterprises 
(1999–2014) 
 
Source NBS, domestic trade and household survey, accessed through CEIC China Premium 
Database. 2004, 2005 data are unavailable. 
 
Accommodation and catering account for a further two per cent of GDP. Within catering, 
the state-controlled share of revenue fell from 33 per cent in 2000 to five per cent in 2014 
(CEIC China Premium Database, Domestic Trade and Household Survey). In hotels the number 
of (formally registered) state-owned star-rated hotels has more than halved in absolute terms 
from 5,832 out of 12,731 star-rated hotels in 2006 (Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2015) to 2,426 out of 12,327 star-rated hotels in 2015 (Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism of the People’s Republic of China, 2017). 
3.1.3 Primary Industry  
The third largest sector (nine per cent of GDP) includes agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
As noted in Section 1.2.1, the agricultural sector was heavily influenced by state policies but not 
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formally state owned. Fewer than 2,000 state farms trace their origins to the 1950s (Lardy, 2014, 
p. 62), which by 2014 accounted for less than one per cent of SOE assets. 
3.1.4 Finance  
The state remains the leading player in the fourth largest sector, financial intermediation 
(seven per cent of GDP). Five large commercial banks are partially owned, either directly or 
indirectly by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, and are the largest financial intermediaries in 
China. Of these, the ‘Big Four’ (Naughton, 2007b, pp. 455–456) were spun off from the 
People’s Bank of China between 1979 and 1983. The Agricultural Bank of China was 
re-established to serve rural customers, the Bank of China was created to specialise in foreign 
exchange, and the Constitution Bank of China was created to finance fixed asset investment. 
The remaining savings and loans business was transferred to the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (Wu, 2005, p. 220; Lardy, 2014, p. 31). The fifth large commercial bank is the 
Bank of Communications. Its mainland operations had originally been merged with the People’s 
Bank in 1958, but it was re-established in 1987 by the State Council as a commercial bank 
headquartered in Shanghai (Bank of Communications, 2018).  
Although these five banks remain dominant, Figure 3-3 shows that their total share of 
Chinese banking assets declined from 58 to 39 per cent between 2003 and 2015. China’s other 
commercial and policy banks and financial institutions are also substantially state owned, but 
not necessarily at the central government level. Chang (2001) argued that foreign competition as 
part of China’s WTO accession would fundamentally reshape the China’s financial system, and 
with it the Chinese political-economy. Yet the share of assets held by foreign banks in China 
stubbornly remains around two per cent (Lardy, 2014, pp. 20–21). 
Figure 3-3 Share of total banking assets (2003–2015) 
 
Note Other commercial banks include shareholding commercial banks, city commercial banks 
and rural commercial banks. 
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Source Author’s calculation based on China Banking Regulatory Commission accessed 
through CEIC China Premium Database.  
 
3.1.5 Construction 
Construction is the fifth largest sector in the national accounts (seven per cent of GDP). 
Here the state remains dominant, although Table 3-3 shows that the state share of both revenues 
and profits declined from around four fifths in 2003 to around two thirds in 2014.  
Table 3-3 Share of domestic-non-private construction activity (2003–2014) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Assets 




Revenue 86.0 80.5 80.2 77.5 76.7 74.5 75.6 74.4 73.5 72.5 
 
70.6 
Profit 78.5 70.8 71.9 67.9 70.5 67.6 67.7 66.2 65.8 66.2 65.1 64.9 
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS, Construction Activity Indicator, accessed through 
CEIC China Premium Database. 
 
It is difficult in this sector to disentangle SOE performance from the efficiency of state 
spending more generally. Over this period, between a quarter and a third of the revenue of 
construction companies was for civil engineering projects. Given this is a state-dominated sector, 
it is associated with popular perceptions of China ‘over investing’ in unproductive infrastructure 
(for example, international airports or super highways well beyond current needs). However, the 
question of whether the government is spending on valuable assets should be separated from 
whether SOEs are an efficient method of producing those assets.  
If a particular local government in China expands infrastructure it is likely that the 
construction activity will be carried out by an SOE. Although the plan itself may be an entirely 
non-productive piece of infrastructure, the SOE might carry it out efficiently, in which case the 
problem lies with the state’s manner of project selection and budgeting rather than state 
ownership. By contrast, if the state-owned construction company is responsible for delivering 
what should be a highly productive piece of infrastructure, but is unable to control costs or 
deliver quality output to the same extent as a private firm, then there is a case for identifying 
state ownership as the culprit of inefficiency. 
3.1.6 Real Estate 
The real estate sector now accounts for six per cent of GDP, and ten per cent of SOE assets. 
Under the planned economy, capital for urban housing was financed by the central government, 
and then allocated and maintained by work units and municipalities. The first experiments with 
housing markets took place in Xi’an in 1979, before the large-scale privatisation took off with 
the National Housing Reform Plan in 1988. SOEs and local work units finally abandoned the 
provision of housing in 1998, by which time the housing market was more or less privatised 
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(Gibson, 2009). But while SOEs have played an active and opportunistic role in real estate 
development (Deng et al., 2015), they are not dominant. 
3.1.7 Industry – Mining 
Mining (primarily coal, oil and gas) and quarrying accounted for four per cent of GDP in 
2014. This is another sector that is dominated by SOEs, although the SOE share of mining 
assets has declined from more than 90 per cent in 2000 to around 70 per cent by 2014.  
Coal mining is the largest of these subsectors, with a long history of state ownership. From 
1949 to 1988 the entire Chinese coal industry was organised by a single ministry and divided 
into state-owned mines under the central government, with local state mines under provincial, 
county or prefectural governments, and ‘local non-state’ mines operated by townships, 
communes, collectives or the Army (Thomson, 2003, p. 28). Subsidisation, if not outright 
nationalisation, of coal is by no means unique to China – the British coal industry was 
nationalised in 1946. Coal also received ongoing government subsidies in the United States, 
Japan and Germany even into the 1980s (Thomson, 2003, p. 77). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, coal faced both increasing competition from TVEs and also 
heavy price regulation. The policy objective  was not to maintain high profits for SOEs but to 
ensure low costs for downstream energy users (Wright, 2000). Nevertheless, performance can 
be assessed through careful estimates of technical efficiency to measure the differences between 
different ownership types while controlling for geography. For example, using a stochastic 
production frontier technique (Zhao, 1994; Kalirajan and Zhao, 1997; Coelli, Rao and Battese, 
1998), Shi and Grafton (2010) estimate that state-owned coal mines in China were significantly 
less technically efficient than collectives or privately owned mines between 2000 and 2005.  
Although mining accounts for only three per cent of SOE assets, the state coal industry 
accounts for a disproportionate share of SOE employment. Of the 18 million employees of 
industrial SOEs in 2014, 3.2 million were employed in coal SOEs (China Ministry of Finance, 
2015, p. 391) – virtually unchanged over ten years.  
3.1.8 Industry – Utilities 
The utility sector covers the distribution and production of electricity, heat, gas and water. 
While only two per cent of GDP, this sector accounts for nine per cent of SOE assets. The SOE 
share of assets in this sector was relatively constant at 90 per cent from 2000 to 2014, although 
limited private sector operations have occurred in the city gas business (Lardy, 2014, pp. 76–78). 
The economic characteristics of network utilities, and the case for state ownership in the case of 
naturally monopolistic sectors, were discussed in the previous chapter. 
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3.1.9 Other Sectors 
Reliable measures of either assets or output are not available in other sectors such as 
transport, storage and post, public administration, health, education and utility management 
(which account for a further 13 per cent of output). Market reforms in these sectors lagged the 
reform and opening up of these sectors – the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
monopolised telecommunications into the 1990s (Naughton, 2007b, p. 343). Despite 
corporatisation and some market reforms, these are sectors where state ownership remains 
important (Naughton, 2017, p. 286). The next section will show that many large central SOEs 
operate in the transport and telecommunications sectors. 
The final nine per cent of Chinese output covers less established and newer service sectors 
such as information technology services, leasing and commercial services, scientific research, 
culture, sport and entertainment and other services, which either did not exist or were not a 
focus of economic development under the old economy. As per capita incomes rise in China 
they are likely to become more important (Hubbard, Hurley and Sharma, 2012), but the relative 
growth in the services sector creates something of a blind spot for the study of SOEs.  
Figure 3-4 shows that the distribution of SOE assets has been shifting – the services share 
grew from less than half in 2005 to more than 60 per cent in 2014. This shift is confirmed by the 
2013 Decision which pledged to ‘ensure state-owned capital increases its input into public-
welfare enterprises and make greater contributions in the provision of public services’ 
(Communist Party of China, 2014). These sectors are related to social services such as hospitals, 
kindergartens, museums, publishing houses, schools and universities (Brødsgaard, 2014, pp. 6–
7). To the extent that the value created in these sectors cannot be captured in competitive market 
prices for the goods and services that they produce, profit will be a poor measure for assessing 
the performance of SOEs in these sectors. 
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Figure 3-4 Distribution of SOE assets between sectors (2005-2014) 
 
Source (China Ministry of Finance, 2015, p. 384)  
 
While the industrial sectors (mining, manufacturing and utilities) are covered by 
comprehensive annual statistics, the newer services sector has grown rapidly without 
commensurate statistical coverage (Lardy, 2014, p. 79). Whether these are newly-created SOEs, 
or existing government services restructured in a new enterprise form, benchmarking against 
industrial SOEs’ performance might not be particularly informative. 
3.2 Projected distribution based on state share of fixed 
asset investment  
While comprehensive data on Chinese output by ownership is not available across all 
economic sectors, comprehensive statistics on fixed asset investment by ownership type are 
available (Lardy, 2014, pp. 117–119). They provide a leading indicator of the role of the state in 
economic output. The main limitation is that such data may understate the role of the state in 
sectors that are less dependent on fixed asset investment (such as finance, which accounts for 
seven per cent of GDP but only 0.2 per cent of fixed asset investment).  
Figure 3-5 shows the declining role of the state in fixed asset investment from 56 per cent 
in 2004 to 32 per cent by 2015. Of the five major sectors that collectively accounted for 80 per 
cent of fixed asset investment between 2004 and 2015, the state’s share fell significantly for all 
sectors except real estate.  
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Figure 3-5 Share of fixed asset investment by state-controlled enterprises, by 
sector (2004–2015) 
 
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS, Domestic Investment Indicator accessed through 
CEIC China Premium Database.  
 
The small surge in SOE investment in 2009 can be attributed to China’s infrastructure-
heavy stimulus response to the GFC (McKissack and Xu, 2011). The stimulus is sometimes 
portrayed as loose spending on behalf of SOEs at the behest of the state (Kowalski et al., 2013; 
Deng et al., 2015). But the National Development and Reform Commission Chairman’s 
pronouncement that ‘no ordinary manufacturing projects would get money’ (Wang, 2009) is 
borne out in the aggregate statistics – the SOE share of manufacturing investment continued to 
fall in 2009. Instead, the temporary uptick in the state share of total fixed asset investment 
suggests a temporary shift in the composition of investment toward infrastructure sectors that 
are state-owned, rather than an attempt to boost the investment of SOEs in general.   
Table 3-4 shows that by 2014 the state undertook around a third of fixed asset investment. 
In the manufacturing sector the share of fixed asset investment by state enterprises had fallen to 
just eight per cent.  
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Industry – Manufacturing 18,023,340.2 1,379,937.8  8  
Real Estate 12,670,615.7 3,073,478.6  24  
Water Conservancy, Environment and Utility Management 5,567,903.4 4,104,725.5  74  
Transport, Storage and Post 4,897,481.1 3,611,447.7  74  
Industry – Utilities 2,670,962.8 1,651,884.7  62  
Primary Industry 1,906,231.6 448,149.3  24  
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1,868,142.5 163,549.8  9  
Industry – Mining 1,297,021.8 580,526.8  45  
Leasing and Commercial Service 943,583.1 273,972.9  29  
Public Administration and Social Organization 785,091.8 571,064.5  73  
Education 772,324.2 556,974.9  72  
Culture, Sport and Entertainment 672,412.0 276,776.6  41  
Accommodation and Catering 650,422.6 83,233.0  13  
Information Transmission, Computer Service and Software 551,637.0 264,513.9  48  
Health Care, Social Security and Welfare 517,469.0 313,122.8  61  
Construction 489,670.1 263,916.0  54  
Scientific Research 475,154.0 146,930.0  31  
Other Service 262,816.2 64,608.5  25  
Financial Intermediation 136,724.9 64,492.3  47  
Total 55,159,003.8 17,893,305.6  32  
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS, Domestic Investment Indicator accessed through 
CEIC China Premium Database. 
 
The future state share of output can be projected by considering the contribution of 
different sectors to GDP today, and the state’s share in investment in each of these sectors. On 
the basis of GDP sector weights and the SOE share of fixed asset investment in 2007, 
Szamosszegi and Kyle (2011) estimated an implied long-run state share of value added of 
around 40 per cent. This is roughly double the average share of government production in GDP 
from the OECD of 21.5 per cent (OECD, 2016b).  
Table 3-5 shows the same calculation based on the changes in GDP and fixed asset 
investment shares up to 2014, to provide a long-run estimate of 30 per cent. While still much 
higher than an OECD average, it is well within the range of government production shares in 
France (27.6), Iceland (27.8), the Netherlands (29.9), Sweden (30.3), Denmark (30.5) and 
Finland (31.6) (OECD, 2016b). It projects that the state will remain concentrated in sectors 
where state intervention and involvement is not unusual in a mixed economy, including 
transport, education, health and construction.  
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(A) x (B) = implied 
long-run state 
percentage share of 
GDP 
Industry – Manufacturing 30 8 2 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 10 9 1 
Primary Industry 9 24 2 
Construction 7 54 4 
Financial Intermediation 7 47 3 
Real Estate 6 24 1 
Transport, Storage and Post 4 74 3 
Public Administration and Social Organization 4 73 3 
Industry – Mining 4 45 2 
Education 3 72 2 
Industry – Utilities 2 62 1 
Health Care, Social Security and Welfare 2 61 1 
Information Transmission, Computer Service and Software 2 48 1 
Leasing and Commercial Service 2 29 1 
Scientific Research 2 31 1 
Other Service 2 25 0 
Accommodation and Catering 2 13 0 
Water Conservancy, Environment and Utility Management 1 74 0 
Culture, Sport and Entertainment 1 41 0 
Gross Domestic Product 100 0 30 
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS, Domestic Investment Indicator and accessed 
through CEIC China Premium Database, and GDP value-added shares calculated 
from NBS (2016, secs 3–6) 
3.3 Diverse state owners20 
Part of the reason for the emphasis on China’s state sector has been that many of the 
largest Chinese companies, particularly those that have become large overseas investors are 
SOEs. Between 2005 and 2014, the number of Chinese SOEs included on the Global Fortune 
500 increased from 14 to 76 (Kwiatkowski and Augustynowicz, 2015). Table 3-6 shows that 44 
of China’s 50 largest corporations in 2013 were SOEs. These top 50 companies account for just 
under half (US$4.3 trillion) of the revenue for China’s 500 largest companies that year (US$9.2 
trillion). Where do these fit into the state system? What is the nature of these companies – and 
how do those that are administered by the central government (see section 3.3.1) compare to 
those administered by local governments (section 3.3.2)? 
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Table 3-6 Fifty largest Chinese enterprises by revenue (2013) 







1 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)  2,945.1   475.7   Central SASAC  
2 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)  2,759.3   445.7   Central SASAC  
3 State Grid Corporation of China  2,049.8   331.1   Central SASAC  
4 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC)  925.6   149.5   Central Other  
5 China Construction Bank Corporation (CCB)  771.0   124.5   Central Other  
6 Agricultural Bank of China  706.3   114.1   Central Other  
7 China State Construction Engineering Corporation  681.0   110.0   Central SASAC  
8 China Mobile Communications Corporation (CMCC)  661.9   106.9   Central SASAC  
9 Bank of China Limited (BOC)  649.4   104.9   Central Other  
10 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)  590.1   95.3   Central SASAC  
11 China Railway Construction Corporation Limited  588.7   95.1   Central SASAC  
12 SAIC Motor Corporation Limited   565.8   91.4   Provincial SASAC  
13 China Railway Group Limited  560.4   90.5   Central SASAC  
14 ChinaLife Insurance Company Ltd.  497.5   80.4   Central Other  
15 Sinochem Group  466.9   75.4   Central SASAC  
16 FAW Group Corporation  461.2   74.5   Central SASAC  
17 Dongfeng Motor Corporation  455.0   73.5   Central SASAC  
18 China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd.  447.0   72.2   Central SASAC  
19 China Development Bank  439.0   70.9   Central Other  
20 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China  415.5   67.1   Provincial Other  
21 China Minmetals Corporation  414.7   67.0   Central SASAC  
22 China Resources (Holdings)Co., Ltd  405.5   65.5   Central SASAC  
23 China North Industries Group Corporation  385.3   62.2   Central SASAC  
24 China Telecom Corp. Ltd.  381.5   61.6   Central SASAC  
25 CITIC Group  375.1   60.6   Central Other  
26 Shenhua Group Corporation Limited  367.8   59.4   Central SASAC  
27 China Pacific Construction Group Limited  366.6   59.2   Private  
28 China Post  362.5   58.6   Central Other  
29 China South Industries Corporation Group  361.8   58.4   Central SASAC  
30 Aviation Industry Corporation of China  349.4   56.4   Central SASAC  
31 Tianjin Material & Equipment Group Corporation  337.9   54.6   Provincial SASAC  
32 China Communications Construction Group  335.8   54.2   Central SASAC  
33 People's Insurance Company (Group) of China  304.7   49.2   Central Other  
34 China United Network Communications Corporation Ltd  304.7   49.2   Central SASAC  
35 Bao Steel Group Corporation  303.1   49.0   Central SASAC  
36 Bank of Communications  296.5   47.9   Central Other  
37 China Huaneng Group  293.2   47.4   Central SASAC  
38 Suning Corporation  279.8   45.2   Private  
39 China Aluminum Corporation  279.4   45.1   Central SASAC  
40 Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co., Ltd.  266.4   43.0   Provincial SASAC  
41 China National Building Materials Group Corporation  252.3   40.7   Central SASAC  
42 Greenland Group  252.2   40.7   Provincial SASAC  
43 Hebei Iron & Steel Group Co. Ltd  251.0   40.6   Provincial SASAC  
44 China National Chemical Corporation  244.0   39.4   Central SASAC  
45 Lenovo Holdings Ltd.  244.0   39.4   Private  
46 China National Machinery Industry Corporation  242.4   39.2   Central SASAC  
47 Shandong Weiqiao Pioneering Group Co..Ltd  241.4   39.0   Private  
48 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd  239.0   38.6   Private  
49 Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co., Ltd.  236.1   38.1   Provincial SASAC  
50 Amer International Group  233.8   37.8   Private  
Source China Top 500 Enterprises list (China Enterprise Confederation/China Enterprise 
Directors Association, 2014), China Top 500 Private Enterprises 2014 list (Sina, 
2014), firm ownership information from central and local SASAC websites, 
central Huijin website and annual reports. 
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There are some very large enterprise groups under the control of the central government, 
such as the national electricity grid, State Grid Corporation, and the two oil giants, Sinopec and 
CNPC. These SOEs are the parent companies for much larger corporate groups. It is these large 
enterprise groups that have gained global prominence in the Fortune 500 and large-scale 
overseas investment (Luo, Qi and Hubbard, 2017). 
Amongst the 44 largest SOEs, 37 were under the direct administration of the central 
government, and seven SOEs are under the direct administration of local state agencies. For two 
thirds of all of these, including China’s key industrial conglomerates in electricity, oil, minerals, 
telecommunications and leading heavy-manufacturing firms, the central government is 
represented by central SASAC. Of the 161,000 SOEs and subsidiaries enumerated in the 2015 
Finance Yearbook (China Ministry of Finance, 2015), 54,000 come under the jurisdiction of the 
central government. The remaining 106,000 are administered at provincial level and below. 
Although the largest and most prominent SOEs are administered at the central level, more 
than half of SOE assets were controlled below central level by 2015, as shown in Table 3-7. 
Table 3-7 Total of SOE assets by supervising authority (Billion RMB) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central-SASAC 17,360.7  20,976.0  24,321.8  27,972.8  31,337.7 34,941.9  38,625.9  
Central-Other  5,599.7   6,934.1   8,709.7  10,434.8  12,074.2 13,653.0  15,351.7  
Local 20,351.0  25,514.3  30,989.9  37,500.7  46,077.1 55,499.9  64,494.0  
Total 43,311.4  53,424.4  64,021.4  75,908.2  89,489.0  104,094   118,471  
Central SASAC (%) 40  39  38  37  35  34  33  
Central Other (%) 13  13  14  14  13  13  13  
Local (%) 47  48  48  49  51  53  54  
Source Author’s calculation based on Finance Yearbook (China Ministry of Finance, 2015, pp. 
381–383) 
3.3.1 Central state owners 
Table 3-8 shows that there are 823 SOEs that report directly to central government 
ministries, commissions, administrations and bureaux. Aside from central SASAC and the 
Ministry of Finance, there are 26 central government ministries, agencies and affiliated bodies 
that supervise 698 other central SOEs. 
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Table 3-8 Number of SOEs under direct central supervision (2015) 
Ministries and Commissions under the State Council: 599 
  










East China Normal University 
  
15 






Beijing Normal University 
  
13 
Sun Yat-sen University 
  
13 






Ocean University of China 
  
10 
83 other universities with fewer than ten SOEs 
  
229 










China Railway Corporation 
  
1 
Central Cultural Enterprises under the supervision of Ministry of Finance 
  
111 
































State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 114 
  
Organizations directly under the State Council 54 
  




















Administrations and bureaux under ministries and commissions 14 
  












































Source Author’s deconstruction of Central State Capital Budget Reporting System (China 
Ministry of Finance, 2016) 
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The relationships of central state agencies to these SOEs, and also their listed subsidiaries 
(including joint ventures) are illustrated in Figure 3-6. The ministries, commissions and other 
agencies of the central government are illustrated as red nodes, emanating from the “central 
government” node next to the corresponding label in the bottom, right of the diagram. Central 
SASAC is one of these commissions, marked as a red node in the top right of the diagram. The 
cyan nodes coming from this SASAC node are central SASAC SOEs (to be introduced in the 
next subsection). Other cyan nodes are SOEs of other central ministries and agencies (to be 
introduced in Subsection 3.3.1.2). Light green dots are SOE subsidiaries of Central Huijin, a 
holding company for China’s most important financial system players. On the left-hand side of 
the diagram, the dark blue nodes represent universities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education. The magenta nodes indicate SOEs that are subsidiary of those universities.  
The grey nodes are publicly-listed subsidiaries of SOEs on China’s two domestic stock 
exchanges. Where there are multiple edges leading to more than one parent, this indicates 
publicly-listed SOEs that are partially owned by more than one SOE parent. For example, 
financial SOEs owned by ‘Central Huijin’ may also have a stake in listed university-SOEs 
(populating the space to the left of ‘Central Huijin’) or Central SASAC SOEs (to the right). 
Figure 3-6 Central government SOEs and their listed subsidiary companies 
 
Source Created by author using Gephi is an open-source network analysis and visualisation 
software package, based on Ministry of Finance (2016), and ‘ultimate controlling 
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3.3.1.1 Central SASAC SOEs 
Table 3-9 shows that 30 per cent of the SOE assets under the control of central SASAC sit 
inside three Chinese oil companies, State Grid (the monopoly electricity distributor for 88 per 
cent of China), and China Mobile (China’s largest telecommunications company). The smallest 
56 central SASAC SOEs have a combined total asset value equivalent to that of State Grid. 
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Table 3-9 Largest central SASAC SOEs by total asset value (2014) 





(%) Cum (%) 
1 China National Petroleum Corporation 3,939.4 641.3 10 10 
2 State Grid Corporation of China 2,892.9 470.9 7 18 
3 China Petroleum &. Chemical Corporation 2,228.4 362.8 6 23 
4 China Mobile Communications Corporation 1,530.8 249.2 4 27 
5 China National Offshore Oil Corporation 1,119.4 182.2 3 30 
6 China Resources (Holdings) Co, Ltd  934.6 152.2 2 33 
7 Shenhua Group Corporation Limited 928.6 151.2 2 35 
8 China Huaneng Group 928.2 151.1 2 37 
9 China State Construction Engineering Corporation 923.9 150.4 2 40 
10 Aviation Industry Corporation of China 799.6 130.2 2 42 
11 China Guodian Corporation 787.1 128.1 2 44 
12 China Huadian Corporation 726.6 118.3 2 46 
13 China Datang Corporation 720.4 117.3 2 47 
14 China Telecommunications Corporation 700.3 114.0 2 49 
15 China Railway Engineering Corporation 685.4 111.6 2 51 
16 China Power Investment Corporation 680.4 110.8 2 53 
17 China Grain Reserves Corporation 678.8 110.5 2 55 
18 China Communications Construction Company, Ltd 661.9 107.8 2 56 
19 China Railway Construction Corporation 630.1 102.6 2 58 
20 China Merchants Group 624.2 101.6 2 59 
21 China Southern Power Grid Co, Ltd 617.0 100.4 2 61 
22 China United Network Telecommunications Group Corp 591.7 96.3 2 63 
23 China Poly Group Corporation 550.9 89.7 1 64 
24 Baosteel Group Corporation 534.7 87.0 1 65 
25 Aluminum Corporation of China Limited 486.5 79.2 1 67 
26 China Three Gorges Project Corporation 475.5 77.4 1 68 
27 State Development & Investment Corp 461.7 75.2 1 69 
28 COFCO Corporation 439.8 71.6 1 70 
29 China Power Construction Corporation 413.2 67.3 1 71 
30 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 412.7 67.2 1 72 
31 China National Building Material Group Corporation 406.9 66.2 1 73 
32 China National Nuclear Corporation 394.6 64.2 1 74 
33 China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation 388.9 63.3 1 75 
34 China Minmetals Corporation 366.1 59.6 1 76 
35 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 359.1 58.5 1 77 
36 Sinochem Corporation 355.4 57.8 1 78 
37 China Metallurgical Group Corporation 338.8 55.1 1 79 
38 China South Industries Group Corporation 334.9 54.5 1 80 
39 China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 328.9 53.5 1 81 
40 China FAW Group Corporation 328.7 53.5 1 82 
 
Other enterprises with above-median assets: 17 4,145.8 674.9 11 11 
 
Enterprises with below-median assets 56 3,015.8 491.0 8 18 
 
All Central SASAC SOEs 38,868.4 6,327.5 100 
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Central SASAC companies and their subsidiaries employed 12.8 million workers in 2014 
(SASAC, 2016, p. 1). Half of these were employed by just ten SOEs. By contrast, the smallest 
central SOEs such as China Travelsky Holding Company, China National Arts & Craft (Group), 
the China National Cotton Reserves Corporation and the China National Silk Import & Export 
Corporation each employ no more than a few thousand workers.  
Table 3-10 shows that the distribution of financial returns from central SOEs is even more 
concentrated in a handful of large SOEs. Seven central SOEs produced half of the 515 billion 
RMB (US$83.8 billion) accounting profits in 2014 for central SASAC SOEs. Notably the three 
oil companies are not only the most profitable, but pay 42 per cent of the total taxes of central 
SOEs, due to the significant resource rents they can extract. Total central SASAC SOE losses 
amounted to just four per cent of profits, showing that the sector as a whole was profitable. 
Losses were concentrated in resource companies, the largest loss maker being the Aluminum 
Corporation of China (Chinalco). 
Table 3-10 Largest profits and losses amongst central SASAC SOEs (2014) 
 

















China National Petroleum Corporation 123.8 20.2 13 427.8 69.6 21 
China Mobile Communications Corporation 94.1 15.3 10 72.3 11.8 4 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 79.2 12.9 8 129.7 21.1 6 
State Grid Corporation of China 62.4 10.2 6 138.3 22.5 7 
Shenhua Group Corporation Limited 48.4 7.9 5 58.1 9.5 3 
China Petroleum &. Chemical Corporation 45.1 7.3 5 309.5 50.4 15 
China FAW Group Corporation 44.6 7.3 5 75.5 12.3 4 
Other Profitable SOEs – 97 515.0 83.8 53 806.2 131.2 39 
Loss Making SOEs – 9 -35.5 -5.8 -4 33.2 5.4 2 
Aluminum Corporation of China Limited -21.2 -3.45 -2.2 7.6 1.2 
 
Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation -5.0 -0.82 -5.1 9.3 1.5 
 
Sinosteel Corporation -3.8 -0.61 -3.8 1.9 0.3 
 
China Railway Materials Commercial Corp. -2.7 -0.44 -2.8 1.3 0.2 
 
China Minmetals Corporation -2.0 -0.32 -2.0 6.9 1.1 
 
China National Salt Industry Corporation -0.2 -0.04 -0.3 1.8 0.3 
 
Harbin Electric Corporation -0.2 -0.03 -0.2 1.3 0.2 
 
China National Gold Group Corporation -0.2 -0.03 -0.2 2.7 0.4 
 
China First Heavy Industries -0.2 -0.02 -0.2 0.5 0.1 
 
Source Author’s calculation based on SASAC General Affairs Bureau (2016)  
 
Although there were only 114 SOEs directly administered by central SASAC in 2014, 
there are 40,615 central SOEs after including their subsidiaries (SASAC, 2015, p. 699) – an 
average of 356 members in each SOE group. Since these may be in different industries it can be 
difficult to distinguish from the name of the group the extent of the operations of its subsidiaries. 
Businesses can be diversified well beyond the main sector of their parent company name (Eaton, 
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2013; Lardy, 2014, pp. 50–51). These include subsidiaries and joint ventures that may or may 
not be listed on the stock market, or otherwise involve mixed ownership.   
3.3.1.2 Other central ministries and agencies 
The central government also indirectly owns much of the financial sector outside the 
SASAC system. The head of the China Investment Corporation, a sovereign wealth fund 
established in 2007, is a direct appointment by the State Council, and its governance is heavily 
influenced by the Ministry of Finance (Hu, 2014). The China Investment Corporation is the 
parent of Central Huijin Investment Limited, which holds controlling shares in China’s largest 
banks.21 The Ministry of Finance also administers the China National Tobacco Corporation, 
China Post and the China Railway Corporation, which itself was converted from a ministry to 
corporate form in 2013 (China Railway Corporation, 2015).  
Of this rump group of central SOEs, 372 are university-run enterprises. These enterprises 
fall under the jurisdiction of individual universities under the Ministry of Education. They were 
typically created to take advantage of some technology or other asset of the university, and 
include many high technology firms, including personal computer manufacturers Tongfang and 
Founder. Legend Holdings, the parent company of computer manufacturer Lenovo, is an 
academy-run enterprise founded by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Eun, Lee and Wu, 2006). 
In the absence of a strong intellectual property regime, these enterprises are one way to provide 
incentives for the development and commercialisation of research conducted at the university 
(Fu and Zhang, 2017). 
The Ministry of Finance is also responsible for overseeing more than one hundred ‘central 
cultural enterprises’ (mostly publishers). The China Film Group Corporation is an SOE under 
the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television. Other examples 
include the Capital Airport Group Corporation, which owns the Beijing Capital Information 
Airport, and is itself administered by the Civil Aviation Administration of China. Less 
economically significant, but still reflecting the diversity of central SOEs, the four-star Beijing 
Debao Hotel is an SOE under the General Office of the State Council. 
3.3.2 Local state owners 
The administrative structures for managing provincial and local SOEs mirror those of 
central SOEs. Reporting to central SASAC, there is a provincial-level SASAC for each of 
China’s 31 provincial level governments, as well as for the cities of Dalian, Ningbo, Xiamen, 
                                                     
21 Banking executives tend to be technocrats originally drawn from the State’s economic and planning 
ministries (Zhang, 2016). 
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Qingdao and Shenzhen.22 In turn, these provincial-level SASACs oversee state asset 
administration offices and bureaux at the municipal, district and county levels.  
The greatest value of local SOE assets is in the more developed coastal regions. Map 3-1 
shows the distribution of SOE assets between provincial SASACs. The size of the pie represents 
the relative value of SOE assets in each province, which are concentrated in coastal provinces, 
and the area around Beijing. The colours represent the division between industrial SOEs (dark 
red) and those in non-industrial sectors (light grey). The weight of SOE assets in most provinces 
is toward non-industrial sectors – notably the social service, government and real estate sectors.  
Map 3-1 Distribution of local SOE assets by province and industry (2014) 
 
Source Author’s map based on SASAC (2015, pp. 704–709)   
                                                     
22 The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (or bingtuan) also has its own SASAC, separate from 
that of Xinjiang provincial SASAC. The bingtuan was established in 1954 and compromised of 
demobilised army units. In 1975 there were 12 plants – including two iron and steel plants (McMillen, 
1981, p. 72). By 2014 the bingtuan were 1,068 SOEs and subsidiaries (including state farms, and social 
service enterprises), administered either directly by the bingtuan, its SASAC, or one of its 14 prefecture-
level divisions (SASAC, 2015, p. 369). 
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A large proportion of these local SOE assets are administered at a sub-provincial level. 
Map 3-2 shows the distribution of SOE equity at the sub-provincial level. These are spread 
throughout 506 municipal, county and district level state asset offices and bureaux, as well as 11 
special zones (such as free-trade zones or development zones). County-level SOE equity tends 
to be concentrated in coastal provinces, including along the Yangtze River, and inland around 
Chengdu. There is no systematic public reporting of SOEs by sector at this level. 
Map 3-2 County-level equity by provincial SOE owner (2014) 
 
Source Author’s map based on SASAC-- 
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Provincial SOEs employed 16.4 million workers in 2014. Map 3-3 shows the share of 
provincial SOE employment in the total employment of each province. In the coastal provinces, 
the share of SOE employees is low – the concentration is much higher in the northern provinces 
around Beijing, and poorer inland provinces.  
Map 3-3 Provincial SOE employment as share of urban employment (2014) 
 
Source Author’s map based on SASAC (2015, pp. 701–702) and Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security, Urban Employment, accessed through CEIC 
China Premium Database. 
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Map 3-4 shows that the highest return on SOE capital comes from coastal provinces and 
Beijing. Notably, the municipalities of Tianjin and Chongqing had high SOE investment, but 
low returns on SOEs. In Heilongjiang, provincial SOEs lost an average of 11,145 RMB per 
worker. 
Map 3-4 Return on local SOE assets (2014) 
 
Source Author’s calculation based on SASAC (2015, p. 701,713-766).  
 
Large local SOE conglomerates are uncommon. While there is no consistent and 
comprehensive statistical reporting on direct and indirect ownership of various types of SOEs, 
the 2010 SASAC Yearbook provided a breakdown of industrial sector SOEs according to 
whether they were directly administered by the state (first tier) or not (second and third tier). 
Fourth-tier subsidiaries and below are not reported. Table 3-11 shows that the industrial central 




Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
Table 3-11 Industrial SOEs and their subsidiaries (2009) 
 
 
First tier To third Tier Employees 
End of year 
state assets  
(billion RMB) 
Industrial SOEs 10,125 36,618 18,445,000   7,340.98  
of which, central 590 11,222 8,464,000  5,057.12  
SASAC 56 10,442 7,734,000  4,258.13  
Other 534 780  730,000   798.99  
of which, local 9,535 25,396 9,981,000  2,283.86  
Source SASAC (2010, p. 775) 
 
Table 3-12 shows a detailed breakdown for Liaoning Province adapted from the province’s 
report from the 2015 SASAC Yearbook. In total, there are 3,591 state-controlled companies of 
which just over half (1,812) are directly controlled a state agency. The remainder are indirectly 
controlled subsidiaries.  
Table 3-12 Liaoning Province, direct and indirect local SOEs (2014) 
 
Total Direct Indirect 
Whole Province 3,591 1,812 1,779 
Provincial 1,263 396 867 
SASAC 697 24 673 
Other 566 372 194 
Municipal 2,328 1,416 912 
Dalian City 687 182 505 
Shenyang City 497 235 262 
Yingkou City 202 90 112 
Dandong City 151 151 0 
Fuxin City 148 148 0 
Anshan City 115 115 0 
Fushun City 110 104 6 
Chaoyang City 105 78 27 
Huludao City 72 72 0 
Panjin City 70 70 0 
Jinzhou City 68 68 0 
Tieling City 51 51 0 
Benxi City 26 26 0 
Liaoyang City 26 26 0 
Source Adapted from SASAC (2015, p. 128) 
 
Even within these limited statistics it is possible to observe quite different holding patterns. 
SOEs that are controlled directly by smaller municipalities within the province tend to have no 
subsidiaries at all. The average number of subsidiaries per SOE is higher in large cities such as 
Dalian and Shenyang. For companies that are under direct administration at the provincial level, 
there is a clear distinction between SOEs controlled by Liaoning SASAC, and those controlled 
by other agencies of the provincial government.  
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At this provincial level, 87 per cent of state equity is controlled through the SASAC 
system. The largest Liaoning Provincial SASAC SOE is the Benxi Steel Group Corporation, 
which was the world’s 21st largest steel maker by tonnage in 2015, and the 11th largest Chinese 
steel maker (World Steel Association, 2015). This steel company itself was the product of a 
2010 merger between Benxi Steel and municipal level Beitai Steel (Benxi Steel Group 
Corporaton, 2017). It is also the parent of Bengang Steel Plates, a company listed on the 
Shenzhen stock exchange which in 2014 was listed 136th by revenue. The names of the other 
largest provincial SASAC SOEs also indicate that they are part of corporate groups rather than 
stand-alone enterprises. In total, the 24 Liaoning SASAC SOEs control 673 subsidiaries.  
By contrast, the remaining 13 per cent of state equity administered at the provincial level is 
not administered through the SASAC system. Instead, local agencies such as the local water 
department, transport authority, and news and broadcasting authority directly control 372 SOEs, 
which between them have only 194 subsidiary companies. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The extent of state ownership in the Chinese economy varies greatly between sectors. 
SOEs have all but retreated from China’s largest export-oriented manufacturing sector; but the 
state retains its traditional dominance in finance, construction, mining and utilities. It is in these 
latter sectors that China’s (and some of the world’s) largest SOEs are to be found. But such 
companies are becoming less representative of state ownership overall. With the continued 
development of China’s economy, the services sector – particularly related to social services – 
is a large and growing share of state investment. Projections based on the state’s share of fixed 
asset investment across different sectors suggest that overall the state’s share of the economy 
may be approaching that of other mixed economies. 
While China’s most prominent SOEs tend to be sprawling conglomerates under the 
jurisdiction of central SASAC, these central SOEs are not typical of state ownership overall. 
Most state capital is now controlled by local state owners, at the provincial and county level. 
These SOEs are much more likely to be smaller, stand-alone enterprises. Their profitability, as 
well as their contribution to the local economy, varies regionally – with local SOE profitability 
being highest in the more developed coastal provinces where SOE employment is least 
significant. Local SOE assets are mostly outside the industrial sector. This diversity, not just 
amongst SOEs but between different state owners across China, cautions against SOEs as a 
homogenous category. The next chapter considers variation between sectors. 
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Chapter 4: The extent of state monopoly in 
Chinese industry23 
 
Under the planned economy, Chinese industry was deliberately monopolised by the state. 
After decades of domestic and foreign competition, to what extent does this remain the case? 
Chapter 2 argued that SOE profitability could be a good indicator of performance in those 
competitive sectors where profits are not confounded by monopoly rents. An empirical 
assessment of which Chinese industrial subsectors are in fact competitive is necessary to 
identify those subsectors where a direct, profit-based comparison of SOEs and non-SOEs is 
most meaningful. 
Previous studies, using the NBS’ Survey of Above-Scale Industrial enterprises, have found 
a low degree of market concentration as measured in Chinese industry. Because the survey’s 
unit of observation is the individual plant or legal entity, this misses potential coordination of 
economic activity between members of the large SOE conglomerates identified in the previous 
chapter. This chapter proposes some adjustments to account for this and identifies large state 
monopolies. 
The 2011 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission claimed that ‘in many sectors state-owned enterprises have substantial market 
power, allowing them to dictate prices and earn above-normal returns’ (2011, p. 42). But after 
comparing the profit margins of state and non-state sectors from China’s National Statistics 
Yearbook, Lardy argues that there is ‘no evidence either that state firms as a group have long 
had market power that boosts their profitability’ (2014, p. 26). Having identified concentrated 
sectors, this chapter considers which of these claims can be substantiated by the data?  Is it 
possible to describe SOE behaviour in general – or is their proclivity to extract monopoly rents 
sector specific, as suggested by the framework presented in Chapter 2? 
4.1 Measuring market concentration  
To argue that industrial concentration is low in China, Lardy (2014, p. 23) relies on an 
OECD working paper (Conway et al., 2010) and a related report (OECD, 2010). These studies 
found that, when measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration 
(Hall and Tideman, 1967), only 34 of China’s 523 industrial subsectors could be classified as 
‘highly concentrated’ by 2008, compared to 88 of 591 industrial subsectors in 1998. 
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The HHI is calculated by adding the sum of the squares of each firm’s share of output in a 
particular sector. A subsector that is literally monopolised (that is, has a single seller) has a HHI 
of one. At the other extreme, in a subsector approaching perfect competition, all firms have an 
infinitesimally small share of revenue and so the industry’s HHI approach zero. A duopoly in 
which two firms split revenue equally would have a HHI of 0.5. By contrast, if there were two 
firms in a subsector in which the leading firm had 75 per cent of revenue, and the second firm 
had only 25 per cent of revenue, HHI would increase to 0.625, reflecting the increased market 
concentration of the leading firm. 
The 1997 revision of the anti-trust guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, 1997)24 defines an HHI less than 0.1 to be unconcentrated, between 0.1 and 
0.18 to be moderately concentrated, and more than 0.18 to be highly concentrated.25 While 
thresholds are somewhat arbitrary, they reflect an underlying logic that the difficulty of 
coordinating anti-competitive behaviour increases with the number of firms. Although cartels 
can be organised even in industries that are not highly concentrated, two-thirds of cartels in the 
United States had fewer than ten members (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006); a market divided 
equally amongst ten cartel members would have an HHI of 0.1, equivalent to the threshold for 
moderate concentration. 
A major limitation of the OECD studies is that they provide a count of the number of 
subsectors that are concentrated, but do not account for their different economic weights. 
Between them, the largest 34 subsectors accounted for 50 per cent of Chinese industrial revenue 
in 2009, compared to just 0.1 per cent for the smallest 34 subsectors. This leaves an outstanding 
question of which subsectors are concentrated, and how significant they are to the economy 
overall. A second limitation of these studies is that the survey data on which the calculations 
rely do not recognise that the individual ‘legal persons’ that are the unit of analysis for the 
survey may be part of the large SOE conglomerates that are characteristic of central industrial 
SOEs. To address this, this chapter introduces novel adjustments to group survey observations 
based on both shared company names and shared administrative relationships (lishu guanxi) 
between SOEs in the same industrial subsector.  
4.1.1 Enterprise-level survey data (2009) 
The NBS annual industrial statistics are derived from an annual survey of ‘above-scale 
industrial enterprises’ (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010b). This survey data is 
                                                     
24 HHI has been used since 1982 to assess market concentration before and after potential corporate 
mergers for the enforcement of anti-trust laws in the United States (Calkins, 1983). 
25 These thresholds were revised in 2010, defining unconcentrated markets to be those with an HHI less 
than 0.15, moderately concentrated between 0.15 and 0.25, and highly concentrated above 0.25 (U.S. 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010). Since these thresholds are arbitrary and to 
ensure consistency with the earlier thresholds used by Conway et al. (2010) and OECD (2010) this 
chapter applies the 1997 thresholds. 
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frequently used in empirical studies of China’s industrial economy (Dougherty, Herd and He, 
2007; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012; Liao and Tsui, 
2012; Brandt, Tombe and Zhu, 2013; Li, Jian and Jiang, 2013; Du, Liu and Zhou, 2014). The 
structure of this data is well described by Brandt et al. (2014). The features relevant to the 
measurement of market concentration are described briefly in this section. 
The survey’s unit of analysis is the ‘legal person’, described in this chapter as a firm. Each 
firm is classified according to China’s Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities. 
Prior to 2013, these included 521 industrial subsectors from the 2002 Industrial Classification 
for National Economic Activities (CSIC, GB/T 4754—2002).  
An industrial enterprise is classified as ‘above-scale’ if the revenue from its main business 
is above a certain threshold, set at five million RMB (approximately US$1 million) between 
2007 and 2010, and 20 million RMB (approximately US$3 million) since 2011. Because the 
HHI calculation includes very small firms, it is sensitive to the cut-off threshold – a rise in the 
threshold removes smaller competitors from the calculation and so places an upward bias on the 
measurement of HHI (Bai, Mao and Zhang, 2014). For this reason survey data from the 2009 
year is used since it applies a lower threshold and covers 420,000 observations – the subsequent 
threshold increase excluded around 100,000 firms from the sample. Nevertheless, market 
concentration in Chinese industrial sectors is stable over time after adjusting for changes in 
threshold (Bai, Mao and Zhang, 2014), and so the findings in this chapter are likely to be 
applicable to subsequent years. 
The previous chapter revealed significant differences between central SOEs and SOEs 
administered at a local level. These relationships can be observed in the survey data using the 
administrative relationship (lishu guanxi) variable, which reveals a firm’s level of assignation 
within the state hierarchy (Tan, Li and Xia, 2007). The administrative relationship makes it 
possible to distinguish between SOEs controlled at the central level (SOE-Central), and those 
controlled at the provincial level and below (SOE-Local).  
Table 4-1 provides summary statistics on the distribution of industrial revenue amongst 
ownership types. It shows that SOEs tend to be larger (both mean and median) than non-SOEs, 
with central SOEs being by far the largest. Central SOEs make up less than one percent of all 
industrial enterprises, but earn almost 13 per cent of industrial revenue. 
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Table 4-1 Revenue from main business, by controller (2009) 
 
Revenue (Million RMB) 
   
 
Mean Median Max Sum. Share (%) Obs. Share (%) 
SOE-Central 2,139.5 187.3 146,805.6 6,773,500.7 12.7 3,166 0.8 
SOE-Local 486.7 56.0 209,937.1 8,201,693.2 15.4 16,850 4.0 
State Sector 
   
14,975,194.0 28.1 20,016 4.7 
Collective 131.6 29.6 149,250.4 2,209,532.5 4.1 16,788 4.0 
Private 74.1 25.3 111,049.6 22,358,580.4 42.0 301,694 71.5 
Foreign 137.5 35.2 42,014.8 3,894,574.1 7.3 28,325 6.7 
HMT 225.1 44.0 101,067.6 7,012,686.3 13.2 31,151 7.4 
Other 116.2 29.4 33,553.9 2,807,102.4 5.3 24,149 5.7 
Nonstate Sector 
   
38,282,475.8 71.9 402,107 95.3 
All 126.2 28.2 209,937.1 53,257,669.8 100.0 422,123 100.0 
 
Table 4-2 shows that SOEs in the survey report a total of 21.3 trillion in total assets, 
compared to 21.7 trillion RMB reported in the China Financial Yearbook (China Ministry of 
Finance, 2015, p. 384), and 21.6 trillion RMB reported in the China Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010, secs 14–6). According to the survey data, 
industrial assets are split roughly between central and local SOEs. 
Table 4-2 Total industrial assets, by controller (2009) 
 
Assets (Million RMB) 
   
 
Mean Median Max Sum. Share (%) Obs. Share (%) 
SOE-Central 3,043 293 566,885 10,029,071 20.7 3,296 0.8 
SOE-Local 658 80 222,665 11,260,611 23.3 17,102 4.1 
State Sector 
   
21,289,682 44.0 20,398 4.8 
Collective 104 20 139,651 1,734,594 3.6 16,741 4.0 
Private 48 14 93,086 14,507,160 30.0 301,467 71.4 
Foreign 118 30 31,426 3,334,393 6.9 28,311 6.7 
HMT 172 39 36,877 5,339,502 11.0 31,106 7.4 
Other 89 18 36,306 2,138,362 4.4 24,100 5.7 
Nonstate Sector    27,054,011 56.0 401,725 95.2 
All 115 17 566,885 48,343,693 100.0 422,123 100.0 
 
4.2 Statistical Results 
Having calculated the HHI for each subsector, Table 4-3 lists the 20 subsectors out of 521 
that are ‘highly concentrated’, based on a HHI threshold of 0.18. These subsectors are all very 
small in revenue terms – the largest, ‘switching equipment’ (a manufacturing sector creating 
components for electricity distribution), accounts for just 0.5 per cent of total industrial revenue.  
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3759 Navigation Mark and Other Floating Equipment  0.607  4,179,077 0.01 0.0 
3313 Nickel Cobalt Smelting  0.539  86,343,145 0.16 0.2 
1093 Gem Stone Mining  0.445   600,402 0.00 0.2 
2824 Polyvinyl Alcohol Fiber  0.384  3,262,602 0.01 0.2 
4012 Switching Equipment  0.358   267,623,181  0.50 0.7 
4690 Other Sewage Treatment, Utilizing and Distribution  0.356  6,480,314  0.01 0.7 
3519 Other Motor Machine  0.336  9,261,692  0.02 0.7 
1535 Solid Beverage  0.323  21,397,813  0.04 0.7 
3679 Other Agriculture Machinery and Maintenance  0.310  40,208,489  0.08 0.8 
922 Silver Ore Mining  0.280  3,247,388  0.01 0.8 
3791 Diving and Underwater Succoring, Refloating Equipment  0.259   777,486  0.00 0.8 
3491 Coin and Other Valued Metal Lab Products  0.257  3,523,434  0.01 0.8 
4152 Slide Projector and Overhead Projector  0.248  2,173,051  0.00 0.8 
1364 Fish Oil Distilling and Products  0.241   117,681  0.00 0.8 
690 Other Coal Mining and Washing  0.213  2,374,134  0.00 0.8 
4413 Nuclear Electric Power Generation  0.210  24,455,677  0.05 0.9 
3314 Tin Smelting Industry  0.205  22,999,281  0.04 0.9 
4151 Filming Machine  0.202   472,673  0.00 0.9 
2823 Acrylic Fiber  0.199  7,689,740  0.01 1.0 
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Table 4-4 lists the 31 ‘moderately concentrated’ subsectors (HHI between 0.10 and 0.18). 
These are also a small proportion of Chinese industry. The largest moderately concentrated 
manufacturing subsector is air conditioners. Together, these 51 concentrated subsectors account 
for just 2.5 per cent of industrial revenue.  

















3952 Air Conditioner 0.177 231,634,868 0.43 1.4 
52 Valued Metal Rolling Processing 0.157 63,847,478 0.12 1.5 
3673 Forestry Mechanical Equipment 0.157 314,420 0.00 1.5 
1091 Asbestos and Mica Ore Mining 0.156 1,716,690 0.00 1.5 
3674 Husbandry Mechanical Equipment 0.155 2,604,319 0.00 1.5 
3513 Steam Turbine and Fitting 0.153 46,590,473 0.09 1.6 
3769 Other Aircraft 0.151 587,286 0.00 1.6 
2413 Teaching Specimen and Mode 0.149 4,805,876 0.01 1.6 
4124 Meter Apparatus for Farming, Forestry, and Fishing 0.146 604,873 0.00 1.6 
933 Radioactive Metal Ore Mining 0.145 911,785 0.00 1.6 
3514 Water Turbine and Fitting 0.142 4,446,066 0.01 1.6 
4020 Radar Detectors and Auxiliary Apparatus 0.139 12,972,703 0.02 1.7 
2623 Kalium Fertilizer 0.138 16,111,953 0.03 1.7 
3799 All Other Transportation Equipment 0.138 16,180,315 0.03 1.7 
2673 Oral Cavity Sanitary Products 0.138 9,895,591 0.02 1.7 
3951 Household Refrigerator and Home Freezer 0.131 174,817,641 0.33 2.1 
4159 Other Stationery and Office Machine 0.128 5,180,766 0.01 2.1 
1100 Other Ore Mining 0.124 1,413,218 0.00 2.1 
3752 Non-metal Ship Building 0.123 5,297,763 0.01 2.1 
2671 Soap, Washing Powder and Synthetic Detergent 0.116 102,522,317 0.19 2.3 
3671 Tractor 0.116 37,747,488 0.07 2.3 
3162 Mica Product Industry 0.114 2,941,352 0.01 2.3 
3762 Aircraft 0.113 6,904,448 0.01 2.4 
1461 Monosodium Glutamate 0.112 38,958,037 0.07 2.4 
3692 Geology Reconnaissance Special Equipment 0.110 2,674,712 0.01 2.4 
2452 Entertaining Appliances and Indoor Amusement Eq. 0.108 5,864,438 0.01 2.5 
2414 Ink 0.107 710,280 0.00 2.5 
3471 Industrial Use Enamel Products 0.107 3,066,427 0.01 2.5 
3683 Lab and Disinfectant Equipment and Utensils 0.106 4,042,345 0.01 2.5 
932 Earth Metal Ores Mining 0.104 2,068,264 0.00 2.5 
4125 Geologic Prospecting, Earthquakes use Instrument 0.102 5,909,152 0.01 2.5 
 
Although this result has detected 20 ‘highly concentrated’ and 31 ‘moderately 
concentrated’ industrial subsectors, these tend to be insignificant in economic terms – 
cumulatively accounting for just 2.5 per cent of total revenue for China’s industrial sector in 
2009. By contrast, Table 4-5 lists revenue concentration in China’s 20 largest industry 
subsectors, collectively accounting for 40 per cent of survey revenue. All of these are 
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comfortably below the threshold for market concentration, apparently supporting the 
proposition that China’s industrial economy is highly competitive. 

















3230 Steel Rolling Processing 0.008 3,059,250,726 5.74 5.7 
4420 Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power 0.030 2,131,028,640 4.00 9.7 
2511 Crude Oil Processing and Petroleum Product 0.016 1,750,413,633 3.29 13.0 
610 
Bituminous Coal and Anthracite Mining and  
Washing 0.008 1,616,151,873 3.03 16.1 
3721 Automobile Complete 0.028 1,529,386,077 2.87 18.9 
3725 Automobile Parts and Attachments 0.003 1,189,499,367 2.23 21.2 
4411 Thermal Power Generation 0.004 998,594,413 1.88 23.0 
1711 
Cotton and Chemical Fiber Spinning and  
Weaving Processing 0.007 975,890,781 1.83 24.9 
1810 Apparel 0.001 937,567,445 1.76 26.6 
4041 Computer Body 0.051 869,298,348 1.63 28.3 
3351 Commonly Used Non-Ferrous Rolling Processing 0.004 855,195,408 1.61 29.9 
3220 Steel Smelting 0.053 754,485,885 1.42 31.3 
3931 Wire and Cable Manufacturing 0.003 661,769,078 1.24 32.5 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 0.096 622,852,095 1.17 33.7 
4043 Computer Peripheral Equipment 0.023 603,042,057 1.13 34.8 
4061 Electronic Components 0.012 595,740,070 1.12 36.0 
3111 Cement 0.002 560,551,127 1.05 37.0 
2614 Organic Chemical Material 0.016 548,556,270 1.03 38.0 
1331 Edible Vegetable Oil Processing 0.007 481,903,142 0.90 38.9 
1620 Cigarettes 0.041 472,392,978 0.89 39.8 
 
4.2.1 Adjusting market concentration estimates to account for 
SOE groups 
The very low HHI figures for some subsectors warrant further investigation. For example, 
China’s oil giants Sinopec and China National Petroleum, and the national electricity grid State 
Grid, were all ranked in the top ten of Fortune 500 companies by revenue for 2009 (Xinhua, 
2010). But of the subsectors, which these companies presumably dominate, only ‘crude oil and 
gas mining’ appears to be remotely concentrated (with an HHI just below the moderate 
concentration margin, at 0.096).  
Similarly, the entire tobacco industry is unashamedly monopolised by the State Tobacco 
Monopoly Administration (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012). But the twentieth largest subsector, the manufacture of cigarettes, has an HHI of 0.041, 
making it only the 148th most concentrated subsector according to this measure. The failure of 
the HHI, as calculated on an enterprise basis, to identify these subsectors as even moderately 
concentrated suggests that the raw HHI calculation is an adequate to identify monopolies. 
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Table 4-6 shows the distribution of central and local SOE assets across subsectors. 
Cumulatively, these 20 largest subsectors (by revenue) account for 42 per cent of industrial 
assets. SOEs control most assets in nine subsectors, including the five largest. In five of these 
nine state-dominated sectors – relating to oil, electricity and tobacco – central SOEs have a 
greater share of assets than local SOEs. State ownership is close to 100 per cent in ‘transmission 
and distribution of electric power’, ‘crude oil and gas mining’, and the manufacture of 
cigarettes.26 There are also large subsectors, such as cotton weaving, apparel, computer bodies, 
wire manufacturing and computer and electrical components, in which the share of state 
ownership is negligible. 


























3230 Steel Rolling Processing  2,852,592,912 5.9 5.9 17 44 61 
4420 Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power 2,962,797,127 6.1 12.0 79 20 99 
2511 Crude Oil Processing and Petroleum Product 868,567,442 1.8 13.8 62 20 82 
610 
Bituminous Coal and Anthracite Mining  
and Washing 2,210,070,221 4.6 18.4 12 64 76 
3721 Automobile Complete 1,228,060,564 2.5 20.9 29 55 84 
3725 Automobile Parts and Attachments 953,508,892 2.0 22.9 4 12 16 
4411 Thermal Power Generation 2,197,221,646 4.5 27.5 45 37 82 
1711 
Cotton and Chemical Fiber Spinning and  
Weaving Processing 676,121,018 1.4 28.9 1 7 8 
1810 Apparel 553,349,213 1.1 30.0 1 2 3 
4041 Computer Body 295,222,614 0.6 30.6 0 5 5 
3351 Commonly Used Non-Ferrous Rolling Processing 483,509,840 1.0 31.6 7 9 16 
3220 Steel Smelting 795,237,636 1.6 33.3 22 50 73 
3931 Wire and Cable Manufacturing 404,606,614 0.8 34.1 1 5 5 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 1,240,637,394 2.6 36.7 89 8 97 
4043 Computer Peripheral Equipment 302,259,577 0.6 37.3 2 4 5 
4061 Electronic Components 438,830,479 0.9 38.2 1 11 12 
3111 Cement 718,213,487 1.5 39.7 4 29 33 
2614 Organic Chemical Material 505,333,998 1.0 40.7 26 23 49 
1331 Edible Vegetable Oil Processing 253,716,105 0.5 41.2 2 9 10 
1620 Cigarettes 473,789,048 1.0 42.2 91 8 100 
 
                                                     
26 Although the state chose to monopolise the production and distribution of tobacco products, it did not 
do so through a single nation-wide conglomerate. Nor were the market reforms applied to other sectors 
from the 1980s extended to tobacco. Wang (2013) provides an excellent account of the industry, and 
illustrates how de facto competition and entrepreneurial behaviour is possible even in a formally state-
owned and centrally planned industry.  
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The reason why these state monopolies are not detected by the ‘raw’ HHI calculation is 
that the unit of analysis of the survey is a ‘legal person’. In 2007, 96.6 per cent of these ‘legal 
persons’ were single-plant firms (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2014, p. 340). But the 
previous chapter showed that industrial SOEs – particularly those under the jurisdiction of 
central SASAC – are often part of large corporate groups of hundreds of related entities. Failure 
to account for potentially related parties means that the standard measure fails to identify 
concentration in sectors such as oil and gas, electricity and tobacco. 
4.2.1.1 Grouping based on name 
Membership of SOE groups is not recorded in the survey. One approach to identifying 
them is by inference, noting that members of a group often share the first part of their name. For 
example, the names of 44 enterprises in the survey begin with the Chinese characters for
‘Sinopec Group’ (中国石化集团). By identifying a range of suffixes that typically end the 
names of companies (for example, equivalent to Ltd., Corp., Group), a parent name can be 
constructed based on the Chinese characters to the left of the first suffix. For example, ‘Sinopec 
Group Nanjing Chemical Industry Ltd. Corp. (中国石化集团南京化学工业有限公司)’ 
becomes associated with the parent name ‘Sinopec (中国石化)’. All observations with the same 
parent name within the same subsector are then consolidated into a single observation for that 
parent. For example, this leaves 22 consolidated revenue observations for Sinopec across 22 
subsectors. Overall, this consolidates into 9,803 observations. 
When revenue from an enterprise identified as a central SOE is consolidated with another 
enterprise, the new consolidated revenue is attributed to a central SOE. Similarly, if a local SOE 
is consolidated with a non-SOE, then the consolidated figure is attributed to the local SOE. This 
assumes that non-SOEs may be subsidiaries of SOEs (say, if the SOE is not the majority 
shareholder), but that an SOE will not be a subsidiary of a non-SOE. Local subsidiaries of a 
central SOE may identify on the survey with their local jurisdiction, but in reality be controlled 
by a central SOE. This allocates an additional 1.7 per cent of survey revenue to the state sector.  
After recalculating HHI based on consolidated revenue, Table 4-7 shows the five 
subsectors that were previously measured as unconcentrated, but that now appear to be 
concentrated. Three of these, accounting for 4.8 per cent of total industrial revenue, relate to oil 
and gas. The consolidated measure of concentration for cigarette manufacturing increases from 
0.041 to 0.046, after reducing the number of observations in this subsector from 67 to 53.  
88 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  










Share of  
Industrial 
Revenue % 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 0.096 0.149 0.054 1.2 
2511 Crude Oil Processing and Petroleum Product 0.016 0.133 0.117 3.3 
790 Support Activities for Oil and Gas Mining 0.069 0.125 0.057 0.3 
916 Aluminum Ore Mining 0.095 0.112 0.017 0.0 
4127 
Nucleon and Nuclear Radiation Measuring  
Apparatus 
0.090 0.106 0.017 0.0 
 
While grouping by name is an improvement, it is still inadequate to identify all group 
members. Table 4-8 shows the maximum revenue for a central SOE in a single subsector is 
505 billion RMB (approx. US$74 billion) compared to 147 billion RMB (approx. US$21 billion) 
reported in Table 4-1. This can be compared to the scale of Sinopec Group, for which 2009 
revenues across all sectors was US$187 billion (Xinhua, 2010). While some of Sinopec’s group 
revenue may fall outside its oil subsector, much of its revenue appears still not to be captured. 
Table 4-8 Revenue by ownership type, observations grouped by name 
 
 
Revenue (1000 RMB) Observations 






SOE-Central 2,399,937 177,398 505,336,166 6,993,416,182 13 2,914 1 
SOE-Local 504,127 56,501 211,653,269 8,241,975,323 15 16,349 4 
State Sector 
   
15,235,391,505 29 19,263 5 
Collective 131,830 29,673 149,250,409 2,158,720,178 4 16,375 4 
Private 75,694 25,767 130,067,501 22,357,554,098 42 295,369 72 
Foreign 138,198 35,568 56,854,349 3,816,619,346 7 27,617 7 
HMT 229,224 43,982 101,067,603 6,910,190,933 13 30,146 7 
Other 117,847 29,845 33,553,930 2,779,193,691 5 23,583 6 
Nonstate Sector 
   
38,022,278,246 71 393,090 95 
All 129,156 28,629 505,336,166 53,257,669,751 100 412,353 100 
 
For many related groups, identification based on name is insufficient. For example, 
because the name of many SOEs are according to a location, this method does not consolidate 
revenues from all tobacco subsidiaries (for example, ‘Guangdong Central Tobacco’ and 
‘Guangxi Central Tobacco’ remain as separate observations).  
Basing groupings on names also misses business groups that have been formed by mergers 
and acquisitions of differently named companies. For example, the creation of the Benxi Steel 
Group Corporation to be a holding company for the state-owned Benxi and Beitai steel 
companies in Liaoning need not affect the reporting to statistical authorities, given that both 
plants might continue to operate as separate legal subsidiaries (see Section 3.3.2). So long as 
each plant’s output volume and price remains unchanged, so too does total revenue and so HHI 
is unaffected. The newly created corporate group may be able to coordinate production between 
the two previously competing entities in such a way that output is restricted in either (or both) 
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plants. What is, in fact, an increase in market concentration is not identified in the HHI. Other 
forms of horizontal ties falling short of a complete merger – such as joint ventures or strategic 
alliances – might similarly reduce competition in an industry without registering an increase in 
HHI (Bresnahan and Salop, 1986). 
4.2.1.2 Grouping based on common administrative relationship 
To account for the deficiencies of grouping by name, a further operational assumption is 
employed such that each SOE is deemed to be ultimately controlled by central owner or a local 
owner. This is based on the administrative relationship, with local owners grouped at the 
provincial level. That owner is assumed to be able to coordinate activity all SOEs in the same 
subsector operating within its jurisdiction. This still allows for competition between SOEs 
across provincial boundaries (as local owners do not cooperate with each other) and vertically 
(central owners do not cooperate with provincial owners).  
For example, the revenues from any SOEs belonging to either Sinopec or PetroChina 
would be assigned to a ‘central oil’ category. SOEs with administrative relationships at the 
provincial level or below are assigned to one of 31 hypothetical provincial owners. For example, 
all local SOE coal mines in Hebei would be assigned to a ‘Hebei Coal SASAC’ observation, 
while local SOE coal mines in Shaanxi would be assigned to a ‘Shaanxi Coal SASAC’ 
observation.  
This approach reduces the number of observations by 14,168 to 5,095. Table 4-9 shows 
that central SOEs are active across 350 subsectors, the largest of which had revenues of 
1,486 billion RMB (US$217 billion). This captures 61 per cent of the combined revenues for 
China’s two largest oil companies – Sinopec and CNPC – which in 2009 was $353 billion 
(Xinhua, 2010). 
Table 4-9 Revenue consolidated by common administrative relationship 
 Revenue (1000 RMB) Observations 
 






SOE-Central 19,981,189 1,486,694,640 6,993,416,182 13 350 0 
SOE-Local 1,736,981 230,789,089 8,241,975,323 15 4,745 1 
State Sector   15,235,391,505 29 5,095 1 
Collective 131,830 149,250,409 2,158,720,178 4 16,375 4 
Private 75,694 130,067,501 22,357,554,098 42 295,369 74 
Foreign 138,198 56,854,349 3,816,619,346 7 27,617 7 
HMT 229,224 101,067,603 6,910,190,933 13 30,146 8 
Other 117,847 33,553,930 2,779,193,691 5 23,583 6 
Nonstate Sector   38,022,278,246 71 393,090 99 
All 133,751 1,486,694,640 53,257,669,751  398,185  
 
Table 4-10 shows the ‘potential’ HHI for each subsector – that is, the degree of 
concentration that could be achieved if the above assumptions were satisfied in practice. In total, 
90 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
22 previously unconcentrated subsectors are recognised as potentially concentrated. Fourteen 
subsectors, including oil and gas, tobacco, and electricity, are identified as potentially highly 
concentrated (HHI over 0.18). A further eight subsectors that are potentially moderately 
concentrated (HHI between 0.1 and 0.18), including the manufacture of complete automobiles. 
These potentially concentrated subsectors account for 15.7 per cent of total industrial revenue, 
compared to the 2.5 per cent revenue for subsectors that are concentrated on ‘raw’ HHI 
measures. 




























1620 Cigarettes 0.041 0.842 472,392,978 0.89 0.9 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 0.096 0.829 622,852,095 1.17 2.1 
3761 Airplane and Repairing 0.036 0.667 110,949,821 0.21 2.3 
3719 
Other Rail Transportation Equipment 
and Repairing 
0.048 0.649 15,220,979 0.03 2.3 
790 
Support Activities for Oil and Gas 
Mining 
0.069 0.604 163,297,772 0.31 2.6 
2511 
Crude Oil Processing and Petroleum 
Product 
0.016 0.520 1,750,413,633 3.29 5.9 
4420 
Transmission and Distribution of 
Electric Power 
0.030 0.501 2,131,028,640 4.00 9.9 
3711 Locomotives and Trains, 0.065 0.477 82,815,316 0.16 10.0 
3669 
Aviation, Aerospace and Other Special 
Equipment 
0.077 0.381 7,127,602 0.01 10.1 
1610 Tobacco Leaf Processing 0.092 0.323 9,415,980 0.02 10.1 
4412 Hydroelectric Power Generation 0.026 0.223 140,757,499 0.26 10.3 
4411 Thermal Power Generation 0.004 0.222 998,594,413 1.88 12.2 
916 Aluminum Ore Mining 0.095 0.219 8,953,661 0.02 12.2 
3714 Rail Apparatus, Equipment and Parts 0.026 0.204 35,216,258 0.07 12.3 
3755 Ship Repairing and Dismantling 0.074 0.173 56,019,595 0.11 12.4 
3615 Special Metallurgy Equipment 0.059 0.161 91,656,179 0.17 12.6 
3721 Automobile Complete 0.028 0.131 1,529,386,077 2.87 15.4 
4127 
Nucleon and Nuclear Radiation 
Measuring Apparatus 
0.090 0.124 712,754 0.00 15.4 
2622 Phosphate Fertilizer 0.069 0.123 44,904,279 0.08 15.5 
4419 Other Power Industry 0.016 0.114 29,410,401 0.06 15.6 
915 Antimony Ore Mining 0.074 0.108 1,203,970 0.00 15.6 
3321 Gold Smelting 0.085 0.107 77,368,040 0.15 15.7 
 
The method of calculating potential industry concentration by consolidating SOEs 
according to hypothetical SASAC owners indirectly links potential HHI to state dominance on 
the production side. For example, the nuclear electric power generation subsector contains six 
enterprises, five of which are central SOEs. The raw HHI of the industry is 0.210, but potential 
HHI is 0.997 based on their ultimate owner. For this reason, concentrated subsectors presented 
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in the previous table will be those in which there is a significant share of state ownership. 
Indeed, once central SOEs have a revenue share of 31 per cent, the potential HHI is 
concentrated (since the square of 31 per cent rounds up to 0.1) and highly concentrated once the 
central SOE revenue share exceeds 42 per cent (since the square of 42 per cent rounds up to 
0.18). 
Table 4-11 shows that while the share of revenue between state-owned and non-state-
owned subsectors remains the same (31 per cent), those subsectors which are majority state 
owned are much more likely to be concentrated.  
Table 4-11 Subsectors and revenue by potential industry concentration and 
state ownership share 
  
SOE Asset Share 
Total 
  
< 50% > 50% 
  
Subsectors Revenue % Subsectors Revenue % Subsectors Revenue % 
Potential  
HHI 
> .10 34 2 39 16 73 18 
< .10 421 67 27 15 448 82 
Total 455 69 66 31 
  
 
Table 4-12 decomposes the 66 majority SOE-owned subsectors into those that are 
dominated by central owners, and the rest. Of the 31 sectors in which central state ownership is 
dominant, 25 are potentially concentrated according to the HHI measure. Together these 
subsectors account for 13 per cent of total industrial revenue. The five largest subsectors, 
accounting for 11.2 per cent of total industrial revenue, are transmission and distribution of 
electric power (4.0 per cent, Potential HHI 0.5), crude oil processing and petroleum products 
(3.3 per cent, Potential HHI 0.52), thermal power generation (1.9 per cent, Potential HHI 0.22), 
crude oil and gas mining (1.2  per cent, Potential 0.83), and cigarettes (0.9  per cent, Potential 
HHI 0.84). 
Table 4-12 Majority state-owned subsectors  
  
Majority SOE Assets 
Total 
  
Majority Central Majority Local 
  
Subsectors Revenue % Subsectors Revenue % Subsectors Revenue % 
Potential  
HHI 
> .10 25 13 14 3 39 16 
< .10 6 1 21 14 27 15 
Total 31 14 35 17 66 31 
 
By contrast, subsectors in which local SOEs are dominant tend to be unconcentrated (and 
account for 14 per cent of total industrial revenue). The three largest of these, accounting for 
10.2 per cent of total industrial revenue are steel roll processing (5.7%, Potential HHI 0.21), 
coal mining (3% Potential HHI 0.05) and steel smelting (1.4% Potential HHI 0.07). 
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Table 4-13 shows that while manufacturing assets overall – including local SOE assets – 
are found in unconcentrated subsectors, it is SOEs – and particularly central SOEs – that 
dominate concentrated subsectors. 
Table 4-13 Assets by ownership and concentration 
 
Total Industry Assets 
(Million RMB) 
Share of  
Total % 
Share of assets  
in unconcentrated 
and concentrated  
subsectors 
Share by  
Owner % 
Potential HHI U C U C U C U C 
SOE-Central 2,526,858,705 7,502,212,170 5 16 7 60 25 75 
SOE-Local 7,950,233,690 3,310,377,239 16 7 22 26 71 29 
State 10,477,092,395 10,812,589,409 22 22 29 86 49 51 
Collective 1,416,409,352 318,185,070 3 1 4 3 82 18 
Private 13,796,638,477 710,521,744 29 1 39 6 95 5 
Foreign 3,099,417,188 234,975,503 6 0 9 2 93 7 
HMT 5,032,277,955 307,224,373 10 1 14 2 94 6 
Other 1,939,879,820 198,481,930 4 0 5 2 91 9 
Nonstate 25,284,622,792 1,769,388,620 52 4 71 14 93 7 
All 35,761,715,187 12,581,978,029 74 26 100 100 
  
Note (U) Unconcentrated, HHI < 0.1, (C) Concentrated, HHI > 0.1 
 
The distribution of non-state firms in the most competitive subsectors reflects the 
dynamics described in the first chapter – since new entrants tend not to be state-owned, over 
time a much higher proportion of non-state companies will operate where barriers to entry are 
lowest. Even if there is no explicit policy to keep concentrated sectors in state ownership, the 
fact that these sectors of the economy were state owned to begin with means that they are much 
more likely to remain state owned given higher barriers to entry. 
These results show that previous estimates of HHI based on raw NBS plant-level data tend 
to dramatically underestimate market concentration by failing to account for potential 
coordination between members of SOE conglomerates. After making adjustments to account for 
this, the findings qualify, rather than overturn, the claim that Chinese industry is largely 
competitive. Results so far can be summarised into four stylised facts about state ownership and 
market concentration: 
1. Most Chinese industrial assets are in unconcentrated sectors.  
2. Unconcentrated sectors 27  of the Chinese economy are predominantly non-state 
owned. 
3. Provincial and local SOEs tend to hold assets in unconcentrated sectors; and, 
4. Concentrated sectors of the Chinese economy are predominantly owned by central 
SOEs. 
                                                     
27 After making the adjustments to account for SOE groups. 
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4.2.2 Identification of large state-monopoly sectors 
Table 4-14 lists concentrated subsectors in order of their contribution to total industrial 
revenue (See Appendix A:Potential concentration of all industrial subsectors (2009) for 
complete listing of concentration and state ownership for all industrial subsectors). 




























































Distribution of Electric 
Power 
0.03 0.50  4.00 4.0 80 20 99 Central 
2511 
Crude Oil Processing and 
Petroleum Product 
0.02 0.52  3.29 7.3 62 20 82 Central 
3721 Automobile Complete 0.03 0.13  2.87 6.2 33 55 88 Local 
4411 Thermal Power Generation 0.00 0.22  1.88 4.7 46 37 83 Central 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 0.10 0.83  1.17 3.0 89 8 97 Central 
1620 Cigarettes 0.04 0.84  0.89 2.1 92 8 100 Central 
4012 Switching Equipment 0.36 0.40  0.50 1.4 40 2 42 Nonstate 
3952 Air Conditioner 0.18 0.20  0.43 0.9 0 36 36 Nonstate 
3951 
Household Refrigerator and 
Home Freezer 
0.13 0.13  0.33 0.8 0 12 12 Nonstate 
790 
Support Activities for Oil 
and Gas Mining 




0.03 0.22  0.26 0.6 52 31 84 Central 
3761 Airplane and Repairing 0.04 0.67  0.21 0.5 91 2 93 Central 
2671 
Soap, Washing Powder and 
Synthetic Detergent 




0.06 0.16  0.17 0.4 39 38 77 Central 
3313 Nickel Cobalt Smelting 0.54 0.54  0.16 0.3 0 78 78 Local 
3711 Locomotives and Trains 0.06 0.48  0.16 0.3 70 17 87 Central 
3321 Gold Smelting 0.08 0.11  0.15 0.3 5 65 70 Local 
3352 
Valued Metal Rolling 
Processing 
0.16 0.18  0.12 0.3 1 15 16 Nonstate 
3755 
Ship Repairing and 
Dismantling 
0.07 0.17  0.11 0.2 53 18 72 Central 
3513 Steam Turbine and Fitting 0.15 0.29  0.09 0.2 63 25 88 Central 
2622 Phosphate Fertilizer 0.07 0.12  0.08 0.2 0 68 68 Local 
3679 
Other Agriculture Machinery 
and Maintenance 
0.31 0.31  0.08 0.2 8 40 48 Nonstate 
1461 Monosodium Glutamate 0.11 0.11  0.07 0.1 0 28 28 Nonstate 
3671 Tractor 0.12 0.12  0.07 0.1 40 13 53 Central 
3714 
Rail Apparatus, Equipment 
and Parts 
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Grouping related sectors, this suggests three large central SOE monopolies – electricity, oil 
tobacco. 
Electricity: Includes generation and distribution (subsectors 4420, 4411, 4012, 4412, 4419 
and 4413, nuclear power generation). This accounts for 37 per cent of revenue in concentrated 
subsectors.  
Oil: Includes both extraction and refining (subsectors 2511, 710, 790). This accounts for 
26 per cent of revenue in concentrated subsectors. 
Tobacco: Includes cigarette manufacturing and tobacco leaf processing (subsectors 1620 
and 1610); accounts for five per cent of revenue in concentrated subsectors. 
4.2.2.1 Potential market concentration in automobiles28 
The automobile subsector (3721), which accounts for 16 per cent of revenue in 
concentrated sectors, is also identified as potentially concentrated amongst local SOEs on this 
measure. But a closer examination of this sector suggests that one of the assumptions on which 
the ‘potential HHI’ was constructed – that the provincial owner is able effectively to coordinate 
behaviour of all SOEs under its administrative jurisdiction – may not hold (Chu, 2011).  
In the planned economy period, China’s First Auto Works and Second Auto Works were 
set up in northeast China and central China respectively, to concentrate on truck building as part 
of the plan to build up heavy industry. Passenger cars were a bourgeois luxury – annual Chinese 
passenger car production did not exceed 1,000 until 1973. In the absence of a modern domestic 
automotive industry the development of this sector during the 1980s relied on technological 
transfer through joint ventures (Chu, 2011).  
Beginning in 1983 with a joint venture that created the Beijing Jeep Company, China’s 
existing automotive companies entered joint venture arrangements with leading foreign brands 
including Peugeot, Daihatsu, Volkswagen and Citroën. The industry was sheltered behind high 
tariff walls and high domestic content requirements. By 2002, when China had joined the WTO, 
both domestic content restrictions and foreign entry barriers had been lowered. Domestic car 
production had grown to over one million units per year and indigenous car makers including 
SOEs Hafei and Chery, and non-SOEs Geely and BYD, began to occupy a strong market 
position (Chu, 2011). However, by 2008 GM and VW branded automobiles remained the 
market leaders, each accounting for just over ten per cent of motor vehicle sales (Tang, 2009). 
Policy efforts to consolidate and create national champion automobile manufacturers appear to 
have failed (Lardy, 2014, p. 144). 
                                                     
28 Thanks to Richard Herd for his comments on Hubbard (2016) which led to further consideration of 
market power in the Chinese automobile industry 
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 Table 4-15 shows that on the basis of brand in 2008, the HHI for the car industry would be 
around 0.04, and therefore should not be considered as concentrated. This will be further tested 
in the next section, which considers relative profitability in concentrated and unconcentrated 
subsectors.  








General Motors 11.30  0.0128  
Volkswagen 10.10  0.0102  
Toyota 5.60  0.0031  
Honda 4.90  0.0024  
Hyundai-Kia 4.60  0.0021  
Chery 3.70  0.0014  
Nissan 3.60  0.0013  
FAW 3.20  0.0010  
Geely 2.50  0.0006  
Mazda 2.20  0.0005  
Sum 51.70  0.0354  
Source based on Tang (2009) 
4.3 Potential industry concentration and profit 
Do SOEs take advantage of market concentration to increase profits? To consider this 
question, a profit margin is calculated by dividing the aggregate profits by aggregate revenues 
for state and non-state owners. This shows an average profit margin for the non-state sector of 
6.5 per cent, compared to 6.2 per cent for the state sector. This accords with Lardy’s observation 
on the basis of aggregate results that ‘the profit margins of the two types of firms are virtually 
indistinguishable in the past few years’ (Lardy, 2014, p. 26). That is, SOEs do not appear to be 
converting market concentration into monopoly rents. 
Table 4-16 disaggregates profit margins according to different types of ownership and 
between concentrated and unconcentrated subsectors. This suggests that industry concentration 
is indeed related to higher profits. The average profit margin in concentrated subsectors is 7.4 
per cent, compared to 6.1 per cent in unconcentrated subsectors. The profit margin of SOEs in 
unconcentrated subsectors is even lower at 5.2 per cent. Within the state sector, central SOEs in 
concentrated subsectors have the highest aggregate profit margins, although they are somewhat 
lower than the average profit margins of other ownership types.  
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Table 4-16 Aggregate profit margin by ownership and concentration 
 
Total Revenue (1000 RMB) Profit (1000 RMB) Profit Margin 
 





SOE-Central 1,710,665,929 5,207,993,710 91,295,055 380,578,333 5.3 7.3 
SOE-Local 5,573,376,545 2,676,226,258 284,195,621 182,955,091 5.1 6.8 
State  
Subtotal 
7,284,042,474 7,884,219,968 375,490,676 563,533,424 5.2 7.1 
Collective 1,870,775,886 326,178,044 132,553,869 33,204,572 7.1 10.2 
Private 21,495,584,153 800,419,859 1,371,067,905 53,271,467 6.4 6.7 
Foreign 3,728,838,329 162,917,829 225,693,192 26,242,389 6.1 16.1 
HMT 6,603,329,130 309,495,871 396,286,094 28,885,940 6.0 9.3 
Other 2,574,294,429 217,573,779 176,297,791 13,780,960 6.8 6.3 
Non-state  
Subtotal 
36,272,821,927 1,816,585,382 2,301,898,851 155,385,328 6.3 8.6 
All 43,556,864,401 9,700,805,350 2,677,389,527 718,918,752 6.1 7.4 
Note (U) Unconcentrated, HHI < 0.1, (C) Concentrated, HHI > 0.1 
 
Further consideration of profit measures across sectors reveals a more nuanced story, 
suggesting that different SOEs are indeed pursuing different objectives depending on the sector 
in which they are operating. Table 4-17 shows relevant statistics for the 20 largest subsectors by 
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3230 Steel Rolling Processing 5.7 3.0 3.4 3.6 18 43 61 
4420 
Transmission and Distribution of Electric 
Power 
4.0 0.8 1.3 0.9 80 20 99 
2511 Crude Oil Processing and Petroleum Product 3.3 2.3 4.5 9.1 62 20 82 
610 
Bituminous Coal and Anthracite Mining and 
Washing 
3.0 5.8 12.1 8.9 12 64 76 
3721 Automobile Complete 2.9 3.6 7.9 9.9 33 55 88 
3725 Automobile Parts and Attachments 2.2 2.8 8.0 9.9 4 12 16 
4411 Thermal Power Generation 1.9 1.8 6.0 2.7 46 37 83 
1711 
Cotton and Chemical Fiber Spinning and 
Weaving Processing 
1.8 1.4 4.8 6.9 1 7 8 
1810 Apparel 1.8 1.7 6.0 10.2 1 2 3 
4041 Computer Body 1.6 0.4 1.8 5.2 0 5 5 
3351 
Commonly Used Non-Ferrous Rolling 
Processing 
1.6 1.3 5.2 9.2 8 9 16 
3220 Steel Smelting 1.4 0.6 2.6 2.5 22 50 73 
3931 Wire and Cable Manufacturing 1.2 1.0 5.4 8.8 1 5 5 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 1.2 5.7 30.9 15.5 89 8 97 
4043 Computer Peripheral Equipment 1.1 0.7 4.1 8.3 2 4 5 
4061 Electronic Components 1.1 0.8 4.3 5.9 1 11 12 
3111 Cement 1.1 1.4 8.5 6.6 5 29 34 
2614 Organic Chemical Material 1.0 0.6 3.9 4.2 26 23 49 
1331 Edible Vegetable Oil Processing 0.9 0.7 4.8 9.1 3 9 12 
1620 Cigarettes 0.9 1.8 13.2 13.2 92 8 100 
 
The profit measures related to the largest potential monopoly – electricity – are very low. 
Conversely, the profit measures for oil and cigarettes are amongst the highest. The profit margin 
and return on assets for the (locally) state-owned automobile assembly subsector are higher than 
average, but not higher than the non-state ‘automobile parts and attachments’ subsector, which 
supports the proposition that the automobile subsector is not a state monopoly. Also notable is 
the relatively high profit margins in the locally SOE-owned, but unconcentrated, coal mining 
sector. 
Given different potential state policy objectives, profit in the industrial sector is broken 
down into resources (two-digit industry codes below 12), manufacturing (two-digit industry 
codes between 13 and 42) and utilities (two-digit industry codes above 43). 
Table 4-18 shows that the distribution of asset holdings by different types of ownership 
drives the returns to which they have access. Note that 4.1 per cent of non-state assets are 
invested in the high-yielding resources sector, compared to 16 per cent for SOEs. More than 
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92 per cent of non-state assets are invested in manufacturing, of which most are in 
unconcentrated manufacturing subsectors. Less than four per cent of non-state assets are in 
utilities, but this low-yielding sector makes up almost a third of SOE assets. The majority of 
local SOE assets are in manufacturing sectors (61 per cent), followed by utilities (23 per cent) 
and resources (16 per cent). Central SOE assets are skewed toward utilities (42 per cent). 
Table 4-18 Distribution of assets by owner  
  
Resources Manufacturing Utilities Total 
  
C U C U C U C U 
SOE 
Central 0.131 0.029 0.203 0.219 0.414 0.003 0.748 0.252 
Local 0.011 0.149 0.119 0.491 0.164 0.066 0.294 0.706 
Subtotal 0.067 0.093 0.158 0.363 0.282 0.037 0.508 0.492 
Non-
state 
Collective 0.006 0.090 0.127 0.705 0.051 0.022 0.183 0.817 
Private 0.001 0.050 0.031 0.892 0.017 0.009 0.049 0.951 
Foreign 0.008 0.011 0.022 0.901 0.040 0.018 0.070 0.930 
HMT 0.000 0.006 0.037 0.924 0.020 0.013 0.058 0.942 
Other 0.002 0.047 0.049 0.844 0.042 0.017 0.093 0.907 
Subtotal 0.002 0.039 0.039 0.884 0.024 0.012 0.065 0.935 
All 
 
0.031 0.062 0.091 0.654 0.138 0.023 0.260 0.740 
Note (U) Unconcentrated, HHI < 0.1, (C) Concentrated, HHI > 0.1 
 
Table 4-19 shows that concentrated resources and manufacturing subsectors have higher 
profit margins than non-concentrated sectors – both SOEs and non-SOEs appear to convert 
market concentration into high profit. The reverse is true for central SOEs in the concentrated 
utilities sector (i.e. electricity) – a result opposite to what would be expected from a profit-
maximising monopolist.  
Table 4-19 Profit margins of subsectors by ownership and concentration 
  
Resources Manufacturing Utilities Total 
  
C U C U C U C U 
SOE 
Central 0.24 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Local 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05 
Subtotal 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.05 
Non-state 
Collective 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.07 
Private 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Foreign 0.51 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.06 
HMT 0.05 0.29 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.06 
Other 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Subtotal 0.24 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.06 
All 
 
0.24 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 
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4.4 Conclusion 
After three decades of reforming the planned economy and opening up to world markets, 
China’s industrial economy is now largely competitive. Nevertheless, the structure of the NBS 
survey data used to estimate market concentration mean have tended to understate market 
concentration, and failed to detect the large state monopolies that do remain. An analysis of 
2009 data detects only 20 ‘highly concentrated’ and 31 ‘moderately concentrated’ industrial 
subsectors. Moreover, counting the number of subsectors doesn’t give an indication of their 
economic significance. In total, the 51 subsectors identified as either moderately or highly 
concentrated cumulatively accounted for less than 2.5 per cent of total industrial revenue. 
Making adjustment to deem SOEs in the same subsector to be part of the same central or local 
SOE ownership group, identifies 22 additional potentially concentrated subsectors. These 
include the large central SOE monopolies continue in the electricity, oil and tobacco sectors. 
Collectively, these sectors accounted for almost 16 per cent of the total revenue of large-scale 
industrial firms in 2009. 
Despite these limitations of the earlier studies, the overall finding that Chinese industry has 
in fact become highly competitive can be sustained. After adjusting for the existence of large 
SOE conglomerates, less than one quarter of Chinese industry can be characterised by having 
moderate-to-high degrees of market concentration. The automotive sector has a high degree of 
state ownership but falls short of monopoly. Even steel, which has become emblematic of SOE, 
is dominated by (local) SOEs but is characterised by a low degree of market concentration. This 
supports William’s (2013) conclusion that the sector is highly competitive, in spite of central 
government attempts to consolidate the industry. 
On average, SOEs operating in concentrated sectors have higher returns than those in non-
concentrated industries. This is consistent with the expected behaviour of private profit-
maximising firms. At first glance this appears to be consistent with the claim that monopolist 
SOEs exploit their market power to achieve excess profits.  
But this chapter suggests that SOE behaviour is in fact contingent on the sector in which 
they operate. The profit margin varies markedly between sectors. State-owned resource 
companies in concentrated sectors have some of the highest profit margins – consistent with a 
policy of extracting resource rents on behalf of the state. By contrast, the some of the lowest 
profit margins are in concentrated utilities sectors under the control of central SOEs. Rather than 
the typical profit maximising monopolist that under-invests to drive up price, it appears that the 
state-owned utility company over-invests and drives up downstream economic activity. This 
opens the possibility that the foregone profits of some SOEs spill over into greater economic 
activity elsewhere. In this case, a narrow assessment of SOE performance based on profits in 
concentrated sectors will understate their broader economic contribution. 
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Chapter 5: SOE profitability and value-added 
in manufacturing  
 
How do SOEs perform relative to non-SOEs in competitive markets for manufactured 
goods? The previous chapter showed that most of China’s manufacturing subsectors tend to be 
highly competitive and dominated by private firms. In principle, this allows performance to be 
measured using a profit-based measure as a proxy for the return on capital, unconfounded by 
persistent rents (from monopolies or natural resources). Moreover, excellent statistical coverage 
(using the 2011–2013 waves of the above-scale industrial survey) allows profit and value-added 
measures to be calculated at the firm level, controlling for province and industrial subsector. 
Investigating firm-level results makes it possible to consider some of the questions raised 
in Chapter 2. Does ownership still matter for those SOEs that are very small relative to the 
market, where SOEs continue to exist without obvious public policy justification? To what 
extent are SOEs “bigger” – as called for by Xi Jinping – and are bigger SOEs better or worse for 
profitability? If large SOEs are less profitable, could it be that the missing value recaptured by 
SOE management or workers, therefore reflecting a trade-off between profit maximisation and 
the achievement of other policy objectives (like winning favour for reforms or providing social 
stability, as suggested in Chapter 2)? 
The results of this chapter are necessarily limited to SOEs in manufacturing – a relatively 
small and declining share of the SOE portfolio. It therefore does not address questions about 
whether state-ownership can be an effective at contributing to policy goals in sectors relating to 
services or network utilities. Nevertheless, given that China’s largest manufacturing subsector 
relates to steel, and that Chinese steel SOEs are notorious for their poor profitability, it is worth 
considering whether steel SOEs are representative of SOEs more broadly, or whether they are a 
special case. 
5.1 Measuring SOE performance 
Access to large survey data has allowed assessments of the relative performance of SOEs 
over time. Jefferson, Hu, Guan and Yu (2003) considered the productivity and performance of 
22,000 large and medium enterprises based on NBS survey data from 1994–1999. They 
estimated the multifactor productivity of SOEs compared to non-SOEs and showed that SOEs 
had the slowest productivity growth compared to other ownership forms over that period. 
However this analysis was not restricted to competitive manufacturing sectors. It included both 
utilities and resources companies. 
Based on a World Bank Investment Climate Survey of financial data from 2002–2004 for 
12,400 Chinese manufacturing firms in 125 Chinese cities, Dollar and Wei (2007) found that 
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the return on capital (whether measured in terms of profits per unit of fixed assets – described as 
the marginal revenue product of capital, or total value added per unit of fixed assets – described 
as the average revenue product of capital) for state-owned manufacturing firms was between 23 
and 54 percentage points lower than comparable non-state firms. They interpret these lower 
returns as a distortion to the cost of capital, and therefore as a symptom of investment 
inefficiency. 
Ding, Knight and Zhang (2016) calculated the same capital performance measures as 
Dollar and Wei (marginal revenue product of capital, and average revenue product of capital), 
but applies to the broader NBS survey data from 2000-2007, including 100,000 mining and 
manufacturing enterprises. They also found that SOEs were the least efficient users of capital, in 
that their returns were systematically lower than the returns of non-SOEs. The finding also 
holds on measures of both profit and total value added. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use the ratio 
of profits to fixed assets in the industrial survey from 1998–2005 as an intermediate step to 
estimate firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). For SOE manufacturers, total factor productivity 
is 41 per cent below that for non-SOEs. But they do detect a marked improvement in total factor 
productivity between 2002 and 2005, which they attribute to the exit of loss-making SOEs. 
More recently, Wei and Rong (2012) used aggregate statistics from the Industrial 
Yearbook to estimate the technical efficiency of SOEs relative to non-SOEs from 2000-2009 
according to a stochastic production frontier. Excluding non-competitive sectors (defined 
broadly, according to a CR-4 measure29 in 2002), they argued that the technical efficiency of 
SOEs had converged with non-SOEs by the final two years of the survey – the average technical 
efficiency of SOEs in 2009 was 0.72 compared to 0.74 for non-SOEs. By contrast, estimates 
based on provincial-level data, and including SOEs across the non-agricultural economy 
including the health and education sectors, show no such convergence between 1985 and 2007 
(Brandt, Tombe and Zhu, 2013). 
These prior studies are widely cited but are based on data that does not capture the full 
effects of China’s WTO accession, the effect of governance changes following the creation of 
the SASAC system, and the continued growth of private competition in Chinese manufacturing 
subsectors. 
My unpublished working paper (Hubbard, 2015b) applied Dollar and Wei’s methodology 
to the 2012 World Bank Enterprise Survey. The survey was restricted to 2,700 firms with 
private ownership and 148 wholly-state-owned enterprises from firms in only 25 mostly richer 
coastal Chinese cities. After excluding firms with missing observations, fewer than six per cent 
                                                     
29 The Concentration Ratio (CR)-4 measure considers the market share of the leading four enterprise in an 
industry. When the required data is available, the HHI is a preferable measure to measures, since it 
includes information on the broader distribution within a subsector, while still giving extra weight to the 
leading firms through the use of the square term (Hall and Tideman, 1967; Calkins, 1983). 
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of the 1,032 complete observations had any state ownership – further evidence of the 
retrenchment of SOEs from the manufacturing sector. In this sample, the difference in value 
added per unit of fixed capital between the six wholly state-owned enterprises and non-SOEs 
was not statistically significant. The difference between non-SOEs and the 48 majority SOEs 
was statistically significantly (at 5 per cent), with SOEs reporting higher value added per unit of 
fixed capital. Taken at face value, high capital returns would suggest underinvestment by state 
firms. While entirely unexpected, the small number of SOEs in this survey did not allow for too 
much confidence in the results.  
The contribution of this chapter is to draw on the latest available above-scale industrial 
survey data, from 2011 to 2013. It follows the approach of Dollar and Wei (2007) in calculating 
capital returns for manufacturing firms, but uses the larger industrial survey. Following Hsieh 
and Klenow, the chapter considers profits, a broader return to capital (profits and depreciation), 
and total value added of manufacturers based on the total value of their fixed assets. While 
firm-level data on employee compensation is available, survey observations are not available for 
the number of workers. For this reason a stochastic production frontier analysis is not estimated. 
The aggregate trends of manufacturing profits (excluding tobacco and petroleum sectors) 
divided by fixed assets are shown in Figure 5-1. The absolute rate of profit is higher (since fixed 
assets are necessarily smaller than total assets) but the overall trends between SOEs and 
non-SOEs are the same as previously observed in Figure 1-1. The dashed line shows the 
average return for all shifts over time from the solid SOE line at the start of the period, toward 
the non-SOE line at the end of the period, reflects the shifting weight in these sectors from 
SOEs to non-SOEs over this period. 
Figure 5-1 Return on fixed assets for manufacturing sectors (2000–2015) 
 
Source Author’s calculations based on NBS, Statistical Yearbook various years. 
103 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
5.1.1 Pooled enterprise-level survey data (2011–2013) 
Does the large gap between SOEs and non-SOEs also emerge when considering firm-level 
statistics? This chapter employs the 2011–2013 waves of the annual above-scale industrial 
survey previously described in Section 4.1.1. Revised industry classifications CSIC (GB/T 
4754—2011) are reported in the National Statistical Yearbook from 2012, and in the survey 
data from 2013. To ensure consistent industry classifications, all observations with 2011 
industry revisions are converted using an official conversion table (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2011). To avoid capital returns being confounded by monopoly or resource rents, 
resource (two-digit subsectors 12 or below) and utilities (two-digit subsectors 44 and above) 
industries are dropped, as well as state monopoly manufacturing subsectors – tobacco (two-digit 
sector 12) and oil processing (four-digit subsector 2511). 
Observations are included for the book value of the firm’s fixed assets, profits, 
depreciation, taxes on production, and employee compensation. Employee compensation is a 
broad measure of labour costs that includes wages, bonuses, allowances, subsidies, welfare 
expenses (including insurance benefits) and other monetary and non-monetary compensation 
(Ministry of Finance 2006). After 2007 the survey does not include separate observations for 
value added, but summing profits, depreciation, taxes on production and employee 
compensation provides a measure of value added, consistent with the methodology used in 
China’s national income accounts (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012). Observations 
for the firm’s provincial location are missing for some years – this is recovered by identifying 
the province based on the leading two digits of the firm’s postcode. 
All observations are pooled for years 2011–2013.  
Observations are dropped in the case of obvious errors where fixed assets are zero or 
negative, or fixed assets are greater than total assets.  
Table 5-1 gives summary statistics for each of the key variables in the sample, broken 
down into SOEs and non-SOEs. Consistent with the findings of the previous chapter that 
China’s manufacturing sectors are largely dominated by private firms, the table confirms that 
the sample is dominated by non-SOE manufacturers – SOEs account for three per cent of firm-
year observations. But SOEs on average are larger – accounting for 23 per cent of total fixed 
assets in the sample. The median SOE, measured in terms of its fixed assets, is more than four 
times larger than the median non-SOE. Median results for value added and its components are 
all between two and five times larger for SOEs than non-SOEs.  
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  Mean Median Max Min Sum Std. Dev. 
Fixed Assets 
       
Non-SOE  50.2   12.6   52,632.6   0.0   34,389,249.4   317.3  684,498  
SOE  463.0   54.0   107,441.4   0.2   10,467,184.6   2,360.0   22,605  
Total  63.4   13.0   107,441.4   0.0   44,856,433.9   529.9  707,103  
SOE / Total  7.3   4.1   1.0   199.0   0.23     0.03  
Value Added 
       
Non-SOE  42.9   13.1   58,798.1   0.0   29,383,060.2   242.6   684,498  
SOE  268.8   43.5   118,031.7   0.1   6,077,105.0   1,703.6   22,605  
Ratio SOE/Non-SOE  6.3   3.3   2.01   28.00   0.21      
Of which: Profits 
       
Non-SOE  17.6   3.6   24,370.5   -888.1   12,015,762.2   105.1   684,498  
SOE  94.4   8.5   59,633.4   -2,490.0   2,133,637.8   840.1   22,605  
Ratio SOE/Non-SOE  5.4   2.4   2.45   2.80   0.18      
Depreciation 
       
Non-SOE  6.7   1.1   11,335.4   0.0   4,556,746.9   58.9   684,498  
SOE  48.8   4.9   10,339.0   0.0   1,102,543.3   278.4   22,605  
Ratio SOE/Non-SOE  7.3   4.6   0.9   1.0   0.2      
Taxes 
       
Non-SOE  7.8   2.0   26,687.6   -2,287.1   5,355,064.1   65.7   684,498  
SOE  56.3   5.5   38,877.0   -917.0   1,273,707.7   525.4   22,605  
Ratio SOE/Non-SOE  7.2   2.7   1.46   0.40   0.24      
Compensation 
       
Non-SOE  10.9   3.9   14,673.6   0.0   7,455,487.1   62.6   684,498  
SOE  69.3   15.0   13,082.3   0.0   1,567,216.2   314.7   22,605  
Ratio SOE/Non-SOE  6.4   3.9   0.89   1.00   0.21      
 
Table 5-2 reports average performance of SOEs and non-SOEs measured according to 
profit per unit of fixed assets (equivalent to the return on fixed assets measure reported in Figure 
5-1), combined profit and depreciation per unit of fixed assets  (the return on capital, equivalent 
to Dollar and Wei’s marginal revenue product of capital), and total value-added per unit of fixed 
assets (equivalent to Dollar and Wei’s average revenue product of capital measure). 
Comparisons are presented as a ratio, and also a log-difference between the two results to 
facilitate comparison with the regression results below. 
Table 5-2 Aggregate return on fixed assets 
 
Sum Profits 
/ Sum Fixed Assets 
Sum (Profits 
+ Depreciation) 
/ Sum Fixed Assets 
Sum Value Added 
/ Sum Fixed Assets 
Non-SOE 0.35 0.48 0.85 
SOE 0.2 0.31 0.58 
Ratio SOE / Non-SOE 0.58 0.64 0.68 
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These results suggest that, on average, SOE manufacturers earn 20 RMB worth of profits 
per 100 RMB of fixed capital investment, compared to 35 RMB per 100 RMB investment by 
non-SOEs. This suggests that the profitability of SOE manufacturers is around half that of non-
SOEs. This gap closes somewhat when depreciation is considered (noting from the previous 
table that SOEs face relatively larger depreciation bills than non-SOEs). In terms of total value 
added, on average non-SOEs produce 85 RMB of value added per 100 RMB of fixed assets, 
which closes the performance gap to around 40 per cent. 
5.2 Statistical Results 
Table 5-3 presents the mean and median returns for each of the SOEs and non-SOEs in the 
sample. In all cases the mean results are much higher than the median results, with the median 
results being closer to the aggregate results. This is a result of the market mechanism by which 
loss-making firms tend to be removed from the market. Thousands of smaller firms, some of 
which have very high profitability, survive in the market,30 which pulls up average firm 
profitability, but corresponding loss-making firms are not observed since these would go out of 
business. The performance of the median SOE and non-SOE firm provides a more reliable 
guide to overall performance, more closely matching the aggregate performance results from the 
previous table. The median SOE earns 18 RMB in profit on every 100 RMB of fixed capital, 
compared to 31 RMB for non-SOEs. But the proportional difference closes to around a third 
based on value-added measures. 
Table 5-3 Mean and median return on fixed assets 
 
 Profit /  
Fixed Assets  
 (Profit + 
Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets  
 Value Added  
/ Fixed Assets  
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Non-SOE  0.60   0.31   0.74   0.44   1.87   1.14  
SOE  0.44   0.18   0.58   0.31   1.53   0.83  
Ratio SOE/Non-SOE  0.73   0.59   0.78   0.69   0.82   0.73  
Log Difference  -0.31   -0.53   -0.25   -0.37   -0.34   -0.31  
 
To what extent do these results reflect the poor performance of SOEs at the firm level, 
compared to a potentially higher concentration of SOEs in less profitable subsectors, or more 
depressed regions? This lower rate of return might be explained by the concentration of SOEs in 
less profitable subsectors, or specific regions, where rates of return are lower. This effect of 
sectoral and regional variation can be reduced using simple regression analysis.  
Table 5-4 reports the results of three separate panel least-squares regressions. In each case 
the dependent variable is the log of each of the three different performance measures reported in 
                                                     
30 Smaller firms have a smaller ratio of non-fixed assets to total assets. 
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the previous table. Performance variables are estimated based on the profit divided by fixed 
assets, profit and depreciation divided by fixed assets, and value added divided by fixed assets. 
Logs of these performance variables are taken from subsamples trimming the top and bottom 
tails of observations to remove negative observations and extreme outliers – this removes the 
top and bottom 11 per cent of observations in the case of the profit measure, the top and bottom 
five per cent of observations for profits and depreciation measures (this recovers some 
unprofitable firms that are excluded in the straight profit measure), and the top and bottom two 
per cent for the value-added measure. 
Independent variables include fixed effects dummies for all China’s provinces, each four-
digit industry subsector, and the year. A dummy variable takes a value of one if the firm is an 
SOE – hence the coefficient on the dummy variable can be interpreted as the log-difference 
(approximate to the percentage difference for small values) in performance of SOEs relative to 
non-SOEs, after controlling for regional and subsector distribution.  
Table 5-4 Panel least-squares regression results, no size controls 
Dependent Variable 
 Log (Profit / Fixed 
Assets)  
 Log  
((Profit + 
Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets)  
 Log (Value Added / 
Fixed Assets)  
   Coefficient   Prob.   Coefficient   Prob.   Coefficient  Prob. 
Constant  -1.32  0.00  -0.81  0.00  0.14  0.00 
SOE Dummy  -0.28  0.00  -0.25  0.00  -0.23  0.00 
Province Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y 
 
4-Digit Subsector Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y 
 
Year Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y 
 
Observations  675,328     710,198     768,490  
 
R-squared  0.04     0.04     0.09  
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.04     0.04     0.09  
 
 
The coefficient of –0.28 in the regression of profit indicates that the average profitability of 
manufacturing SOEs is around a quarter below non-SOEs. The smaller coefficient of -0.23 in 
the value-added regression suggests the performance gap is still around 20 per cent on the 
value-added measure. This suggests that the observed poor performance of manufacturing SOEs 
is not primarily determined by regional or sectoral distribution of SOE fixed assets.  
To what extent does size matter? The most conspicuous feature of SOEs in the descriptive 
statistics is their large size. The next section considers the performance of SOEs according to 
their small and great. It then considers the suggestion made in Chapter 2 that profits might be 
foregone to achieve other objectives. 
107 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
5.3 Returns for manufacturers with relatively small 
market shares 
This subsection considers those manufacturing firms facing the fiercest competitive 
environment – these firms are selected from amongst the smallest five per cent of manufacturers 
measured according to their share of total revenue in their subsector. For the year 2013, this 
provided 15,078 observations of firms, including 131 SOEs, with a revenue share for their 
four-digit industry subsector less than 0.003 per cent. There are 23 four-digit subsectors 
represented in this sample. The most common are firms primarily producing auto parts (5,172 
firms), woven cloth manufacturing (3,790 firms) and steel pressing (2,494 firms). The large 
number of very small firms in these sectors suggests market conditions that may be as close as 
is practicably feasible to textbook perfectly competitive conditions.  
Table 5-5 reports the performance measures these SOEs and non-SOEs. The gap between 
SOE and non-SOE performance appears to have closed significantly – indeed the value-added 
measures suggest that SOE performance may be slightly higher. 
Table 5-5 Performance measures of manufacturing firms with small national 
market share 
 
Profit /  
Fixed Assets 
(Profit + Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets 
Value Added  
/ Fixed Assets 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Non-SOE  0.40   0.21   0.54   0.33   1.99   1.06  
SOE  0.39   0.18   0.56   0.31   2.17   1.12  
Log Difference  -0.04   -0.16   0.04   -0.06   0.18   0.06  
 
Table 5-6 reports the result of three separate regressions, including controls for province, 
industry subsector and year.  
Table 5-6 Panel least-squares regression results, competitive SOEs  
Dependent Variable 
 Log (Profit / 
Fixed Assets)  
 Log  
((Profit + 
Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets)  
 Log (Value 
Added / Fixed 
Assets)  






 Coef. Prob. 
Constant  -1.42  0.27  -0.52  0.59  0.03  0.98 
SOE Dummy  0.01  0.92  0.07  0.23  0.09  0.10 
Province Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y 
 
4-Digit Subsector Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y 
 
Year Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y 
 
Observations  27,357     28,232    28,232  
 
R-squared  0.03     0.03     0.16  
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In all cases the coefficient on the SOE dummy is positive but not statistically significant. 
In other words, this can be interpreted as suggesting that the performance of small SOEs 
operating the most competitive manufacturing subsectors is statistically equivalent to that of 
non-SOEs. This is an important result because it suggests that there are competitive conditions 
in which SOE performance can converge to non-SOE performance. In other words, SOE 
underperformance is not inevitable; at least in certain circumstances competition might triumph 
over ownership. Identifying the circumstances under which this occurs is an important subject 
for future research, relevant to designing corporate governance arrangements for those SOEs for 
which the state owner’s sole objective is to maximise its financial returns.  
5.4 Returns for the largest manufacturers 
Having shown that both profitability and value-added measures of some SOEs can be 
equivalent to non-SOEs, how can the large differences between aggregate SOE and non-SOE 
performance be explained? One suggestion, from Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) is that the lower cost 
of capital for SOEs leads SOEs to invest more than non-SOEs and therefore become much 
larger than private companies facing the higher competitive cost for capital. This can be 
explored by grouping firms based on fixed asset size.  
Table 5-7 reports for 2013 the number and total fixed assets of SOEs and non-SOEs 
grouped below median size (first to fiftieth percentile), above median size excluding the top 
percentile (fifty-first to ninety-ninth percentile), and the top (hundredth percentile). This shows 
that of the 7,515 SOEs in the sample, roughly a tenth of these sit within the top percentile of all 
manufacturing firms. These include 188 central SOEs and 537 very large local-level SOEs.  
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Table 5-7 Distribution of manufacturing fixed assets (2013) 
 
Fixed Asset Size by Percentile 
 
  1-50 51-99 Top Total 
Number 
  
    
SOE  1,552   5,238   725   7,515  
Central SOE  235   1,037   188   1,460  
Local SOE  1,317   4,201   537   6,055  
Non-SOE  116,670   127,356   1,871   245,897  
All  118,222   132,594   2,596   253,412  
Total Fixed Assets (RMB Million) 
 
    
SOE  8,975   728,236   2,888,808   3,626,018  
Central SOE  1,340   165,239   828,002   994,581  
Local SOE  7,635   562,997   2,060,806   2,631,438  
Non-SOE  642,740   8,496,908   4,134,822   13,274,470  
All  651,715   9,225,144   7,023,630   16,900,489  
Share of Total Fixed Assets (%) 
 
    
SOE  0.1   4.3   17.1   21.5  
Central SOE  0.01   1.0   4.9   5.9  
Local SOE  0.05   3.3   12.2   15.6  
Non-SOE  3.8   50.3   24.5   78.5  
All  3.9   54.6   41.6   100.0  
 
The distribution of fixed assets between SOEs and non-SOEs of different sizes reveals why 
the top percentile is particularly important – because this percentile of manufacturing firms in 
our sample accounts for 40 per cent of the fixed assets. SOE assets are particularly concentrated 
in the largest SOEs – of the 3.6 trillion RMB of SOE fixed assets, 2.8 trillion (80 per cent) are 
accounted for by SOEs in the top percentile. Consequently, 80 per cent of the aggregate mean 
result for SOE performance will be determined by these 725 largest manufacturing SOEs. For 
non-SOE manufacturers, only 40 per cent of their aggregate results will be explained by 
manufacturers in the top percentile; half (50.3 per cent) of all manufacturing assets sit within 
non-SOE manufacturers that are above median size but not in the top one percent. 
The median profitability on fixed assets of large SOEs is eight per cent – just above the 
benchmark ‘official interest rates of loans of financial institutions’ for loans of longer than five 
years, which between 2011 and 2013 was officially between 6.55 and 7.05 per cent (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015, secs 19–6). By contrast large non-SOE manufacturers had a 
return on fixed assets of around 13 per cent, roughly double the benchmark rate. But the 
proportional gap in percentage terms narrows when considering value added measures – the 
lower returns for large non-SOEs close the SOE-non-SOE gap to eight per cent at the mean 
(from 18 per cent in aggregate), and 15 per cent at the median (from 27 per cent in aggregate). 
This is evidence of continued dual-track pricing of capital for SOEs (see section 2.2). 
Table 5-8 shows the various performance measures for SOEs and non-SOEs within this top 
percentile. All measures – both for these very large SOEs and non-SOEs – are much lower than 
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the results summarising the averages for all firms reported in Table 5-3. This is because larger 
firms (with lower average returns) dominate the distribution. The results for SOEs in this table 
are almost identical to the results for SOEs in aggregate reported in Table 5-2, confirming the 
observation made from the previous table that aggregate SOE manufacturing returns will be 
dominated by the returns of the largest SOEs in the sample. 
Table 5-8 Returns on fixed assets for top percentile of manufacturing firms 
 
 Profit /  
Fixed Assets  
 (Profit + Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets  
 Value Added  
/ Fixed Assets  
   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median  
 Non-SOE   0.25   0.13   0.39   0.26   0.61   0.42  
 SOE   0.20   0.08   0.30   0.18   0.56   0.36  
 Ratio SOE/Non-SOE   0.79   0.60   0.78   0.67   0.92   0.86  
 Log Difference   -0.23   -0.50   -0.25   -0.40   -0.08   -0.15  
 
Table 5-9 provides a brief survey of the most significant SOEs within the largest sectors 
that accounted for 80 per cent of the fixed asset investment of all large SOEs in 2013. For 
example, 68 steel pressers account for 29 per cent of fixed assets. The table also shows the 
coefficients for labour and capital from individual estimates of Cobb-Douglas production 
functions for each of the subsectors. This makes it possible to check whether the lower returns 
might be explained by decreasing returns to scale in the particular industry – in this case, the 
sum of labour and capital shares is significantly less than one. The results suggest that while 
some manufactured products (nitrogenous fertilizer, inorganic alkali, coking, paper and 
paperboard, liquor, and auto parts) do have production technologies with decreasing returns to 
scale, this is not the case for the largest subsectors, which exhibit constant or even possibly 
increasing returns to scale in this sample.  
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Table 5-9 Cobb-Douglas estimates for industries with large SOE manufacturers 
 














Steel Pressing 29.0 68 0.64  0.39  1.03   ***  
Integrated Automobiles 11.4 63 0.62  0.36  0.98  - 
Steel Smelting 6.5 8 0.55  0.44  0.99   - 
Organic Chemical Materials 4.5 31 0.58  0.40  0.98   *  
Cement 4.0 73 0.62  0.38  0.99   - 
Nitrogenous Fertilizer 3.7 36 0.59  0.32  0.91   ***  
Primary-form Plastic and Synthetic Resin 3.0 22 0.62 0.38 1.00  - 
Photoelectron Parts and Other Electronic 
Parts 
2.8 20 0.68  0.28  0.96   ***  
Copper Smelting 2.4 7 0.64  0.49  1.13   ***  
Inorganic Alkali 2.0 14 0.55  0.35  0.89   ***  
Coking 1.4 20 0.54  0.37  0.91   ***  
Machine-made Paper and Paperboard 1.3 14 0.62  0.33  0.94   ***  
Liquor 1.2 6 0.59  0.34  0.93   ***  
Auto Parts and Fittings 1.0 16 0.64  0.32  0.96   ***  
Phosphoric Fertilizer 1.0 5 
    
Railway Engines and Groups of Conveying 
Vehicles 
1.0 11 
    
Iron Smelting 1.0 4 0.52  0.47  0.99   - 
Metal Ships 1.0 14 0.61  0.32  0.92   ***  
Tyre Production 0.9 15 0.60  0.33  0.93   ***  
Compound or Mixed Fertilizers 0.9 11 0.63  0.37  1.00   - 
       Subtotal 80.0 458  
    
Of which: Increasing 31.4  75  
    
Constant 31.2 212  
    
Decreasing 15.4 155  
    
Note Reject null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS) with 1% confidence (***), 5% 
confidence (**), 10% confidence (*).  
 
Table 5-10 presents three new regressions, this time with separate dummies to account for 
size – the reference case is for manufacturing firms below median size with separate dummies 
for manufacturers above median size but not in the top percentile, and manufacturing firms in 
the top percentile. There are three additional interaction variables for SOEs in different size 
categories. The negative coefficients on the size variables show that manufacturers with larger 
fixed assets also tend to have lower profits per fixed assets, as already noted.  
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Table 5-10 Panel least–squares regression results, size controls 
Dependent Variable 
 Log (Profit / Fixed 
Assets)  
 Log  
((Profit + 
Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets)  
 Log (Value Added / 
Fixed Assets)  
   Coefficient   Prob.   Coefficient   Prob.   Coefficient  Prob. 
Constant  -1.09  0.00  -0.57  0.00  0.55  0.00 
50-99 percentile FA  -0.43  0.00  -0.48  0.00  -0.83  0.00 
Top percentile FA  -0.85  0.00  -0.75  0.00  -1.36  0.00 
SOE x 1-49 percentile FA  0.02  0.24  0.08  0.00  0.31  0.00 
SOE x 50-99 percentile FA  -0.18  0.00  -0.18  0.00  -0.01  0.39 
SOE x Top percentile FA  -0.33  0.00  -0.30  0.00  -0.05  0.02 
Province Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y  
 
4-Digit Subsector Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y  
 
Year Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y  
 
Observations  623,100     706,362     706,362  
 
R-squared  0.07     0.09     0.26  
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.07     0.09     0.26  
 
 
The interaction terms are most relevant: the profitability of SOEs below median size is not 
significantly different from those of similarly sized non-SOEs. This is supports the proposition 
that it is the difference in profitability amongst the largest SOEs that drives the poor relative 
aggregate performance of SOEs.  
For those SOEs in the largest percentile of manufacturing firms, the coefficient on the SOE 
interaction term suggests that financial profits of those SOEs are around a third lower than non-
SOEs in the largest percentile. But on the value-added measure much of that gap closes – the 
total contribution to value added per unit of fixed capital in these largest SOEs is now only five 
per cent lower than correspondingly large non-SOEs. The difference is statistically significant at 
the five percent level, but no longer at the one per cent level. Similarly, there is no statistically 
significant difference in value added between SOEs and non-SOEs amongst manufacturing 
firms above median size when measured on a value added rather than profit basis. 
5.5 Distribution of value added within SOEs 
To what extent are large SOEs missing profits captured in other components of their value 
added? Table 5-11 shows the distribution of value added amongst the largest manufacturing 
firms in the sample for the year 2013. It shows that, out of the total distribution of value added, 
SOEs account for a full five percentage points less in profits and depreciation. However, they 
also account for an additional six percentage points of value added in taxes, and four percentage 
points in compensation to workers. The final row shows that, had the value added of these large 
SOEs been fixed but redistributed in the same way as for non-SOEs, profits would have been 
higher by 71 billion RMB, and depreciation higher by 79 billion – with a 90 billion RMB 
reduction in taxes and a 60 billion RMB reduction in value added. In this case, the mean 
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profitability of the largest SOEs would be adjusted upward 17.6 per cent to 20.0 per cent, 
coming very close to the 20.7 per cent figure for the largest non-SOE manufacturers in the same 
year. 
Table 5-11 Composition of value added amongst top percentile of 
manufacturing firms (2013) 














Billion RMB, 2013 
    
  
  
 Non-SOE   856.6   571.6   399.6   455.2   2,283.0   4,134.8   20.7  
SOE  507.7   307.3   360.2   367.9   1,543.0   2,888.8   17.6  
Shares of Value Added (%) 
    
  
  
Non-SOE  38   25   18   20   100  
  




 -5   -5   6   4   -      
Hypothetical, applying Non-SOE shares to SOE Value Added     
  
 SOE (Hypothetical)   579.0   386.3   270.1   307.6   1,543.0   2,888.8   20.0  
 
Potential reasons for differences between SOEs in shares of value added between 
depreciation, taxes and employee are now considered in turn. The finding that are smaller share 
of SOE value added is accounted for by depreciation can be further explored by considering the 
depreciation rate for SOEs and non-SOEs. Table 5-12 shows the mean depreciation rate for 
different sized manufacturing firms, by dividing depreciation by the previous year’s fixed assets. 
It shows that while across the whole sample SOEs and non-SOEs have an average depreciation 
rate of around 13 per cent, the depreciation rate for SOEs in the largest percentile of fixed assets 
is 3.5 percentage points lower than non-SOEs.  
Table 5-12 Depreciation Rate of Fixed Assets, Manufacturing Firms (2012–2013) 
 
Percentile of Fixed Assets 
 
 
1-50 51-99 Top All Sample 
Non-SOE  14.3   12.1   13.7   13.2  
SOE  18.0   11.6   10.2   12.8  
All  14.4   12.1   12.6   13.2  
 
This difference may be partly explained by considering the different incentives facing state 
owners and non-state owners. One way that a private owner might seek to maximise financial 
returns on assets would be to minimise or avoid tax to the greatest possible extent. One long-
standing way of doing this is to depreciate assets as quickly as possible, thereby increasing the 
tax deduction, allowing more value added to be distributed as profit (Lardy, 1998, p. 53). By 
contrast, the state owner (in the absence of agency problems) would be indifferent to receiving 
income from taxation as from ownership, as the two modes are substitutes.  
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A consequence of a lower depreciation rate amongst large SOEs would be a tendency for 
the book value of SOE assets to be higher than the book value of non-SOE assets that have been 
written down at a faster rate. As this effect builds up over time, even if SOEs and non-SOEs 
operate with the same efficiency, performance measures based on book value of assets will be 
relatively worse for SOEs, since the denominator is lower. Research focusing on technical 
efficiency rather than financial returns should re-estimate asset values based on a perpetual 
inventory method (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2014, pp. 346–347); this is not 
attempted here because 2010 data is missing. 
SOEs appear to claim less in depreciation, but do pay a higher share of their value added in 
taxation. This is consistent with other empirical evidence supporting the finding that SOEs are 
less inclined to minimise tax than non-SOEs. Based on analysis of 2,054 publicly listed Chinese 
companies from 1999–2012, Bradshaw, Liao and Ma (2016) show that listed SOEs, and in 
particular those that are ultimately controlled by local governments, are less likely to avoid 
taxes than listed private companies. They explain this based on the incentives facing SOE 
managers, whose performance evaluation is partly based on the tax paid by their SOE 
(Bradshaw, Liao and Ma, 2016, p. 25). By contrast, Liu and Liu (2013), based on a shorter 
analysis of listed firms between 2003 and 2006, suggest that SOEs actually face a lower tax 
burden as a form of government paternalism, by receiving higher tax refunds under the value 
added tax. 
It is possible for both motives to apply, depending on the type of SOEs. Table 5-13 shows 
that on average across the entire sample of manufacturing firms, both central SOEs and local 
SOEs have a higher tax share of value added than non-SOEs. Amongst the ten central SOEs 
operating with very small market share (considered in Section 5.3) the tax share of value added 
is still higher than average, but the 120 local SOEs in this subsample on average pay slightly 
less in tax. By contrast, the tax take of the 188 central SOEs and 537 local SOEs operating in 
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Top Percentile  
Fixed Assets 
Non-SOE  19.0   16.6   17.5  
Central SOE  22.2   17.9   24.0  
Local SOE  21.6   15.5   23.0  
All  19.4   16.6   19.9  
Number of observations 
  
Non-SOE  246,207   11,371   1,871  
Central SOE  1,463   10   188  
Local SOE  6,062   120   537  
All  253,732   11,501   2,596  
 
Also offsetting the lower share of value added paid as profits, SOEs also tend to distribute 
a higher share of value added to workers through labour compensation. Figure 5-2 shows the 
employee compensation share of total value per unit of fixed capital. The figure shows that 
overall the smallest firms, whether or not SOEs, have the highest share of value added going to 
labour. Firms with the largest fixed assets make the smallest relative payments to labour. SOEs 
of any given size tend to pay a higher share of value added to employees. The bigger the capital 
investment, the larger the gap. For the top percentile of manufacturers by fixed assets, 
21 per cent of the value added of non-state manufacturers is paid to employees compared to 31 
per cent for SOEs.  
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Because the survey data does not include observations for the number of employees in 
each firm, it is not possible to tell whether the higher share of value added to labour is the result 
of SOEs employing more workers than non-SOEs (over-manning) or paying a similar number 
of workers a higher amount. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Evidence from a 
panel of 700 SOEs in the 1990s suggests that over-manning was endemic during that period 
(Dong and Putterman, 2003). A survey of 6,000 workers taken in 1995 similarly found that 
SOEs paid significantly higher wages and were generally less responsive to changes in market 
conditions (Hering and Poncet, 2010). 
The aggregate data for the manufacturing sector calculated from the 2012 China Statistical 
Yearbook provides more recent insights (see Appendix B). In all but one of the 29 sectors, the 
average value of fixed capital per worker was much higher in SOEs. In the steel sector (smelting 
and pressing of ferrous metals), which employed 1.4 million state employees (compared to 
936,000 non-SOE employees), the average value of fixed capital per employee was 
758,000 RMB ($US117,000). This was roughly three times the equivalent figure for privately 
controlled steel works. An even larger sector for employment is the manufacture of transport 
equipment (including automobile manufacturing), in which 1.9 million state employees used an 
average of 288,000 RMB ($US45,000) per worker. This was more than double the average for 
the 1.5 million employees in the same sector outside of state ownership. The one exception at a 
two-digit level is state manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, footwear and caps, where SOE 
employment is negligible (73,400 SOE employees compared to 1.5 million non-SOE 
employees).  
Overall, it appears that large SOEs do have lower profits and rates of depreciation than 
non-SOEs. But the fact that the distribution of value-added varies between SOEs and non-SOEs, 
means that observed lower profits need not necessarily implied low value-added. It appears that 
at least some of the missing profits could be captured in taxes or payments to workers that 
would be higher than expected in non-SOEs. This suggests that the state owners might indeed 
have a different distributional preference to the private owners. This suggests that where 
possible the economic contribution of SOEs should be judged from a complete observation of 
value-added, rather than being inferred from partial (profit) measures. 
This is not to claim that an efficient market allocation of capital between SOEs and 
non-SOEs has actually been achieved. The fact that large SOEs’ observed rate of profitability 
might understate their actual return on capital suggests only that their raw profitability measure 
is a poor measure of performance. But this by no means implies that capital has been allocated 
efficiently between competing uses. Moreover, the tendency of SOEs to make higher payments 
to workers would create distortions elsewhere. In regions where SOEs are big employers, this 
could attract labour away from the private sector, bidding up private sector costs at the expense 
of private sector growth in those regions.  
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If efficiency is to be achieved through market mechanisms, as per the stated goal of the 
Decision, then the information available to the market is inadequate for market processes to 
select out poorly performing SOEs. In the absence of this market pressure, it is highly unlikely 
that most, or even many, SOEs are operating at the efficient frontier. 
5.6 Pressing sector-specific problems  
This section considers the sector-specific aspects of large SOE capital returns. 
Table 5-14 reports the results of regression analysis on a subsample of the largest 
manufacturing firms, with separate interaction terms between SOEs and each four-digit 
subsector. The results are presented in descending order, showing the interactions for the twenty 
largest subsectors based on the total fixed asset investment of large SOEs (accounting in 2013 
for 355 large SOEs and 83 per cent of the fixed assets of large SOEs). A complete table of 
interactions for results for all sectors is included for reference in Appendix C. 
 The results show that in almost all subsectors (cement, liquor, copper smelting and auto-
parts), large SOEs are less profitable than large non-SOEs. But much of this apparent difference 
in performance declines greatly, often to the point that the difference is no longer statistically 
significant, when the difference in value added per unit of capital is used (final column). Most 
conspicuously, the largest subsector for SOE manufacturers – steel pressing (accounting for 52 
SOEs in the top percentile of manufacturing firms, and 27 per cent of the fixed assets of large 
SOEs in the top percentile) – has significantly poorer performance on all measures. 
Table 5-14 Subsector-specific SOE dummy coefficients, for top percentile 
of manufacturing firms 
Dependent Variable 
 Log (Profit / 
Fixed Assets)  
 Log 
 Log (Value 




/ Fixed Assets)  
     Coef.   Prob.   Coef.   Prob.   Coef.  Prob. 
Constant  -2.28         -     -0.73         -     -0.22         -    
SOE x Steel Pressing  -1.20         -     -0.71         -     -0.43         -    
SOE x Integrated Automobiles  -0.02    0.91    0.10    0.35    0.25    0.01  
SOE x Steel Smelting  -1.12         -     -0.35    0.05    0.02    0.89  
SOE x Organic Chemical Materials  -0.24    0.15   -0.17    0.14   -0.05    0.66  
SOE x Cement   0.23    0.05    0.11    0.16    0.13    0.09  
SOE x Photoelectron Parts and Other Elec. Parts  -0.20    0.36   -0.31    0.04   -0.52         -    
SOE x Copper Smelting   0.33    0.49    0.52    0.11    0.20    0.51  
SOE x Nitrogenous Fertilizer  -0.25    0.23   -0.20    0.17   -0.01    0.95  
SOE x Primary-form Plastic and Synthetic Resin  -0.22    0.28   -0.33    0.02   -0.17    0.18  
SOE x Inorganic Alkali  -1.24         -     -0.81         -     -0.56         -    
SOE x Liquor   0.79    0.03    1.07         -      1.02         -    
SOE x Auto Parts and Fittings   0.01    0.95    0.05    0.70    0.24    0.06  
SOE x Phosphoric Fertilizer  -0.22    0.79    0.40    0.48    0.13    0.80  
SOE x Metal Ships  -0.61         -     -0.43         -     -0.30    0.02  
SOE x Communication System Equipment Mfg  -0.18    0.69   -0.32    0.32   -0.49    0.10  
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SOE x Machine-made Paper and Paperboard  -0.14    0.54    0.04    0.80    0.23    0.11  
SOE x Tyre Production  -0.76         -     -0.49         -     -0.15    0.31  
SOE x Petroleum Extraction Equipment  -0.77    0.13   -0.48    0.17    0.10    0.75  
SOE x Coking  -1.19         -     -0.88         -     -0.56         -    
SOE x Potassic Fertilizer  -0.48    0.52   -0.86    0.10   -0.59   ·  
SOE x 115 other 4-digit subsectors Y   Y   
 
Y 
Province Fixed Effects Y   Y   
 
Y 
4-Digit Subsector Fixed Effects Y   Y   
 
Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y   Y   
 
Y 
Observations 5,287   5,287   
 
5,287 
R-squared 0.23   0.27   
 
0.32 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18   0.23     0.28 
 
The other subsector in which large SOEs perform very badly relates to the manufacturing 
of photoelectron parts (solar cells) – another sector which had received substantial policy 
support since 2006, and was at the time facing ‘a severe manufacturing surplus’ coupled with a 
saturated export market and weak domestic demand (Honghang et al., 2014). 
Lardy (2014, pp. 125–128) highlighted steel as an important heavy industrial sector in 
which the performance of state firms is inferior to that of private ones. It remains the most 
prominent case in which ‘industrial overcapacity’ began in 2010 to cause major trade frictions 
with the United States (Tang, 2010). Figure 5-3 shows that the return on assets in the steel 
sector collapsed after 2007 and was barely breaking even for the period of this study. 
Figure 5-3 Aggregate return on assets for smelting and pressing of ferrous 
metals (2000–2015) 
 
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS, Statistical Yearbook (various years), adapted and 
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Figure 5-4 shows the aggregate return on assets for competitive manufacturing sectors, 
excluding the steel sector. Removing steel closes the gap between SOE and non-SOE profits by 
a full percentage point. Finally, while the profit gap between SOEs and non-SOEs does widen 
slightly over time, the relationship between SOE and non-SOE manufacturing profits is 
relatively stable over time when contrasted with the apparent convergence and then wide 
divergence observed in Figure 1-1.  
In other words, it appears that the key to understanding much of the aggregate volatility 
depends on understanding the dynamics of the large and volatile steel sector. Manufacturing 
SOEs in general (that is, excluding steel) are much less volatile. Care needs to be taken not to 
over-generalise results from the steel SOEs to manufacturing or industrial SOEs in general.   
Figure 5-4 Return on assets in ordinary manufacturing sectors, excluding steel 
 
Source Author’s calculation based on NBS, Statistical Yearbook (various years)  
 
Section 1.2 noted the importance of steel in terms of China’s industrial policy under the 
planned economy and in the period of reform that followed. Steel was designated a nationally 
important ‘pillar’ industry in 2005 (Williams, 2013; Qi, Song and Liu, 2016). And steel remains 
the most significant industrial sector for Chinese SOEs. One third of SOE workers in 
competitive manufacturing sectors belonged to industry sectors relating to steel or automobiles. 
Amongst the largest SOEs, Table 5-5 shows that 46.9 per cent of the value of fixed assets 
pertains to 139 very large SOEs involved in steel pressing, integrated automobiles and steel 
smelting subsectors.  
Even amongst SOEs, the problem of steel appears to be geographically concentrated. Map 
5-1 shows the average profit per worker for provincial SOE steel SOEs, as reported in the 
SASAC Yearbook. The lightest two shades on the map show where the profit per worker is 
negative. While profits are high in the rich coastal provinces, returns in central China and inland 
are much lower. 
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Map 5-1 Profit per worker in provincial steel SOEs (2014) 
 
Source Author’s calculations based on SASAC (2015, pp. 713–766)  
 
One of the reasons why the steel industry may be a special (albeit large case), is the 
political and economic importance of coal and steel to some regions of China. Table 5-15 shows 
that half of the assets for provincial coal and steel SOEs are in Shanxi, Shandong, Hebei, Henan 
and Shaanxi. Moreover, in Shanxi, Hebei and Henan, these coal and steel SOEs account for 
almost three quarters of provincial SOE assets. Provincial governments’ commitment to their 
local steel SOEs have stymied central government attempts to rein in steel production since 
2005 (Haley and Haley, 2013, p. 59).  
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Table 5-15 Leading provinces for coal and steel provincial SOE assets 
 




coal and steel 
(%) 
Share of  
all provincial  
SOE coal and  
steel (%) 
(Cum.) 
Shanxi  2,192.3  1,600.3  73 17 17 
Shandong  2,000.7  1,126.7  56 12 29 
Hebei  1,089.9  795.7  73 8 37 
Henan  987.1  720.1  73 8 45 
Shaanxi  1,397.1  673.9  48 7 52 
Beijing  1,690.8  506.7  30 5 58 
Anhui  931.4  471.0  51 5 63 
Liaoning  861.8  426.9  50 5 67 
Gansu  599.5  421.9  70 4 72 
Tianjin  808.2  387.6  48 4 76 
Other Provinces  8,582.3   2,268.2  26 24 100 
All Provinces  21,141.0   9,398.8  44 100 
 
Source (China Ministry of Finance, 2015)  
5.7 Conclusion 
It is clear that the aggregate rate of profitability of SOEs in China’s (largely competitive) 
manufacturing sectors is well below that of non-SOEs. However, the aggregate results do not 
mean that all SOEs are inefficient. Using enterprise level survey data reveals that there are 
hundreds of SOEs that are small relative to the market, whose measures of profit or value-added 
per unit of capital are around the same as non-SOEs.  
Nevertheless, the competitive performance of some smaller SOEs are overwhelmed by the 
fact that most SOE manufacturing assets are concentrated in a few very, very large SOEs. The 
2013 survey identifies 7,515 manufacturing SOEs out of more than a quarter of a million 
manufacturers, or less than 3 per cent by number. SOE manufactures control 21.5 per cent of 
manufacturing fixed assets – and the largest 725 SOE manufacturers control 17.1 per cent. So 
the profitability of the largest 725 manufacturers determines four-fifths of the aggregate SOE 
performance results. 
These large SOEs do have lower profits – however, the distribution of value added for 
large SOEs appears to be different than for large non-SOEs. They distribute less value added as 
profits or depreciation, but these are offset by higher payments of taxes, and higher payments to 
employees. This suggests that a profit measure under-estimates their economic contribution. 
This is consistent with the idea that the state owner does have different objectives to the private 
profit-maximising capitalist, which may focus on broader contribution to economic activity. It is 
potentially willing to forego financial profit to achieve economic or social benefits elsewhere, as 
suggested in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, this offers only a partial apology for SOEs. While it suggests that the gap 
between SOE and non-SOE profitability in Figure 1-1 overstates the real performance 
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difference between ownership types, it also calls attention to potential distortions they may 
create elsewhere (in the labour market) and confirms the claim that SOEs – even when facing 
competitive markets for output – still face different objectives and constraints compared to 
non-SOEs. Large SOEs may not be as bad for the economy as they appear at first glance. But 
unless they face the same price signals and selection pressures as non-SOEs any convergence to 
competitive market outcomes would be purely coincidental.  
Amongst these large SOEs it is worth paying special attention to the steel sector. 
Four-fifths of SOE manufacturing fixed assets are in just 725 large SOEs. Of these, 52 SOEs are 
in the steel pressing subsector account for 27 per cent of the total value of fixed assets. In other 
words, SOE steelmakers disproportionately affect the aggregate performance results of SOEs. 
SOE steel-makers do appear to be chronic under-performers, even when considering broader 
value-added measures. There is a regional dimension to this as well – suggesting that some state 
owners are prepared to tolerate losses from their steelmakers.  
Getting to the bottom of this phenomenon requires some study of the role of the steel 
industry still plays in parts of China – possibly related to the need to provide employment in less 
prosperous parts of China. Given its significance both to the Chinese economy, and its 
spillovers to the global economy, the Chinese steel industry is well worthy of its own separate 
study (Hogan, 1999; Tang, 2010; Song and Liu, 2012; Williams, 2013). However, care needs to 
be taken to ensure that the analysis and policy recommendations that apply to China’s SOE steel 
makers aren’t generalised or mis-applied to SOEs overall. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and implications 
 
This thesis began with focus on the apparent tension in the ‘socialist market economy’ 
between achieving market efficiency and maintaining state ownership. Given that a founding 
tenet of Communism is to abolish private property, some degree of continued rhetorical support 
for state ownership on the part of the Party’s General Secretary is understandable. Yet this 
commitment to make SOEs bigger, better and stronger – as well as the emergence of China’s 
SOEs as some of world’s biggest companies and investors – appears to conflict with the 
historical record of ongoing retrenchment of the role of SOEs in the economy. The poor and 
declining relative profitability of SOEs in China’s industrial economy has been cited by many 
careful observers of the Chinese economy to support the proposition that rather than making the 
economy better and stronger, Chinese SOEs are bad for efficiency. Some go further to argue 
that the persistence of state influence in the Chinese economy, partly through SOEs, means that 
China’s economy cannot properly be considered to be a ‘market economy’.  
This thesis provided a contemporary empirical assessment of the nature of SOEs in the 
Chinese economy that suggests that this is not the case. SOEs no longer play their old role as 
administrative units of the state under the planned economy. While still connected to parts of 
the state through ownership and personnel ties, they have become independent entities that, in 
those sectors where competition is viable, they are subject to fierce competition from private 
and foreign firms. However, state ownership does remain dominant, by default, in those sectors, 
such as natural monopoly sectors, where free competition is less successful. In this sense, the 
state does maintain a dominant role in key sectors of the economy, even though SOEs do not 
dominate the entire economy. But state ownership is itself diffuse and fragmented – modern 
SOEs are often subsidiaries of other SOEs, and in many cases the line between state ownership 
and private ownership is blurred through ‘mixed capital’ arrangements.  
One of the external criticisms of SOEs is that they do not engage in commercial behaviour 
in the manner of private firms – in the language of economics, they pursue objectives other than 
the maximisation of private profits. When SOEs fail to achieve rates of profit as high as 
non-SOEs, this is taken of proof either of ‘non-commercial’ behaviour or inefficiency. But 
before viewing this as an indictment against SOEs, it is worth considering the conditions under 
which profit maximisation is itself a socially desirable goal. Chapter 2 argued that, in a world of 
perfect competition, perfect information and no public goods or unpriced externalities, profit 
maximisation is sufficient to maximise social welfare. From an efficiency perspective, there 
would be no case for state intervention. Profit maximisation by private actors would sufficient, 
and its abuse could be kept in check by competition by other profit-seekers.  
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Under these circumstances, profit may be a good measure of SOE performance, given that 
there would be no particular case for SOEs to be doing anything else. There is no policy case to 
support an SOEs that cannot maintain profitability in a competitive market. But if an SOE can 
remain profitable under such conditions there is no policy case to abolish it, particularly if the 
state has an ideological presumption in favour of state ownership. The finding in Chapter 5 that 
some smaller SOEs do continue to exist in highly competitive markets – and apparently receive 
equivalent returns to non-SOEs there, suggests that this is at least possible, if not typical of the 
state sector. 
For welfare economists, private property and profit maximisation is not an end in itself, but 
a means to an end of social welfare. In the real world, competition is not always sufficient to 
ensure socially desirable outcomes. State intervention is accepted to help remedy market 
failures – the case of natural monopoly being a common example. Such state intervention in the 
free market can take the form of regulation of private businesses – in effect constraining the 
profit-maximising objective. An alternative means of intervention is through an SOE with an 
explicit public-interest objective. In principle, whether an enterprise is a public enterprise or a 
private enterprise is secondary to the question of whether the enterprise contributes to social 
welfare. The fact that a state owner may be willing to forego so of its potential profits to achieve 
some other socially-desirable goal is not itself an indictment of the SOE. Indeed, where the state 
is deliberately using state ownership as an instrument to further certain social, political or 
developmental goals, then a profit-measure that excludes the value of these public policy 
objectives is likely to understate their value.   
That said, the problems of measuring the value of policy outputs, and monitoring SOE 
management to ensure that they act for the public interest rather than for their personal 
enrichment, introduces principal-agent problems.   
The public policy justification for the maintenance of SOEs in non-competitive sectors 
helps explain the distribution of SOEs revealed in Chapter 3. China’s largest sector – and the 
source of most of China’s exports – is manufacturing. After four decades of reform and opening 
up to global markets, sector is now largely dominated by non-SOEs. At the other extreme, those 
sectors which are characterised either by persistent rents (such as resources) and natural 
monopoly (such as network utilities), are shown here still to be the domain of SOEs. Finance, 
which tends to be highly regulated in any country, is also dominated by state firms. It is not 
surprising that China’s massive SOE conglomerates are also central SOEs in these sectors. But 
it would be a mistake to take these as representative of all sectors. The existence of SOEs in 
sectors such as transport, education and health is also not uniquely Chinese. If the current state 
share of fixed-asset investment is a good guide to future output, then only around one-third of 
Chinese GDP will be produced by state enterprise in the future. This level would be higher than 
in many advanced economies, but not outrageously so. 
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The large central SOEs conglomerates that appear on the Global Fortune 500 list should 
also not to be taken as representative of SOEs in general. There are a few exceptionally large 
SOEs that attract much attention, and that dominate aggregate results. For some purposes – such 
as the study of Chinese elite politics (Brødsgaard, 2012) – they may be the only SOEs that 
matter. Shambaugh  (2014, p. 170) might accuse China’s powerful oil SOEs of ‘hijacking’ 
Chinese foreign policy, and drawing China into foreign entanglements that it would otherwise 
avoid – and for such a study it is only necessary to look at a few massive central SOEs. But it 
says little about the wealth or power of a local SOE operating in an expanding service sector. 
More than half of state capital is held at a local level. Provincial, township, county and even 
district-level SOEs are abundant and unlikely ever to become ‘national champions’. Chinese 
SOEs, like people, are diverse. Simply identifying an enterprise as ‘state-owned’ does not say 
much about the enterprise, nor its importance to the national economy.  
Having argued that profit measures may be an appropriate measure of performance in 
competitive markets, Chapter 4 set out to measure the extent of market concentration in Chinese 
industry. China’s industrial sector has been well studied due to the availability of high-quality 
survey data. But it can be misleading to consider the sector as a whole since it includes not only 
manufacturing (China’s largest economic sector, and dominated by non-SOEs, as revealed in 
Chapter 3) as well as resources and utilities (which are much smaller, but are dominated by 
some of China’s most prominent SOE conglomerates). After making adjustments to account for 
the existence of these conglomerates, the chapter showed that manufacturing subsectors – with 
the exception of the state tobacco monopoly – are marked by a low market concentration and a 
low degree of state ownership. Resources (oil) and utilities (electricity) by contrast are marked 
by a high degree of market concentration and significant state ownership. SOEs in different 
sectors appear to respond to market concentration in different ways – resource companies in 
concentrated sectors tend to increase profits, consistent with an attempt by the state to capture 
resource rents. By contrast, SOEs in utilities sectors have the lowest level of profitability. This 
is consistent with non-profit objectives – but not necessarily inefficient31 considering the 
downstream economic spillovers from this kind of infrastructure activity.  
Chapters 3 and 4 showed that China’s manufacturing sector was largely privately 
dominated, and not over-run by state monopolies. Nevertheless, a rump of SOEs do remain here 
despite four decades of reform and opening up. Given that the private-good nature of most 
manufactured goods, and the success of private competition in this sector, this comes closest to 
the case where profit-maximisation is a desirable social objective. Under these circumstances a 
direct profit comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs in the same subsector is most meaningful. 
                                                     
31 If short-run marginal-cost pricing is taken  as an efficiency benchmark, there is no requirement that 
fixed-costs need to be recovered. There may even be an efficiency case for a capital subsidy given that 
average cost pricing, or a two-part tariff create distortions of their own. 
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The results of the analysis in Chapter 5 for the years 2011-2013 find some SOEs that are small 
relative to the overall market which have profits that on average are close to those of non-SOEs. 
It appears possible for SOEs to be competitive. There is no particular case to maintain state 
ownership in such sectors. However, provided that these SOEs can keep up with the 
competition without subsidy, there is no real reason to abolish them. It simply would not matter 
for the Chinese economy. 
But SOE fixed assets in the manufacturing sector are concentrated in the very largest SOEs. 
They have low rates of profitability relative to similarly large non-SOE manufacturers. It is their 
performance that determines the aggregate poor profitability of manufacturing SOEs. This 
suggest that Xi Jinping’s calls for SOEs to become ‘bigger’ will not tend to make them ‘better 
or stronger’ – at least if this is measured in terms of profit. However, a close look at the 
distribution of value added amongst these large SOEs suggest that state owners’ motivations are 
not in fact to maximise profits. As a share of their total value-added, large SOEs pay out less in 
profits and claim less in depreciation but distribute more in taxes and pay out more to their 
workers. This opens the possibility that the lower relative profits of large SOE manufacturers is 
not so much symptomatic of missing output, but rather that the state has different distributional 
preferences to the private profit-maximising owner. In the absence of a broad social safety-net, 
perhaps state owners care about social stability? Or perhaps the Party prefers to distribute state 
resources to its political supporters? In either case it is the distributional consequences – rather 
than the efficiency effects – that might be the best way to understand Xi’s support for SOEs. 
The fact that the performance of big manufacturing SOEs may not be quite as bad as 
suggested by their poor profitability figures should not be taken as evidence that they are 
achieving efficient market outcomes. The Decision emphasised the need for ‘market rules, 
market prices and market competition’ to maximise market efficiency. Even if it were the case 
that manufacturing SOEs and non-SOEs faced similar market prices and rules in their 
(competitive) output markets, the evidence suggests that they do not face the same rules and 
prices for their factor inputs. Bringing the price of state capital at last onto the same track as the 
competitive market price is China’s major unfinished economic reform. Doing away with those 
capital subsidies that have no economic justification will identify those ‘zombie firms’ (Tan, 
Huang and Woo, 2016) that otherwise hold back China’s economy. 
This thesis has identified the steel sector as the home of many of these zombies. The 
history recounted in the Chapter 1 showed that steel has long been symbolic of industrial 
strength in China. Chapter 4 showed that, unlike most of Chinese manufacturing, steel 
subsectors tend to be locally-state-owned, and highly competitive. The results of Chapter 5 
showed that large SOE steel presses had very low profitability relative to large non-SOEs. And 
while the low profits of other large manufacturing SOEs could be offset when considering 
broader value-added measures, this was not the case for steel.  
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The dynamics of China’s steel sector deserves its own detailed study; the findings of this 
thesis suggest that such a study should focus on distributional effects and regional employment. 
Other countries have, throughout their history, at times had state-owned steel makers, possibly 
because of the scale of capital investment required for efficient steel-making. However, there 
appears to be no reason in principle while China’s provinces cannot retreat and leave steel 
production to private producers, as is the case for most Chinese manufacturing. There may be a 
case for ‘bigger, better and stronger’ Chinese steelmakers, but the abysmal profitability and 
value-added figures relative to private firms suggest that there should be far fewer of them. 
Local owners may be propping up ‘zombie’ manufacturing SOEs for the sake of non-profit 
objectives, such as propping up regional employment in some places. But it can be a grossly 
inefficient means of doing so. Putting in place alternative policy measures to support regions, or 
workers, may provide the desired distributional outcomes, without distorting the industrial 
structure and giving rise to the international trade frictions. 
6.1 Implications for reform 
The thesis has argued against a generic conception of a ‘state sector’ in favour of 
considering the performance of SOEs in sector-specific contexts. There are some sectors, such 
as those with a tendency to natural monopoly or public good characteristics, in which free 
competition between profit-seeking firms does not result in socially efficient outcomes. State 
intervention, whether directly as owner or indirectly as regulator, is commonplace even in such 
sectors even in economies that are otherwise committed to private enterprise and free market 
competition. 
While SOEs remain associated with uncompetitive and some otherwise problematic 
sectors, there is danger in confusing the correlation of SOEs in problematic non-competitive 
sectors, with the claim that SOEs cause problems and necessarily harm competition. 
If further reforms can be undertaken to reduce artificial barriers to entry to introduce new 
competition (whether foreign or domestic) then this should be done. But if free competition is 
not possible – for example, due to natural monopoly characteristics of the industry – then 
regulation in the public interest remains desirable. Whether this is done by way of direct public 
ownership with clear public policy mandates, or whether it is done through the regulation of a 
private monopoly is a second order concern. In the case of China, ongoing ideological 
commitment to public ownership, as well as the problems of effective governance in a system 
with a weak rule of law, the public monopoly is likely to remain the lesser of two evils.  
While Chinese reformers have been willing to embrace private competition when 
pragmatic to do so, it seems they hesitate to entrust large resource SOEs, systemically important 
financial SOEs, or operators of critical infrastructure networks to private ownership. This is 
unlikely to change. 
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To find, in the case of China, that monopoly sectors are populated by SOEs and that 
monopolised sectors are also inefficient, is not proof that SOEs are necessarily inefficient. To 
see whether the ownership problem is causal, the appropriate test is to consider whether 
privatising the public monopoly would lead to demonstrably better outcomes. Depending on the 
taxation arrangements chosen, the conversion of a public monopoly into a private monopoly 
may change the distribution of monopoly rents from public to private hands. But there is no 
clear efficiency gain if the causes of monopoly remain. The incentive problems that might arise 
from the state colluding as both owner and regulator might be avoided, only to be replaced by 
attempts of the new, private, profit-seeking owners to capture regulators themselves (Stigler, 
1975).  
Ongoing ownership reforms to categorise SOEs into those that are purely competitive 
(profit driven) and those with additional policy objectives are therefore important; careful 
specification of fewer policy objectives is preferable if the state owner intends effectively to 
monitor the SOE (Naughton, 2017, p. 296). For those SOEs with no explicit public policy 
objective, it may be necessary to ensure allocative efficiency for the state owner to demand the 
full competitive return on capital. 
Where SOEs are retained – or expanded – as an instrument of state policy, the policy goals 
should be made explicit, and the metrics for whether or not these are achieved need to be 
carefully specified. This evaluation is made more difficult by the fact that the social, political 
and developmental goals favoured by the Party may not be consistent with the normative 
preferences of outsiders – whether Chinese citizens, western economists, or foreign 
governments. The problems of monitoring vague and sometimes competing policy objectives 
may not lead to maximum output, but not all missing SOE profit may be due to shirking and 
waste. 
Without sector-specific reforms that focus on particular market structures, externalities and 
public policy considerations inherent in specific contexts, privatisation could result in a ‘crony 
market economy’ that is potentially more distorting and problematic. Conversely, what remains 
of ‘public ownership’ today is likely more efficient than the now-defunct SOEs that have been 
abandoned over the course of economic reform and concentrated in sectors in which private 
competition amongst profit-maximising firms cannot be relied upon to deliver desired results. 
Given the potential to redistribute economic resources through SOEs, the reform of SOEs 
also has political implications. To the extent that politically connected managers can avoid 
regulation by politically weaker regulators, by inducing the state to erect new barriers to entry 
and opposing economic reforms that would reduce their market position, the politically-
appointed manager has strong incentives to oppose otherwise beneficial economic reforms. 
These are the ‘vested interests’ about which Chinese reformers complain (Shambaugh, 2016). 
129 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
The dynamic costs of protecting an existing monopoly can be more significant than the static 
welfare loss of the monopoly itself (Tullock, 1967). But from a broader political-economy 
perspective, the Party may be prepared to tolerate some of this dynamic inefficiency, and 
therefore longer-term growth, in the interests of maintaining political stability in the short term. 
Political winners and losers from reforms touching on ownership are likely to be a primary 
consideration. The evidence from the previous chapter suggests that reforms that aim to increase 
SOE profits would tend to redistribute income away from other sources, unless accompanied by 
additional measures that tackle the underlying inefficiencies. 
6.2 Implications for future research 
Much of the empirical evidence and study of state ownership has taken place in a time of 
rapid transition. Much of what is conventionally known (SOEs are inefficient) and theorised 
(the soft budget constraint) dates from this time. These propositions need to be re-tested over 
time as markets and regulatory structures evolve together.  
The political role of SOEs in capturing and redistributing rents is worthy of further study. 
While China’s economic progress has been impressive, it is also worth remembering that the 
institutions for regulating a market economy are also under construction. The continued use of 
state ownership as a ‘second best’ instrument for achieving certain policy objectives is likely, 
particularly given the default ideological preference for public ownership. Assessing China’s 
economic reforms based on institutional convergence with a private market economy is to 
misunderstand the destination. 
Most importantly, different economic sectors have evolved in different ways. Those 
sectors closest to the ideal of perfectly competitive markets for private goods – China’s 
competitive manufacturing sector – have flourished. Private competition has now displaced the 
dominant role of the state. SOEs remain dominant in sectors that tend to be confounded by 
intractable public policy problems including externalities, public goods and natural monopolies. 
Whether in China or elsewhere, state intervention in such sectors remains common, ranging 
from indirect regulation to outright ownership. Nevertheless, the largest manufacturers – 
including China’s largest steelmakers – are SOEs. This contributes to a misperception of SOE  
dominance in Chinese manufacturing   
The wealth of publicly available data available through data subscription services on 
publicly listed SOEs similarly gives rise to very many highly useful studies that provide insights 
into the behaviour of a subset of SOEs without revealing insights into their non-listed parent 
companies. Ongoing policy reforms to extend open government information to SOEs will help 
provide further information on these non-listed SOEs that will be useful for further research 
(Hubbard and Xiao, 2017). Beyond existing data subscription services, there is much further 
130 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
data analysis that can be drawn from the official yearbooks (including SASAC Yearbook, China 
Finance Yearbooks) and other Chinese-language sources. 
The empirical basis for re-testing propositions about SOEs is also changing. As a legacy of 
the planned economy, China’s industrial sectors have been very well covered by official 
statistical reporting – yet the industrial share of GDP is in retreat as China’s economy develops. 
Better measurement in the industrial sector is possible (the focus of Chapters 3 and 4), but there 
is a risk of over-generalising this to try to explain SOE performance overall. The challenge of 
assessing SOE involvement and performance in the services sector is compounded by the fact 
that for many services, particularly social services, it can be difficult to conceptualise, let alone 
measure, the value of inputs or outputs of the process. Without competitive ‘private’ 
benchmarks against which to judge SOE behaviour, it is also difficult to understand what 
observations relate from that part of the institutional arrangement of ‘public ownership’, and 
what parts come from other factors, such as uncompetitive market conditions, the existence of 
rents or social service obligations. 
In terms of handling data for research, a key theme of this study is the emphasis that SOEs 
fulfil different functions in different sectors, making it difficult to interpret industrial aggregates 
that mix natural monopolies with natural resources and competitive manufacturing firms. 
Depending on the application, a more thorough analysis of a few leading SOEs might be enough 
to explain most of the aggregate results. 
One particular challenge is to conceive of a simple objective to use when modelling for 
SOEs. As argued in this thesis, profit maximisation is a sound assumption about firm behaviour 
for representative firms operating without subsidy in perfectly competitive markets. This profit 
maximisation assumption in turn determines the distribution of payments to various factors of 
production – providing a relationship between the wage and the marginal product of labour, and 
the rental cost of capital. But these assumptions may not hold in the case of SOEs – given the 
longstanding objection to SOEs – is that they do not maximise profits, and either act in 
non-competitive markets or receive (sometimes implicit) subsidies. As a consequence, the 
standard interpretations may not apply – for example, low profits need not necessarily imply a 
low marginal return on capital. 
In any case, neither the China’s economy nor politics is likely to be static. It will, however, 
remain consequential to the world economy. It is complex. Labels to understand the Chinese 
economy – whether ‘socialist market economy’, ‘state capitalist’, ‘Sino-capitalist’ or ‘state-led 
economic model’ – are sometimes helpful shorthand. But they can be misleading. Ongoing 
research on the nature and performance of China’s SOEs will be essential to understanding a 
part of the global economy that is here to stay. 
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Appendix A: Potential concentration of all industrial subsectors (2009) 
Industry Subsector  HHI  Share of all 
industrial revenue 
(%) 
SOE share of subsector assets (%) Dominant 
Ownership 
Code Name  Raw   Pot  Central Local Total 
610 Bituminous Coal and Anthracite Mining and Washing 0.01 0.05 3.03 12 64 76 Local SOE 
620 Lignite Mining and-Or Washing 0.06 0.08 0.17 14 30 44 Non-SOE 
690 Other Coal Mining and Washing 0.21 0.21 0.00 0 14 14 Nonstate 
710 Crude Oil and Gas Mining 0.1 0.83 1.17 89 8 97 SOE-Central 
790 Support Activities for Oil and Gas Mining 0.07 0.6 0.31 82 11 94 SOE-Central 
810 Iron Ore Mining 0 0 0.63 5 28 33 Non-SOE 
890 Other Ferrous Metal Ore Mining 0.06 0.06 0.04 5 22 27 Non-SOE 
911 Copper Ore Mining 0.01 0.03 0.05 4 45 49 Non-SOE 
912 Lead, Zinc Ore Mining 0.06 0.06 0.14 0 42 42 Non-SOE 
913 Nickel, Cobalt Ore Mining 0.07 0.09 0.01 3 0 3 Non-SOE 
914 Tin Ore Mining 0.08 0.08 0.01 0 31 31 Non-SOE 
915 Antimony Ore Mining 0.07 0.11 0.00 0 71 71 SOE-Local 
916 Aluminum Ore Mining 0.1 0.22 0.02 68 0 68 SOE-Central 
917 Magnesium Ore Mining 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
919 Other Common Non-Ferrous Metal Ore Mining 0.04 0.04 0.01 2 6 8 Non-SOE 
921 Gold Ore Mining 0.04 0.04 0.20 4 40 44 Non-SOE 
922 Silver Ore Mining 0.28 0.28 0.01 0 17 17 Nonstate 
931 Tungsten-molybdenum Mining 0.02 0.03 0.05 0 41 41 Non-SOE 
932 Earth Metal Ores Mining 0.1 0.13 0.00 0 14 14 Nonstate 
933 Radioactive Metal Ore Mining 0.14 0.92 0.00 99 0 99 SOE-Central 
939 Other Rare Metal Ore Mining 0.04 0.04 0.00 6 29 35 Non-SOE 
154 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
1011 Gypsum and Limestone Mining and Quarrying 0 0 0.06 0 9 9 Non-SOE 
1012 Construction & Decoration Stone Mining and Quarrying 0 0.01 0.06 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
1013 Fireclay and Dolomite Mining and Quarrying 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 8 8 Non-SOE 
1019 Clay and Other Stone Mining and Quarrying 0 0 0.13 2 9 11 Non-SOE 
1020 Chemical Mineral Mining 0.02 0.04 0.04 1 39 39 Non-SOE 
1030 Salt Mining 0.02 0.03 0.05 4 57 61 Local SOE 
1091 Asbestos and Mica Ore Mining 0.16 0.16 0.00 5 49 54 SOE-Local 
1092 Graphite and Talc Mining 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
1093 Gem Stone Mining 0.45 0.6 0.00 0 0 0 Nonstate 
1099 Other Non-metallic Mineral Mining 0.01 0.01 0.04 1 4 6 Non-SOE 
1100 Other Ore Mining 0.12 0.12 0.00 0 3 3 Nonstate 
1310 Corn Milling 0 0 0.85 0 12 12 Non-SOE 
1320 Feed Processing 0 0 0.81 1 2 3 Non-SOE 
1331 Edible Vegetable Oil Processing 0.01 0.01 0.90 3 9 12 Non-SOE 
1332 Non-Edible Vegetable Oil Processing 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 15 15 Non-SOE 
1340 Sugar 0.01 0.03 0.11 1 20 22 Non-SOE 
1351 Livestock Slaughtering 0 0 0.62 0 8 8 Non-SOE 
1352 Meat and the Side-Products Processing 0.03 0.03 0.47 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
1361 Seafood Frozen Processing 0 0 0.40 1 3 4 Non-SOE 
1362 Fish Meat Paste Products and Seafood Dried & Preserved Processing 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
1363 Seafood Feed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1364 Fish Oil Distilling and Products 0.24 0.24 0.00 0 0 0 Nonstate 
1369 Other Seafood Processing 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
1370 Vegetable Fruit & Nut Processing 0 0 0.38 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1391 Starch and Starch Products 0.04 0.04 0.29 0 6 6 Non-SOE 
1392 Bean Products 0.02 0.02 0.04 0 5 6 Non-SOE 
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1393 Egg Products Processing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1399 Other Not Listed Agricultural and Side-Product Processing 0 0 0.10 1 5 5 Non-SOE 
1411 Bakeries & Bread 0.01 0.01 0.06 1 4 5 Non-SOE 
1419 Biscuit & Other Baked Food 0.01 0.01 0.12 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
1421 Confectioneries & Chocolate 0.04 0.04 0.09 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
1422 Candied Fruits 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1431 Rice and Flour Products 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 6 6 Non-SOE 
1432 Frozen Food 0.05 0.05 0.06 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1439 Instant Noodle and Other Instant Food 0.02 0.02 0.14 1 2 3 Non-SOE 
1440 Liquid Dairy and Dairy Products 0.01 0.03 0.30 1 32 32 Non-SOE 
1451 Canned Meat & Poultry 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 27 27 Non-SOE 
1452 Canned Seafood 0.06 0.06 0.01 0 21 21 Non-SOE 
1453 Canned Vegetable and Fruit 0.01 0.01 0.09 10 14 24 Non-SOE 
1459 Other Canned Food 0.06 0.06 0.01 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
1461 Monosodium Glutamate 0.11 0.11 0.07 0 28 28 Nonstate 
1462 Soy Sauce, Edible Vinegar and Similarity Product 0.03 0.03 0.07 0 17 17 Non-SOE 
1469 Other Spice and Seasoning & Fermented Products 0.01 0.01 0.09 0 9 9 Non-SOE 
1491 Nutritious and Health Food 0.04 0.04 0.08 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1492 Frozen Beverage and Edible Ice 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 6 6 Non-SOE 
1493 Salt Processing 0.03 0.07 0.01 30 42 72 Local SOE 
1494 Food and Feed Additive 0.01 0.01 0.23 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1499 Other Not Listed Food 0.01 0.01 0.04 8 5 12 Non-SOE 
1510 Alcohol 0.03 0.03 0.08 0 23 23 Non-SOE 
1521 Distilled Spirit 0.04 0.06 0.40 1 53 53 Local SOE 
1522 Beer 0.01 0.04 0.22 9 31 40 Non-SOE 
1523 Cooking Wine 0.07 0.07 0.02 0 44 44 Non-SOE 
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1524 Wine 0.09 0.09 0.05 8 29 37 Non-SOE 
1529 Other Drink 0.06 0.06 0.02 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1531 Carbonated Soft Drinks 0.03 0.04 0.11 0 6 6 Non-SOE 
1532 Bottled and Canned Water 0.05 0.05 0.09 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
1533 Fruit, Vegetable Juice and Syrup & Its Beverage 0.02 0.02 0.11 3 3 6 Non-SOE 
1534 Beverage Including Dairy and Plant Protein Beverage 0.02 0.02 0.07 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1535 Solid Beverage 0.32 0.32 0.04 0 3 4 Nonstate 
1539 Tea Beverage and Other Soft Beverage 0.03 0.04 0.09 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1540 Refined Tea Processing 0 0 0.09 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1610 Tobacco Leaf Processing 0.09 0.32 0.02 50 48 98 SOE-Central 
1620 Cigarettes 0.04 0.84 0.89 92 8 100 SOE-Central 
1690 Other Tobacco Products Processing 0.06 0.07 0.01 7 46 53 Local SOE 
1711 Cotton and Chemical Fiber Spinning and Weaving Processing 0.01 0.01 1.83 1 7 8 Non-SOE 
1712 Cotton and Chemical Fiber Dyeing Refined Processing 0 0 0.44 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1721 Wool Piece Processing 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1722 Wool Spinning 0.04 0.04 0.20 1 2 3 Non-SOE 
1723 Wool Spinning Dyeing Refined Processing 0.04 0.04 0.04 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1730 Ramie, Linen and Hemp 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
1741 Silk Reeling Processing 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
1742 Thin Silk Spinning and Silk Processing 0.01 0.01 0.14 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1743 Silk Dyeing Refined Processing 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
1751 Cotton and Chemical Product 0 0 0.31 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1752 Wool Product 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1753 Ramie Product 0.06 0.06 0.01 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1754 Silk Product 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1755 Rope, Cable and Thin Rope 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
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1756 Spinning and Weaving Thread and Towels and Washcloths 0.07 0.07 0.06 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1757 Nonwoven Fabric 0.01 0.01 0.09 1 4 4 Non-SOE 
1759 Other Textile Product 0 0 0.08 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
1761 Cotton, Chemical Fiber Knit Fabric, Knitting and Product 0 0 0.43 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1762 Wool Knit Fabric and Knitting Product 0 0 0.20 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
1763 Silk Knit Fabric and Knitting Product 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
1769 Other Knit Fabric and Knitting Product 0.01 0.01 0.04 3 2 5 Non-SOE 
1810 Apparel 0 0 1.76 1 2 3 Non-SOE 
1820 Textile Shoes 0.01 0.01 0.07 2 1 2 Non-SOE 
1830 Hat, Cap, and Millinery 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1910 Leather Accessories and Trimmings 0.01 0.01 0.19 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1921 Leather Shoes 0 0 0.52 1 0 1 Non-SOE 
1922 Leather Costume 0.01 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1923 Leather Luggage and Bags 0 0 0.16 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
1924 Leather Glove and Ornament Products 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1929 Other Leather Product 0.03 0.03 0.04 0 20 20 Non-SOE 
1931 Fur, Leather Accessories and Trimmings Processing 0.04 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1932 Fur Leather Apparel Processing 0.03 0.03 0.02 8 2 10 Non-SOE 
1939 Other Fur Leather Product Processing 0.01 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1941 Feather, Down Processing 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
1942 Feather, Down Products Processing 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2011 Sawmills 0.01 0.01 0.07 1 8 9 Non-SOE 
2012 Wood Chips Processing 0 0 0.05 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
2021 Plywood 0 0 0.34 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
2022 Fiberboard 0.03 0.03 0.13 0 12 12 Non-SOE 
2023 Shaving Board 0.03 0.03 0.04 0 23 23 Non-SOE 
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2029 Other Man-Made Woodboard 0.01 0.01 0.14 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
2031 Construction Wood and Wood Sets Processing 0 0 0.12 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
2032 Wood Containers 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2039 Soft Wood Products and Other Wood Products 0 0 0.06 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
2040 Bamboo, Vine, Palm and Grass Products 0 0 0.07 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
2110 Wood Furniture 0 0 0.35 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
2120 Bamboo, Vine Furniture 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
2130 Metal Furniture 0 0 0.14 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
2140 Plastic Furniture 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2190 All Other Furniture 0.01 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2210 Pulp 0.06 0.06 0.05 0 32 32 Non-SOE 
2221 Machine Made Paper and Paperboard 0.01 0.01 0.76 2 22 24 Non-SOE 
2222 Handmade Paper 0.08 0.08 0.00 0 23 23 Non-SOE 
2223 Processed Paper 0.01 0.01 0.07 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2231 Paper and Paper Board Container 0 0 0.39 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
2239 Other Paper Products 0 0 0.20 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
2311 Books, Magazines and Periodicals Printing 0 0.01 0.12 7 31 38 Non-SOE 
2312 Notebook and Tablet 0.01 0.01 0.03 1 6 7 Non-SOE 
2319 Lithographic Printing 0 0 0.35 6 8 14 Non-SOE 
2320 Other Related Printing Activities 0.04 0.04 0.02 20 6 26 Non-SOE 
2330 Recording Media Reproducing 0.04 0.04 0.01 8 11 18 Non-SOE 
2411 Stationery 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2412 Pen and Pencil 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2413 Teaching Specimen and Mode 0.15 0.15 0.01 0 2 2 Nonstate 
2414 Ink 0.11 0.11 0.00 0 6 6 Nonstate 
2419 Other Stationery and Office Supplies 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
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2421 Ball 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
2422 Athletic Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.04 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2423 Fitness Training Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
2424 Sports Protection Appliances 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2429 Other Sporting and Athletic Goods 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
2431 Chinese Musical Instrument 0.05 0.05 0.00 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2432 Western Musical Instrument 0.02 0.03 0.02 0 22 22 Non-SOE 
2433 Electronic Musical Instrument 0.09 0.09 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2439 Other Musical Instrument and Recreational Goods 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2440 Toy 0.01 0.01 0.20 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2451 Outdoor Amusement Equipment 0.05 0.05 0.01 1 0 1 Non-SOE 
2452 Entertaining Appliances and Indoor Amusement Equipment 0.11 0.11 0.01 0 0 0 Nonstate 
2511 Crude Oil Processing and Petroleum Product 0.02 0.52 3.29 62 20 82 SOE-Central 
2512 Man-Made Crude Oil Production Industry 0.09 0.09 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2520 Coke Smelting 0 0.01 0.68 4 15 19 Non-SOE 
2611 Inorganic Acid 0.01 0.01 0.08 1 8 9 Non-SOE 
2612 Alkali 0.02 0.04 0.18 3 61 64 Local SOE 
2613 Inorganic Salt 0 0 0.21 2 19 22 Non-SOE 
2614 Organic Chemical Material 0.02 0.07 1.03 26 23 49 Non-SOE 
2619 Other Basic Chemical Raw Material 0.01 0.01 0.26 8 16 25 Non-SOE 
2621 Nitrogenous Fertilizer 0.01 0.03 0.34 14 50 65 Local SOE 
2622 Phosphate Fertilizer 0.07 0.12 0.08 0 68 68 SOE-Local 
2623 Kalium Fertilizer 0.14 0.23 0.03 20 53 72 SOE-Local 
2624 Compound Fertilizer 0.01 0.02 0.36 3 37 40 Non-SOE 
2625 Organic and Micro Biological Fertilizer 0.02 0.02 0.04 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2629 Other Chemical Fertilizer 0.03 0.03 0.01 3 16 19 Non-SOE 
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2631 Chemical Pesticide 0.01 0.01 0.21 5 22 28 Non-SOE 
2632 Biochemical and Micro Biological Pesticide 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
2641 Coating 0 0 0.34 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
2642 Printing ink 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2643 Dye 0.01 0.01 0.07 4 7 11 Non-SOE 
2644 Dyestuff 0.03 0.03 0.10 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2645 Sealing Fillers and Similarities 0.02 0.02 0.03 1 1 2 Non-SOE 
2651 Basic Plastics and Synthetic Resin 0.01 0.02 0.71 12 15 27 Non-SOE 
2652 Synthetic Rubber 0.09 0.09 0.08 11 6 17 Non-SOE 
2653 Synthon Single (Polymerization) 0.06 0.08 0.25 19 33 52 Local SOE 
2659 Other Synthesized Material 0.03 0.03 0.05 4 3 7 Non-SOE 
2661 Chemical Reagent and Aid Dose 0 0.01 0.65 2 6 8 Non-SOE 
2662 Special Chemical Product 0.01 0.01 0.60 7 4 12 Non-SOE 
2663 Forestry Chemical Products 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 10 10 Non-SOE 
2664 Explosives and Fire and Flame Products 0 0.02 0.17 29 22 52 Central SOE 
2665 Information Chemistry Product 0.02 0.02 0.12 13 12 25 Non-SOE 
2666 Special Medicament Material For Environment Pollution Treatment 0.02 0.02 0.01 2 9 12 Non-SOE 
2667 Animal Glue 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 6 6 Non-SOE 
2669 Other Special Chemical Products 0.01 0.01 0.10 0 5 6 Non-SOE 
2671 Soap, Washing Powder and Synthetic Detergent 0.12 0.12 0.19 0 8 8 Nonstate 
2672 Cosmetics 0.05 0.05 0.10 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
2673 Oral Cavity Sanitary Products 0.14 0.14 0.02 0 57 57 SOE-Local 
2674 Spice and Essence 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
2679 Other Daily Use Chemical Product 0.02 0.02 0.05 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
2710 Chemical Medicines and Reagents 0.01 0.01 0.36 1 27 28 Non-SOE 
2720 Pharmaceutical Preparations 0.01 0.01 0.53 1 25 26 Non-SOE 
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2730 Chinese Traditional Medicine Pills 0.01 0.01 0.09 1 9 10 Non-SOE 
2740 Chinese Patent Drug 0.01 0.01 0.36 3 21 24 Non-SOE 
2750 Veterinary Medicines 0.01 0.01 0.08 6 4 10 Non-SOE 
2760 Biology Product Industry 0.01 0.01 0.17 10 8 18 Non-SOE 
2770 Medical Material and Supplies 0.03 0.03 0.10 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
2811 Chemical Fiber Plasm 0.07 0.07 0.03 0 14 14 Non-SOE 
2812 Man-made Fiber (Fibrin Fiber) 0.04 0.05 0.07 2 55 56 Local SOE 
2821 Polyamide Fiber 0.03 0.03 0.06 0 3 4 Non-SOE 
2822 Polyester Fiber 0.02 0.02 0.44 2 3 5 Non-SOE 
2823 Acrylic Fiber 0.2 0.2 0.01 51 0 51 SOE-Central 
2824 Polyvinyl Alcohol Fiber 0.38 0.44 0.01 0 97 97 SOE-Local 
2829 Other Synthon 0.01 0.02 0.09 1 1 2 Non-SOE 
2911 Automobile, Airplane and Engineering Machinery Tyre 0.02 0.02 0.42 5 20 26 Non-SOE 
2912 Strength Tyre 0.03 0.03 0.02 0 19 19 Non-SOE 
2913 Tires Retreading 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2920 Balata Board, Hose, Belt 0 0 0.11 1 5 6 Non-SOE 
2930 Balata Parts Product Industry 0.01 0.01 0.08 1 5 6 Non-SOE 
2940 Rebirth Parts Product Industry 0.03 0.03 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
2950 Daily Balata Product Industry 0.02 0.02 0.04 6 7 13 Non-SOE 
2960 Balata Shoe 0.01 0.01 0.09 5 4 9 Non-SOE 
2990 Other Balata Product Industry 0.01 0.01 0.07 2 1 3 Non-SOE 
3010 Plastic Pellicle 0.01 0.01 0.26 1 9 10 Non-SOE 
3020 Plastic Board Duct Mallet Material 0 0 0.43 0 8 9 Non-SOE 
3030 Plastic Silk, Rope and Intertexture Product 0 0 0.22 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3040 Foam Plastics 0 0 0.09 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
3050 Man-Made and Synthetic Leather 0.01 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
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3060 Plastic Packing Case and Container 0 0 0.18 2 2 4 Non-SOE 
3070 Plastic Parts 0 0 0.17 1 2 2 Non-SOE 
3081 Plastic Shoes 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3082 Daily Plastic Sundry Goods 0 0 0.17 0 1 2 Non-SOE 
3090 Other Plastic Product Industry 0 0 0.27 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3111 Cement 0 0 1.05 5 29 34 Non-SOE 
3112 Lime and Gypsum 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
3121 Cement Product Industry 0 0 0.46 3 9 13 Non-SOE 
3122 Rubstone Mechanism Component 0.01 0.01 0.09 5 8 14 Non-SOE 
3123 Asbestine Cement Product Industry 0.07 0.07 0.03 3 0 3 Non-SOE 
3124 Light Construction Material 0.01 0.01 0.07 15 20 35 Non-SOE 
3129 Other Cement Product Industry 0.01 0.01 0.02 3 11 14 Non-SOE 
3131 Tile 0 0 0.22 1 8 10 Non-SOE 
3132 Construction and Hygienic Ceramics 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3133 Construction Stone 0 0 0.25 0 1 2 Non-SOE 
3134 Waterproof Sealing Construction Materials 0.01 0.01 0.07 2 5 7 Non-SOE 
3135 Heat Preservation and Sound-Proof Materials 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 14 14 Non-SOE 
3139 Other Tile, Lime and Light Construction Material 0.01 0.01 0.07 2 5 7 Non-SOE 
3141 Flat Glass Products 0.02 0.02 0.10 1 16 16 Non-SOE 
3142 Industrial Technique Glass 0.01 0.01 0.15 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3143 Optical Glass 0.03 0.03 0.03 18 4 23 Non-SOE 
3144 Glass Instruments 0.07 0.07 0.03 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
3145 Daily Glass Product Industry 0 0 0.14 0 6 6 Non-SOE 
3146 Glass Heat Preservation Vessel 0.07 0.07 0.01 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
3147 Fiberglass and Allied Products 0.01 0.01 0.12 1 39 40 Non-SOE 
3148 Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastic Product 0.01 0.02 0.07 12 4 16 Non-SOE 
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3149 Other Glass and Glass Product Industry 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
3151 Construction and Hygienic Ceramics 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3152 Industrial Ceramics 0.01 0.01 0.09 4 4 8 Non-SOE 
3153 Daily Ceramic 0 0 0.10 0 13 13 Non-SOE 
3159 Other Ceramic Product Industry 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3161 Asbestine Product Industry 0.02 0.02 0.02 2 5 7 Non-SOE 
3162 Mica Product Industry 0.11 0.11 0.01 0 22 22 Nonstate 
3169 Other Fireproof Materials Products 0 0 0.35 1 6 7 Non-SOE 
3191 Black Lead and Carbon Product 0 0.01 0.16 7 8 15 Non-SOE 
3199 Other Non-metal Mineral Product 0.01 0.01 0.19 2 10 12 Non-SOE 
3210 Metal Smelting 0.02 0.02 0.42 8 29 37 Non-SOE 
3220 Steel Smelting 0.05 0.07 1.42 22 50 73 Local SOE 
3230 Steel Rolling Processing 0.01 0.02 5.74 18 43 61 Local SOE 
3240 Iron Alloy Smelting Industry 0 0.01 0.42 4 9 13 Non-SOE 
3311 Copper Smelting 0.08 0.08 0.52 5 75 80 Local SOE 
3312 Lead Zinc Smelting Industry 0.02 0.03 0.26 9 38 47 Non-SOE 
3313 Nickel Cobalt Smelting 0.54 0.54 0.16 0 78 78 SOE-Local 
3314 Tin Smelting Industry 0.2 0.21 0.04 0 85 85 SOE-Local 
3315 Stibium smelting Industry 0.05 0.07 0.01 32 15 47 Non-SOE 
3316 Aluminum Smelting 0.04 0.06 0.48 19 39 58 Local SOE 
3317 Magnesium Smelting 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3319 Other Commonly Used Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting Industry 0.02 0.02 0.05 1 19 21 Non-SOE 
3321 Gold Smelting 0.08 0.11 0.15 5 65 70 SOE-Local 
3322 Silver Smelting 0.03 0.04 0.04 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
3329 Other Valued Metal Smelting 0.07 0.07 0.01 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3331 G78 Smelting 0.07 0.08 0.08 0 83 83 Local SOE 
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3332 Rare Earth Metal Smelting 0.02 0.02 0.05 1 32 33 Non-SOE 
3339 Other Rare Metal Smelting 0.04 0.04 0.04 3 33 37 Non-SOE 
3340 Non-Ferrous Metaling Alloy 0.01 0.01 0.15 4 21 24 Non-SOE 
3351 Commonly Used Non-Ferrous Rolling Processing 0 0.01 1.61 8 9 16 Non-SOE 
3352 Valued Metal Rolling Processing 0.16 0.18 0.12 1 15 16 Nonstate 
3353 Rare Earth Metal Rolling Processing 0.04 0.04 0.05 1 17 19 Non-SOE 
3411 Metal Fabric 0 0 0.78 3 7 10 Non-SOE 
3412 Metal Door and Window 0.01 0.01 0.18 2 1 2 Non-SOE 
3421 Cutting tool 0.04 0.04 0.07 2 14 17 Non-SOE 
3422 Handwork Tool 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
3423 Farming or Gardening Metal Tool 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3424 Scissors and Knives Daily Metal Tool 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
3429 Other Metal Tool 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 1 2 Non-SOE 
3431 Container 0.05 0.05 0.03 5 10 15 Non-SOE 
3432 Metal Pressing Vessels 0.01 0.01 0.08 3 11 15 Non-SOE 
3433 Metal Packaging Vessels 0.01 0.01 0.12 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
3440 Metal Thread Products 0.01 0.02 0.28 3 15 18 Non-SOE 
3451 Construction, Household Use Metal Parts 0 0 0.12 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3452 Construction, Decoration and Plumbing Parts 0.01 0.01 0.16 1 9 10 Non-SOE 
3453 Safety, Fire Protection Metal Products 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3459 Other Construction, Safety Metal Products 0.04 0.04 0.03 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
3460 Metal Surface Treating and Heating Processing 0.01 0.01 0.23 1 5 7 Non-SOE 
3471 Industrial Use Enamel Products 0.11 0.11 0.01 10 0 10 Nonstate 
3472 Enamel Sanitary Ware 0.1 0.1 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3479 Enamel Commodity and Other Enamel Products 0.06 0.06 0.01 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3481 Metal Kitchen and Sanitary Ware Products 0.06 0.06 0.07 0 1 2 Non-SOE 
165 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
3482 Metal Kitchen Utensils and Tablewares 0 0 0.13 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3489 Other Daily Metal Products 0 0 0.11 1 2 3 Non-SOE 
3491 Coin and Other Valued Metal Lab Products 0.26 0.94 0.01 98 0 98 SOE-Central 
3499 Other not listed Metal Products 0 0.01 0.26 1 8 9 Non-SOE 
3511 Boiler and Other Fitting Manufacturing 0.03 0.07 0.19 33 14 47 Non-SOE 
3512 Internal Combustion and Fitting 0.01 0.06 0.17 28 27 55 Central SOE 
3513 Steam Turbine and Fitting 0.15 0.29 0.09 63 25 88 SOE-Central 
3514 Water Turbine and Fitting 0.14 0.14 0.01 0 22 22 Nonstate 
3519 Other Motor Machine 0.34 0.34 0.02 1 11 12 Nonstate 
3521 Metal Cutting Machine Tool 0.03 0.09 0.18 1 58 59 Local SOE 
3522 Metal Forming Machine Tool 0 0.01 0.05 0 13 13 Non-SOE 
3523 Foundry Machinery 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3524 Metal Cutting and Welding Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 3 4 Non-SOE 
3525 Machine Tool Parts 0.01 0.01 0.03 1 10 11 Non-SOE 
3529 Other Metal Processing Machinery 0.01 0.01 0.08 2 5 7 Non-SOE 
3530 Crane Transportation Equipment 0.02 0.03 0.58 3 37 40 Non-SOE 
3541 Pump and Vacuum Equipment 0 0 0.19 5 11 16 Non-SOE 
3542 Gas Compressor Machinery 0.02 0.02 0.13 1 19 19 Non-SOE 
3543 Valve and Plug 0 0 0.24 3 2 5 Non-SOE 
3544 Hydraulic Pressure unit and Pneumatic Machine and Component 0 0.01 0.20 1 11 12 Non-SOE 
3551 Bearing 0.01 0.01 0.23 4 13 17 Non-SOE 
3552 Gears and Other Conveyor and Conveying Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.16 6 6 12 Non-SOE 
3560 Oven and Smelting Furnace 0.02 0.02 0.03 7 5 12 Non-SOE 
3571 Fan Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.09 3 43 46 Non-SOE 
3572 Gas, Liquid Separation and Purifying Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 18 18 Non-SOE 
3573 Ventilation, Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment 0.01 0.02 0.26 0 13 14 Non-SOE 
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3574 Pneumatic and Power-Driven Tool 0.02 0.02 0.09 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3575 Gunjet Type Products 0.03 0.03 0.01 4 1 5 Non-SOE 
3576 Packaging Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.03 4 9 13 Non-SOE 
3577 Scale and Balance Equipment 0.02 0.05 0.02 0 5 6 Non-SOE 
3579 Other General Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.12 10 12 22 Non-SOE 
3581 Metal Airproof Parts 0.01 0.01 0.09 2 2 4 Non-SOE 
3582 Fastening Units and Springs 0 0 0.16 1 4 5 Non-SOE 
3583 Machine Parts Processing and Maintenance 0 0 0.21 10 7 17 Non-SOE 
3589 Other General Parts 0.02 0.02 0.09 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
3591 Steel and Iron Forging 0 0 0.64 3 10 12 Non-SOE 
3592 Forging Unit and Powder Metallurgy Products 0 0 0.31 5 5 10 Non-SOE 
3611 Mining Equipment 0.02 0.03 0.29 18 41 59 Local SOE 
3612 Special Oil Mining Equipment 0.02 0.03 0.20 16 20 36 Non-SOE 
3613 Building Construction Equipment 0.03 0.04 0.41 3 37 40 Non-SOE 
3614 Building Material Producing Equipment 0.01 0.03 0.08 23 12 35 Non-SOE 
3615 Special Metallurgy Equipment 0.06 0.16 0.17 39 38 77 SOE-Central 
3621 Petroleum Producing, Chemical Producing Special Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.08 6 24 30 Non-SOE 
3622 Rubber Processing Special Equipment 0.03 0.06 0.02 22 15 37 Non-SOE 
3623 Plastic Processing Special Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.05 1 0 1 Non-SOE 
3624 Sawmill and Woodworking Machinery 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 9 9 Non-SOE 
3625 Die 0 0 0.23 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3629 Other Non-Metal Process Special Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 19 19 Non-SOE 
3631 Food, Beverage, Tobacco Industrial Special Use Equipment 0.01 0.03 0.05 21 12 33 Non-SOE 
3632 Agricultural and Sideline Products Processing Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.05 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3633 Animal Feeds Equipment 0.06 0.06 0.01 0 17 17 Non-SOE 
3641 Plasm Making and Paper Industry Machinery 0.01 0.01 0.04 1 6 8 Non-SOE 
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3642 Printing Industrial Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.03 2 24 26 Non-SOE 
3643 Household Chemicals Producing Equipment 0.04 0.04 0.00 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3644 Pharm Producing Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 8 8 Non-SOE 
3645 Lighting Apparatus and Fixture Special Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3646 Glass, Ceramics and Enamel Products Producing Equipment 0.06 0.06 0.02 0 17 17 Non-SOE 
3649 Other Household Product Producing Equipment 0.06 0.06 0.01 2 1 2 Non-SOE 
3651 Weaving Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.12 19 9 28 Non-SOE 
3652 Leather and Fur Processing Equipment 0.08 0.08 0.00 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3653 Sewing Machinery 0.02 0.02 0.04 0 19 19 Non-SOE 
3659 Other Apparel Processing Equipment 0.09 0.09 0.01 0 9 9 Non-SOE 
3661 Electrical Equipment 0.01 0.02 0.04 12 9 21 Non-SOE 
3662 Electric Industrial Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.09 1 11 12 Non-SOE 
3669 Aviation, Aerospace and Other Special Equipment 0.08 0.38 0.01 69 12 82 SOE-Central 
3671 Tractor 0.12 0.12 0.07 40 13 53 SOE-Central 
3672 Mechanical Farming Machinery and Equipment 0.04 0.04 0.08 1 10 11 Non-SOE 
3673 Forestry Mechanical Equipment 0.16 0.16 0.00 0 17 17 Nonstate 
3674 Husbandry Mechanical Equipment 0.15 0.15 0.00 0 3 3 Nonstate 
3675 Fishing Mechanical Equipment 0.09 0.09 0.00 0 3 3 Non-SOE 
3676 Agriculture Machinery Parts 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3679 Other Agriculture Machinery and Maintenance 0.31 0.31 0.08 8 40 48 Nonstate 
3681 Diagnosis, Monitoring and Treatment Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.05 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
3682 Dental Equipment and Other Utensils 0.05 0.05 0.00 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
3683 Lab and Disinfectant Equipment and Utensils 0.11 0.11 0.01 0 40 40 Nonstate 
3684 Medical, Surgery and Veterinarian Tools 0.02 0.02 0.06 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
3685 Mechanical Treatment and Nursing Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.01 3 9 12 Non-SOE 
3686 Artificial Limb, Organ and Implantation Equipment 0.06 0.07 0.01 1 14 15 Non-SOE 
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3689 Other Medical Equipment and Supplies 0.01 0.01 0.03 5 0 5 Non-SOE 
3691 Environmental Protection and Pollution Treatment Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.14 6 6 12 Non-SOE 
3692 Geology Reconnaissance Special Equipment Manufacturing 0.11 0.13 0.01 17 40 57 SOE-Local 
3693 Postal Industrial Equipment 0.2 0.2 0.00 53 16 69 SOE-Central 
3694 Commercial, Food and Beverage, and Service Industry Machinery 0.06 0.06 0.00 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3695 Social Public Security Equipment and Supplies 0.02 0.02 0.04 1 3 4 Non-SOE 
3696 Transportation Safety and Controlling Equipment 0.04 0.04 0.01 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
3697 Water Resource Professional Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.01 8 4 12 Non-SOE 
3699 Other Environmental Protection, Social Security Special Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.10 8 16 25 Non-SOE 
3711 Locomotives and Trains 0.06 0.48 0.16 70 17 87 SOE-Central 
3712 Mining Vehicles 0.07 0.07 0.00 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
3713 Locomotives Parts 0.02 0.03 0.08 17 18 35 Non-SOE 
3714 Rail Apparatus, Equipment and Parts 0.03 0.2 0.07 53 5 58 SOE-Central 
3719 Other Rail Transportation Equipment and Repairing 0.05 0.65 0.03 89 2 91 SOE-Central 
3721 Automobile Complete 0.03 0.13 2.87 33 55 88 SOE-Local 
3722 Modified Motor Vehicle 0.01 0.02 0.26 13 19 32 Non-SOE 
3723 Trolley 0.06 0.06 0.00 0 22 22 Non-SOE 
3724 Automobile Body and Trailer 0.01 0.02 0.06 4 24 28 Non-SOE 
3725 Automobile Parts and Attachments 0 0.01 2.23 4 12 16 Non-SOE 
3726 Automobile Repairing Service 0.01 0.01 0.05 3 18 21 Non-SOE 
3731 Motorcycle Complete 0.03 0.04 0.21 6 19 26 Non-SOE 
3732 Motorcycle Parts and Attachments 0.01 0.01 0.18 1 7 8 Non-SOE 
3741 Bicycle and Handicapped Vehicle 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
3742 Moped 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3751 Metal Ship Building 0.01 0.1 0.70 43 8 51 Central SOE 
3752 Non-metal Ship Building 0.12 0.12 0.01 3 1 4 Nonstate 
169 
 
Paul C. Hubbard, The Nature and Performance of China's State-owned Enterprises  
3753 Pleasure Boats and Sport Boats and Repairing 0.06 0.06 0.00 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
3754 Boat Auxiliary 0.01 0.05 0.11 31 11 41 Non-SOE 
3755 Ship Repairing and Dismantling 0.07 0.17 0.11 53 18 72 SOE-Central 
3759 Navigation Mark and Other Floating Equipment 0.61 0.88 0.01 0 98 98 SOE-Local 
3761 Airplane and Repairing 0.04 0.67 0.21 91 2 93 SOE-Central 
3762 Aircraft 0.11 0.94 0.01 99 1 99 SOE-Central 
3769 Other Aircraft 0.15 0.15 0.00 0 0 0 Nonstate 
3791 Diving and Underwater Succoring, Refloating Equipment 0.26 0.26 0.00 13 0 13 Nonstate 
3792 Metal Sign and Facilities for Traffic Control 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
3799 All Other Transportation Equipment 0.14 0.14 0.03 4 4 8 Nonstate 
3911 Collector Rings for Generators 0.01 0.03 0.29 26 13 39 Non-SOE 
3912 Motor 0.01 0.01 0.21 4 22 26 Non-SOE 
3919 Tiny Motor and Others Motor 0.01 0.01 0.18 1 1 2 Non-SOE 
3921 Transformers Rectifier, Electric Capacity 0.01 0.01 0.45 13 6 19 Non-SOE 
3922 Capacitor and Other Attachments 0.01 0.02 0.04 0 2 3 Non-SOE 
3923 Switchgear and Switchboard Apparatus 0.01 0.01 0.55 10 8 19 Non-SOE 
3924 Electric and Electronic Component 0.01 0.01 0.19 1 4 5 Non-SOE 
3929 Other Relay and Industrial Control 0.02 0.02 0.16 5 24 30 Non-SOE 
3931 Wire and Cable Manufacturing 0 0 1.24 1 5 5 Non-SOE 
3932 Optical Fiber and Cable 0.04 0.05 0.09 18 6 24 Non-SOE 
3933 Insulated Products 0.02 0.02 0.07 2 3 4 Non-SOE 
3939 Other Electrical Appliance 0.01 0.01 0.05 3 3 6 Non-SOE 
3940 Battery 0.01 0.02 0.54 1 6 7 Non-SOE 
3951 Household Refrigerator and Home Freezer 0.13 0.13 0.33 0 12 12 Nonstate 
3952 Air Conditioner 0.18 0.2 0.43 0 36 36 Nonstate 
3953 Fans, household-type electric, 0.03 0.03 0.06 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
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3954 Fans, household-type kitchen, 0.04 0.04 0.22 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3955 Household Vacuum Cleaner and Laundry Equipment 0.03 0.03 0.11 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
3956 Appliance for Beauty Parlor and Health Manufacturing 0.04 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3957 Electrical Home Appliance and Device Parts 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 12 12 Non-SOE 
3959 Other Electrical Appliance 0.01 0.01 0.08 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3961 Gas, Solar and Similar Energy Appliance 0.01 0.01 0.11 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3969 Other Non-Electric Home Appliance Manufacturing 0.05 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
3971 Lighting Fixture 0.01 0.01 0.12 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3972 Lighting Equipment 0 0 0.18 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
3979 Lamp Appliance Accessories and Other Lighting Equipment 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
3991 Automotive Light Bulbs and Signal Equipment 0.04 0.04 0.05 0 12 12 Non-SOE 
3999 All Other Electric Machinery 0.05 0.05 0.06 18 2 21 Non-SOE 
4011 Transmission Equipment 0.02 0.05 0.12 33 18 51 Central SOE 
4012 Switching Equipment 0.36 0.4 0.50 40 2 42 Nonstate 
4013 Communications Terminal Equipment 0.05 0.05 0.09 7 10 17 Non-SOE 
4014 Mobile Communications Equipment and Terminal Equipment 0.07 0.07 0.78 1 6 8 Non-SOE 
4019 Other Communication Equipment 0.02 0.03 0.09 21 7 28 Non-SOE 
4020 Radar Detectors and Auxiliary Apparatus 0.14 0.23 0.02 25 70 94 SOE-Local 
4031 Television and Radio Transmission Equipment 0.06 0.08 0.01 3 29 33 Non-SOE 
4032 Television and Radio Receiving equipment 0.02 0.02 0.05 2 4 6 Non-SOE 
4039 Applied TV Equipment and Other Audio-Video Equipment 0.06 0.06 0.02 0 8 8 Non-SOE 
4041 Computer Body 0.05 0.05 1.63 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
4042 Computer Network Equipment Manufacturing 0.06 0.06 0.07 0 4 4 Non-SOE 
4043 Computer Peripheral Equipment 0.02 0.02 1.13 2 4 5 Non-SOE 
4051 Vacuum Tubes 0.05 0.06 0.07 4 59 64 Local SOE 
4052 Semi-conductor Devices 0.02 0.02 0.10 0 11 11 Non-SOE 
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4053 Integrated Circuit 0.02 0.02 0.32 2 7 9 Non-SOE 
4059 Photovoltaic devices 0.02 0.02 0.64 4 17 21 Non-SOE 
4061 Electronic Components 0.01 0.01 1.12 1 11 12 Non-SOE 
4062 Bare Printed Circuit Board 0.02 0.02 0.37 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
4071 Household Video Equipment Manufacturing 0.04 0.04 0.56 4 39 43 Non-SOE 
4072 Household Audio Equipment Manufacturing 0.02 0.02 0.17 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
4090 Other Electronic Devices 0.01 0.02 0.21 1 12 12 Non-SOE 
4111 Instruments for Industrial Automation Control 0.01 0.01 0.22 11 17 28 Non-SOE 
4112 Electrical Instruments and Meters 0.01 0.01 0.03 7 5 12 Non-SOE 
4113 Drawing, Counting and Gauge Device 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 17 17 Non-SOE 
4114 Lab Instrument and Apparatus 0.03 0.03 0.02 2 9 11 Non-SOE 
4115 Experimental Machinery 0.05 0.05 0.01 2 6 8 Non-SOE 
4119 General Instrument, Meter Component Parts for Supply Manufacturing 0.05 0.05 0.08 1 3 4 Non-SOE 
4121 Environment Monitor Meter and Instrument 0.05 0.05 0.01 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
4122 Auto Instrument, and Other Meter 0.03 0.04 0.04 1 8 9 Non-SOE 
4123 Navigational, Meteorological and Marine Apparatus Manufacturing 0.05 0.09 0.02 41 22 63 Central SOE 
4124 Meter Apparatus for Farming, Forestry and Fishing 0.15 0.15 0.00 0 0 0 Nonstate 
4125 Geologic Prospecting, Earthquakes use Instrument 0.1 0.13 0.01 47 3 49 Nonstate 
4126 Teaching Apparatus 0.04 0.04 0.01 1 1 2 Non-SOE 
4127 Nucleon and Nuclear Radiation Measuring Apparatus 0.09 0.12 0.00 50 13 64 SOE-Central 
4128 Instrument for Measuring and Testing Electricity and Electrical Signals 0.03 0.03 0.03 14 5 19 Non-SOE 
4129 Other Special Used Apparatus 0.05 0.06 0.02 22 8 29 Non-SOE 
4130 Watch, Clock, and Counting Device 0.01 0.01 0.04 0 9 9 Non-SOE 
4141 Optical Instrument 0.04 0.06 0.08 30 10 39 Non-SOE 
4142 Glasses 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4151 Filming Machine 0.2 0.2 0.00 0 26 26 Nonstate 
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4152 Slide Projector and Overhead Projector 0.25 0.25 0.00 0 0 0 Nonstate 
4153 Camera Equipment 0.08 0.08 0.10 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4154 Copy and Offset Machine 0.07 0.1 0.08 1 3 4 Non-SOE 
4155 Electronic Calculator 0.07 0.07 0.04 0 15 15 Non-SOE 
4159 Other Stationery and Office Machine 0.13 0.13 0.01 1 0 1 Nonstate 
4190 Instrument, Meter and Repairing 0.02 0.02 0.01 1 6 7 Non-SOE 
4211 Carving 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 1 1 Non-SOE 
4212 Metal Handicraft 0.02 0.02 0.04 17 1 18 Non-SOE 
4213 Lacquerware 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4214 Artificial Flower and Painting 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4215 Natural Fiber 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4216 Drawwork and Embroidery 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4217 Carpet and Arras 0.01 0.01 0.05 0 5 5 Non-SOE 
4218 Jewellery and Silverware 0.02 0.03 0.19 0 7 7 Non-SOE 
4219 Other Craft 0 0 0.11 0 2 2 Non-SOE 
4221 Mirrors 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4222 Broom, Brush, and Mop 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4229 Other Various Household Supplies 0.01 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 Non-SOE 
4230 Coal Product 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 13 13 Non-SOE 
4290 All Other Non-listed Industry 0.01 0.07 0.07 45 9 54 Central SOE 
4310 Metal Waste and fragment Treatment and Processing 0.02 0.02 0.23 17 5 22 Non-SOE 
4320 Non-Metal Waste and fragment Treatment and Processing 0.01 0.01 0.03 2 7 9 Non-SOE 
4411 Thermal Power Generation 0 0.22 1.88 46 37 83 SOE-Central 
4412 Hydroelectric Power Generation 0.03 0.22 0.26 52 31 84 SOE-Central 
4413 Nuclear Electric Power Generation 0.21 1 0.05 100 0 100 SOE-Central 
4419 Other Power Industry 0.02 0.11 0.06 27 47 74 SOE-Local 
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4420 Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power 0.03 0.5 4.00 80 20 99 SOE-Central 
4430 Heating Power Production and Supply 0.01 0.04 0.17 7 62 70 Local SOE 
4500 Natural Gas Production and Distribution 0.02 0.03 0.35 1 67 68 Local SOE 
4610 Tap Water Production and Supply 0 0.04 0.15 0 82 83 Local SOE 
4620 Sewage Treatment and Regeneration 0.02 0.03 0.02 0 64 64 Local SOE 
4690 Other Sewage Treatment, Utilizing and Distribution 0.36 0.36 0.01 0 1 1 Nonstate 
English translation of four digit industry code from Beijing HL Consulting (2008) 
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Assets / Employee  
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals  1,361.6   757,928.9  936.3  265,620.0   2.9  
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 104.3   582,003.8  612.1  132,354.2   4.4  
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 965.5   548,771.6   1,591.9  193,365.2   2.8  
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 650.2   503,165.2  589.9  201,346.0   2.5  
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 512.8   472,825.7   2,448.5  167,135.4   2.8  
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers  73.9   317,158.3  172.7  226,155.2   1.4  
Manufacture of Transport Equipment  1,883.6   287,962.4   1,505.9  129,643.4   2.2  
Recycling and Disposal of Waste  5.5   280,909.1   73.2  226,051.9   1.2  
Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing  69.6   263,448.3  453.6   70,244.7   3.8  
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and Other Electronic Equipment 602.5   247,965.1  885.2   84,098.5   2.9  
Manufacture of Plastics  66.2   235,921.5   1,001.7  112,392.9   2.1  
Manufacture of Beverages 256.1   207,184.7  394.0  153,454.3   1.4  
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 179.6   203,786.2   1,745.9  149,454.7   1.4  
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 670.8   199,157.7   1,070.0  134,837.4   1.5  
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 633.6   192,762.0   2,172.7  126,287.6   1.5  
Manufacture of Rubber 107.9   192,103.8  311.6  145,346.6   1.3  
Manufacture of Foods 132.9   186,772.0  666.9  132,513.1   1.4  
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 400.7   184,042.9   1,859.3  114,298.9   1.6  
Manufacture of Medicines 305.0   183,895.1  439.0  169,435.1   1.1  
Manufacture of Metal Products 182.3   178,387.3   1,423.4  131,864.5   1.4  
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm and Straw Products  53.5   132,691.6  836.5   98,932.5   1.3  
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural Activity and Office Work 137.4   130,837.0  315.9  110,528.6   1.2  
Manufacture of Furniture  11.5   128,521.7  476.3   80,886.0   1.6  
Manufacture of Textile 252.1   118,072.2   2,729.4  105,060.1   1.1  
Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activities  11.7   83,931.6  247.5   62,189.9   1.3  
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products  6.5   71,384.6  842.2   49,456.2   1.4  
Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footware and Caps  73.4   42,425.1   1,510.7   50,442.2   0.8  
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 
  
261.1  138,571.4   - 
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Note NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2012. Fixed assets is the ‘Original Value of Fixed Assets’ less ‘Accumulated Depreciation’. Employees is the Average Annual 
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Appendix C: Regression results – SOEs in top percentile of manufacturing 
firms by fixed assets, by subsector (2011–2013) 
Dependent Variable 
 Log (Profit / Fixed 
Assets)  
 Log  
((Profit + 
Depreciation)  
/ Fixed Assets)  
 Log (Value Added / Fixed 
Assets)  
   
 Coef.   Prob.   Coef.   Prob.   Coef.  Prob. 
Constant  -2.28  0.00  -0.73  0.00  -0.22  0.00 
SOE x 1310 Corn Milling  -0.86  0.17  0.46  0.28  0.44  0.27 
SOE x 1320 Feed Processing  0.62  0.59  0.07  0.93  -0.14  0.85 
SOE x 1331 Edible Vegetable Oil Processing  -0.37  0.31  0.27  0.28  0.25  0.28 
SOE x 1340 Sugar Processing  0.18  0.76  -0.49  0.24  -0.22  0.57 
SOE x 1351 Livestock Slaughter  -0.73  0.28  0.63  0.18  1.41  0.00 
SOE x 1352 Poultry Slaughter  -1.06  0.12  0.13  0.79  0.78  0.07 
SOE x 1353 Meat Products and Their Sideline Products Processing  1.21  0.28  -0.01  0.99  0.22  0.75 
SOE x 1391 Starch, and Starch Products  -0.14  0.86  -0.40  0.48  -0.48  0.36 
SOE x 1399 Other Unlisted Agricultural and Sideline Foods Processing  -1.46  0.34  -1.31  0.22  -1.95  0.05 
SOE x 1440 Dairy Products  -0.41  0.44  0.43  0.23  0.66  0.05 
SOE x 1469 Other Condiments and Fermented Products  -1.57  0.06  -1.29  0.02  -0.46  0.39 
SOE x 1511 Alcohol  -2.92  0.00  -1.47  0.01  -1.30  0.01 
SOE x 1512 Liquor  0.79  0.03  1.07  0.00  1.02  0.00 
SOE x 1513 Beer  -1.42  0.00  0.02  0.96  0.45  0.13 
SOE x 1711 Cotton Yarn Processing  -1.40  0.00  -0.60  0.01  -0.49  0.02 
SOE x 1712 Cotton Processing  -2.30  0.04  -2.25  0.00  -2.21  0.00 
SOE x 1761 Knitted or Crocheted Fabric Weaving  -0.10  0.89  -0.49  0.32  -0.18  0.69 
SOE x 1783 Woven Belt and Curtain Cloth  -0.39  0.74  -0.94  0.25  -0.53  0.48 
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SOE x 2110 Wooden Furniture  -0.44  0.74  -0.79  0.39  -0.71  0.40 
SOE x 2211 Wooden Bamboo Pulp Manufacturing  1.21  0.23  0.85  0.22  0.29  0.64 
SOE x 2221 Machine-made Paper and Paperboard  -0.14  0.54  0.04  0.80  0.23  0.11 
SOE x 2319 Printing of Packaging and Upholstering  1.32  0.01  0.58  0.09  0.77  0.02 
SOE x 2520 Coking  -1.19  0.00  -0.88  0.00  -0.56  0.00 
SOE x 2611 Inorganic Acid  -1.09  0.34  -1.25  0.11  -1.24  0.08 
SOE x 2612 Inorganic Alkali  -1.24  0.00  -0.81  0.00  -0.56  0.00 
SOE x 2613 Inorganic Salt  -0.99  0.03  -1.06  0.00  -0.33  0.25 
SOE x 2614 Organic Chemical Materials  -0.24  0.15  -0.17  0.14  -0.05  0.66 
SOE x 2619 Other Basic Chemical Materials  0.34  0.34  0.48  0.05  0.78  0.00 
SOE x 2621 Nitrogenous Fertilizer  -0.25  0.23  -0.20  0.17  -0.01  0.95 
SOE x 2622 Phosphoric Fertilizer  -0.22  0.79  0.40  0.48  0.13  0.80 
SOE x 2623 Potassic Fertilizer  -0.48  0.52  -0.86  0.10  -0.59  0.22 
SOE x 2624 Compound or Mixed Fertilizers  -0.30  0.38  -0.24  0.32  -0.10  0.64 
SOE x 2631 Chemical Pesticides  0.04  0.91  0.34  0.25  0.37  0.17 
SOE x 2651 Primary-form Plastic and Synthetic Resin  -0.22  0.28  -0.33  0.02  -0.17  0.18 
SOE x 2652 Synthetic Rubber  -1.83  0.01  -1.45  0.00  -0.80  0.09 
SOE x 2653 Synthetic Fibre (Single Polymer)  0.13  0.75  -0.07  0.81  -0.02  0.95 
SOE x 2659 Other Synthetic Materials  -3.76  0.00  -2.20  0.00  -1.66  0.00 
SOE x 2661 Chemical Reagent and Catalysts  -1.18  0.15  -0.93  0.10  -0.20  0.70 
SOE x 2662 Chemical Products for Specific Purposes  -0.68  0.07  -0.46  0.07  0.08  0.74 
SOE x 2664 Informational Chemical Products  -0.43  0.28  -0.23  0.40  -0.12  0.62 
SOE x 2671 Explosives and Pyrotechnics Manufacturing  -1.94  0.00  -0.78  0.09  -0.36  0.40 
SOE x 2710 Chemical Medicine Materials  -0.56  0.06  -0.38  0.06  -0.20  0.28 
SOE x 2720 Chemical Medicine Dose  -1.35  0.00  -1.10  0.00  -0.98  0.00 
SOE x 2740 Proprietary Chinese Medicines Production  -0.38  0.31  -0.19  0.45  0.15  0.52 
SOE x 2760 Biopharmaceuticals Manufacturing  0.05  0.93  0.07  0.87  0.10  0.78 
SOE x 2770 Sanitation Materials and Medical Articles  0.89  0.23  0.75  0.15  0.70  0.14 
SOE x 2812 Man-made Fibre (Fibre Material)  0.31  0.35  -0.21  0.34  0.05  0.79 
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SOE x 2826 Spandex Fiber  -0.26  0.71  0.24  0.63  0.33  0.47 
SOE x 2911 Tyre Production  -0.76  0.00  -0.49  0.00  -0.15  0.31 
SOE x 2921 Plastic Film  -0.37  0.56  -0.42  0.34  -0.12  0.76 
SOE x 2922 Plastic Board, Pipeline and Shaped Products  -1.10  0.03  -0.42  0.23  0.02  0.96 
SOE x 3011 Cement  0.23  0.05  0.11  0.16  0.13  0.09 
SOE x 3021 Cement Products  -0.56  0.44  0.04  0.94  0.39  0.40 
SOE x 3041 Flat Glass  -1.19  0.04  -0.32  0.42  -0.08  0.83 
SOE x 3052 Optical Glass  -0.20  0.78  -0.03  0.95  -0.21  0.64 
SOE x 3061 Glass Fibre and Its Products  -0.61  0.16  0.03  0.91  0.22  0.43 
SOE x 3072 Special Ceramics  -1.70  0.14  -2.13  0.01  -1.95  0.01 
SOE x 3091 Graphite and Carbon Products  0.40  0.46  0.02  0.96  -0.10  0.78 
SOE x 3110 Iron Smelting  -1.58  0.00  -0.57  0.05  -0.33  0.21 
SOE x 3120 Steel Smelting  -1.12  0.00  -0.35  0.05  0.02  0.89 
SOE x 3130 Ferrous Metal Casting  -1.47  0.01  -0.22  0.54  0.02  0.96 
SOE x 3140 Steel Pressing  -1.20  0.00  -0.71  0.00  -0.43  0.00 
SOE x 3150 Smelting of Ferroalloy  0.50  0.31  0.48  0.16  0.57  0.07 
SOE x 3211 Copper Smelting  0.33  0.49  0.52  0.11  0.20  0.51 
SOE x 3212 Lead & Zinc Smelting  -1.10  0.02  -0.82  0.01  -0.53  0.08 
SOE x 3213 Nickel & Cobalt Smelting  -1.34  0.11  -0.90  0.12  -1.04  0.05 
SOE x 3215 Antimony Smelting  3.85  0.01  0.87  0.41  1.55  0.11 
SOE x 3216 Aluminium Smelting  -0.56  0.05  -0.56  0.00  -0.34  0.06 
SOE x 3219 Smelting of Other Common-used Non-ferrous Metals  -3.58  0.00  -0.78  0.35  0.14  0.86 
SOE x 3221 
 
 1.13  0.05  0.65  0.11  0.55  0.14 
SOE x 3240 Non-ferrous Metal Alloy  0.62  0.31  0.06  0.89  -0.01  0.98 
SOE x 3261 Copper Rolling Processing  -0.86  0.03  -0.87  0.00  -0.20  0.43 
SOE x 3262 Aluminum Rolling Processing  -1.89  0.00  -1.16  0.00  -0.48  0.04 
SOE x 3312 Metal Doors and Windows  -3.20  0.01  -1.34  0.10  -0.70  0.35 
SOE x 3340 Metal Thread, Rope and Their Products  -1.38  0.04  -1.60  0.00  -0.92  0.03 
SOE x 3399 
 
 -0.37  0.58  0.27  0.55  0.46  0.27 
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SOE x 3411 Boiler and Its Auxiliary Equipment  0.70  0.58  1.59  0.07  1.35  0.09 
SOE x 3412 Internal Combustion Engines and Its Fittings  0.61  0.09  0.39  0.11  0.44  0.05 
SOE x 3421 Metal-cutting Machine Tools  0.03  0.96  0.18  0.65  0.05  0.89 
SOE x 3429 Other Metal-processing Machines  -1.41  0.11  -0.19  0.75  1.02  0.07 
SOE x 3431 Light-small Lifting Equipment Manufacturing  1.38  0.24  1.72  0.03  1.16  0.12 
SOE x 3432 Crane Manufacturing  -0.85  0.12  -0.38  0.31  -0.31  0.38 
SOE x 3435 Elevators, Escalators and Lifts Manufacturing  -0.21  0.81  0.60  0.33  0.67  0.24 
SOE x 3441 Pump and Vacuum Equipment  -1.15  0.25  -0.21  0.76  0.53  0.40 
SOE x 3442 Gas Compressors  -0.33  0.52  -0.46  0.18  -0.38  0.23 
SOE x 3451 Axletree  -0.87  0.16  -0.30  0.48  0.49  0.21 
SOE x 3463 Gas- and Liquid-separating, and Purifying Equipment  -2.14  0.09  -1.67  0.05  -0.68  0.39 
SOE x 3464 Freezing and Air-conditioning Equipment  0.26  0.68  0.44  0.30  0.40  0.31 
SOE x 3484 Mechanical Parts Manufacture  -0.94  0.42  -1.07  0.18  -1.03  0.16 
SOE x 3490 Other Ordinary Equipment  -1.59  0.02  -1.19  0.01  -0.53  0.20 
SOE x 3511 Mining Machinery Manufacturing  -0.71  0.10  -0.55  0.07  -0.35  0.21 
SOE x 3512 Petroleum Extraction Equipment  -0.77  0.13  -0.48  0.17  0.10  0.75 
SOE x 3513 Machines of Construction Engineering  -0.70  0.08  -0.41  0.13  -0.40  0.11 
SOE x 3514 Marine Engineering Equipment Manufacturing  0.02  0.98  0.31  0.47  0.39  0.33 
SOE x 3515 Machinery of Producing Construction Materials  0.11  0.94  0.99  0.28  1.51  0.07 
SOE x 3516 Metallurgical Equipment  0.36  0.75  0.28  0.72  0.76  0.28 
SOE x 3546 Equipment for Glass, Ceramics and Porcelain Enamel Products Manufacture  -2.17  0.03  -2.03  0.00  -2.09  0.00 
SOE x 3562 Equipment for Electronic Industry  -0.82  0.29  -0.27  0.61  -0.28  0.56 
SOE x 3571 Tractor  -0.54  0.55  0.17  0.78  1.07  0.06 
SOE x 3599 Other Special Equipment  1.55  0.06  1.52  0.01  1.20  0.02 
SOE x 3610 Integrated Automobiles  -0.02  0.91  0.10  0.35  0.25  0.01 
SOE x 3620 Refitted Automobiles  0.10  0.86  -0.21  0.60  0.02  0.95 
SOE x 3660 Auto Parts and Fittings  0.01  0.95  0.05  0.70  0.24  0.06 
SOE x 3713 Railway Engines Fittings  -1.73  0.00  -0.85  0.03  -0.30  0.39 
SOE x 3731 Metal Ships  -0.61  0.00  -0.43  0.00  -0.30  0.02 
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SOE x 3734 Matching Equipment for Ships  -2.12  0.01  -0.84  0.14  -0.22  0.68 
SOE x 3735 Ship Conversion and Demolition  1.85  0.03  0.93  0.10  0.66  0.21 
SOE x 3741 
 
 -3.10  0.00  -1.25  0.00  -0.68  0.07 
SOE x 3751 Integrated Motorcycle  -0.02  0.99  0.25  0.75  0.36  0.62 
SOE x 3811 Dynamo and Dynamo Group  -1.27  0.00  -0.50  0.04  -0.01  0.98 
SOE x 3812 Electromotor  0.47  0.60  0.49  0.43  0.91  0.11 
SOE x 3821 Transformers, Rectifiers and Inductances  0.01  0.99  0.20  0.71  -0.09  0.86 
SOE x 3823 Supply-electricity Switches Equipment  -0.80  0.19  -0.30  0.48  0.30  0.43 
SOE x 3825 PV Equipment and Components Manufacturing  -0.80  0.08  -0.78  0.01  -1.02  0.00 
SOE x 3829 Other Transmitting and Controlling Electricity Equipment  0.38  0.70  1.54  0.02  1.97  0.00 
SOE x 3831 Wires and Cables Manufacturing  0.58  0.30  0.40  0.30  0.38  0.29 
SOE x 3832 Optical Fibre and Cable  0.72  0.29  0.38  0.42  0.27  0.53 
SOE x 3841 Lithium-ion Battery Manufacturing  -0.42  0.54  -0.52  0.27  -0.31  0.48 
SOE x 3849 Other Battery Manufacturing  0.58  0.51  0.00  1.00  0.18  0.75 
SOE x 3851 Home Electric Freezing Appliances  -1.42  0.03  -0.35  0.44  -0.07  0.86 
SOE x 3852 Home Electric Air conditioning  0.77  0.11  1.43  0.00  1.22  0.00 
SOE x 3855 Home Electric Cleaning Appliances  -1.02  0.26  -0.32  0.61  0.03  0.96 
SOE x 3861 Fuel Gas, Solar Energy and Similar Energy Appliances Manufacturing  -0.55  0.47  0.38  0.47  0.02  0.97 
SOE x 3911 Computer Machine Manufacturing  -0.16  0.74  -0.08  0.81  -0.11  0.71 
SOE x 3912 Computer Parts and Components Manufacturing  1.34  0.10  0.64  0.25  0.18  0.73 
SOE x 3913 Computer Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing  0.22  0.73  0.01  0.98  0.19  0.62 
SOE x 3921 Communication System Equipment Manufacturing  -0.18  0.69  -0.32  0.32  -0.49  0.10 
SOE x 3953 Television Recording and Playing Equipment Manufacturing  -1.65  0.14  -0.20  0.80  0.28  0.69 
SOE x 3963 Integrated Circuit  0.24  0.67  -0.27  0.48  -0.37  0.30 
SOE x 3969 Photoelectron Parts and Other Electronic Parts  -0.20  0.36  -0.31  0.04  -0.52  0.00 
SOE x 3971 Electronic Components and Sets  -0.16  0.75  -0.25  0.47  -0.10  0.76 
SOE x 3972 Circuit Printing  0.54  0.40  0.09  0.84  0.25  0.53 
SOE x 3990 Other Electronic Equipment  -1.63  0.14  -1.81  0.02  -0.94  0.18 
SOE x 4011 Industrial Automatic Control System Equipment  -0.89  0.44  -0.36  0.65  0.07  0.93 
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SOE x 4343 
 
 -0.57  0.47  -0.00  1.00  0.13  0.79 
 
Province Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y  
 
 
4-Digit Subsector Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y  
 
 
Year Fixed Effects Y    Y    Y  
 
 
Observations  5,287     5,287     5,287  
 
 
R-squared  0.23     0.27     0.32  
 
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.18     0.23     0.28  
 
English translation of four digit industry code from China Data Online (All China Marketing Research, 2018) 
